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Abstract 
 
St. Louis County, Missouri is a fragmented suburban area, covering 
505 square miles, with ninety separate municipalities.  Fifty-six municipalities 
maintain in-house police departments, while thirty-four contract police 
services from other governments.  Previous research concerning 
interjurisdictional collaboration efforts has been rooted in the rational choice 
theory.  However, the rational choice theory alone does not explain why some 
municipalities do or do not enter into contracts for police services.  The 
purpose of this work is to examine police contracting decisions in St. Louis 
County, specifically the drivers behind contracting discussions and decisions 
in five sample municipalities in St. Louis County.  The five case studies were 
examined utilizing theories from the policy process literature, namely 
focusing events and changes in image and venue.  Decisions were also 
examined utilizing Wilson’s typology of police styles.  Of the case studies that 
resulted in a police contract, a change in both venue and image occurred.  In 
the case studies that did not result in a police contract, a change in image and 
venue related to matters of policing did not occur.  Therefore, it was 
determined that changes in image and venue as well as a focusing event on 
police were necessary for successful decisions to contract police services. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 St. Louis County is a patchwork of municipalities that, like a true 
patchwork quilt, vary in shape, size, and community fabric.  Despite the 
differences in these municipalities, each community strives to protect its 
citizens through police services.  The way in which these municipalities 
provide police services is just as much of a patchwork as the myriad of 
municipalities.  Some municipalities maintain their own police departments 
while others contract police services from the County or another 
municipality.  The purpose of this work is to examine police contracting 
decisions in St. Louis County, specifically, the drivers behind contracting 
discussions and decisions in five sample municipalities in St. Louis County.  
The question of contracting decisions touches on matters of efficiency, police-
community relations, as well as justice and fairness. 
Agreements between governments may be made informally, through 
formalized networks, voluntarily created, or mandated by an outside party.  
Mandated agreements may be required by legislative bodies.  In St. Louis 
County, contractual agreements for police services are formal agreements 
created voluntarily between governments.  Formal agreements have been 
described as “transactions that require financial transfers [that are] 
usually…formalized in order to protect property rights of the participating 
governments” (Andrew 2009, 134).  Legally binding agreements are 
important to delineate responsibilities and to ensure that financial 
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commitments and responsibilities are met. 
Lakewood Plan 
 Lakewood, California was one of the first examples of a municipality 
that contracted all of its municipal services with another government.  In 
1954, Lakewood incorporated to stave off annexation by Long Beach, a 
neighboring municipality.  Lakewood utilized contractual agreements to 
avoid start-up and maintenance costs of standard municipal bureaucracies 
(Miller 1981).  Lakewood maintained its legislative governing functions, 
which included responsibilities such as budgeting, finance, planning, and 
policy formation, while contracting municipal services, such as police, fire, 
and trash services.  This model became known as the “Lakewood Plan.”  The 
Lakewood Plan provided a road map for municipalities to contract services 
production traditionally reserved as a responsibility of the provisioning 
municipality (Jamison and Bigger 1957). 
 The police services provided to Lakewood represent a standardized 
service delivery model.  Services are standardized because the provider, the 
County Sheriff’s Department in this case, maintains a set of uniform 
standards that apply to police practices (Mehay 1979, 61).  Under the 
Lakewood Plan the Sheriff’s Department developed a unitized method 
through which police services were offered.  An example of a defined unit 
was a police-car-on-continuous-patrol with the associated auxiliary services 
provided (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 839).  The Lakewood Plan also 
	 6	
provided an example of standardized police services provided to a 
municipality by a contracted agency and an example of how to provide police 
service with unitized methodology. 
 The Lakewood Plan is important to any discussion of contractual 
agreements for the provision of municipal law enforcement services because 
the plan has been successful.  Lakewood was the first municipality to contract 
police services from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Department 2009, 5).  Today, the Sheriff’s Department still 
provides police services to the City of Lakewood.  The Sheriff’s Department 
provides police services for forty-two of the eighty-eight municipalities 
within Los Angeles County (personal interview, September 11, 2015).  One 
former ranking member of the St. Louis County Police Department pointed 
out that the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department program was an example for 
St. Louis County officials on how to effectively implement and manage 
municipal police contracts (personal interview, June 9, 2014). 
Why Understanding Police Contracting is Important 
 The state provides police services as a public good for order 
maintenance.  A pure public good is non-rival and non-excludable.  Non-rival 
means that the consumption of the good by one consumer does not diminish 
the ability of another consumer to utilize the good.  Non-exclusion means that 
it is impossible to prevent people from using the good, even those who may 
not be paying for the good (i.e. free-riders).  When a public good is both non-
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rival and non-exclusionary then it is known as “pure.”  However, most public 
goods—such as police services—are not pure (Hirsch 1970 and Hardin 1982).  
Police services are rivalrous, therefore, they are not pure.  Traffic on a 
freeway is commonly used as an example to explain rival goods.  As traffic 
increases, the ability for drivers to fully enjoy the benefits of the freeway is 
lessened (e.g., the creation of traffic jams).  Similarly, police service is rival 
because as calls for service increase, the benefits available to other citizens 
decrease.  For example, during times of high call volume, pro-active patrols 
decrease and response times increase.  Therefore, as police utilization 
increases, benefits decrease. 
 Police services may be rival, but they are not exclusionary.  Service 
exclusion is generally referred to in the context of the “free rider” problem; 
that is, can those who do not pay for goods or services be excluded from their 
use.  Free riders are often a problem when the ability of others seeking to 
utilize the good or service is diminished.  While some police services may be 
excluded (e.g., alarm calls), police services are not excluded from free riders 
(e.g., citizens who don’t pay their taxes or those without legal status in the 
United States).  Understanding the provisioning of police services is 
important because these decisions impact the actual day-to-day operations of 
police services.  For example, a department with more resources may be able 
to handle increased demands for service, thus reducing issues of rival 
consumption.  Utilizing this example, if a small municipal police agency was 
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merged into a larger police agency, the larger police agency may be able to 
better meet increased demands for police service. 
 Police departments and the local governments that support these 
departments may also benefit from economies of scale and division of labor.  
Economies of scale arise from an increased production of a product (in this 
case policing), which leads to a decrease in the cost to produce the product.  
Police departments may benefit from economies of scale because one large 
department may have increased bargaining power with outside vendors and 
contractors (e.g. uniform supply companies).  Large departments may also 
operate more efficiently because the cost to operate the department is spread 
out over a larger group of citizens who pay less for the department.  An 
increase in revenues dedicated to police services leads to a greater resource 
pool than those available to smaller agencies operated by smaller 
communities.  Division of labor is also important to police services.  When 
labor is divided, there are certain individuals who work in specialized tasks.  
For example, a large police agency may have dedicated units for evidence 
collection and processing crime scenes.  Small agencies, lacking the size to 
divide labor and provide specialization may require an unspecialized patrol 
officer to handle crime scene processing.  A police official from the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department pointed to economies of scale as a 
factor which influenced contracting in Los Angeles County (personal 
interview, September 11, 2015).   
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Provisioning, Production, and Street Level Bureaucrats 
 Roger B. Parks and Ronald J. Oakerson studied service production in St. 
Louis, MO and Allegheny County, PA.  Parks and Oakerson make a 
distinction between providers of services and the producers of services.  They 
define providers as those that “make decisions about whether to make a 
service available through public means and, if so, the quality and quantity of 
service to make available; how funding will be obtained; and select the 
appropriate unit(s) to produce the service” (Parks and Oakerson 1993, 23).  
They then define producers as “[those that] transform resource inputs into 
service outputs” (Parks and Oakerson 1993, 23).  The authors also note that 
municipalities may elect production of services be carried out through 
contractual arrangements. 
 Werner Z. Hirsch provided a similar distinction in his work on local 
versus area wide government services.  Hirsch distinguished between 
rendering and financing.  Rendering refers to the actual physical production 
of the service while financing refers to actually raising funds to meet the 
expenditures of physical production (Hirsh 1964, 332).   
 These authors make a division between providers and producers of 
public goods and services.  This application could be explained utilizing an 
example from a municipality that contracts police service production.  The 
City of Fenton contracts police service from St. Louis County; Fenton 
provisions that police service should be provided, allocates funds for police 
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services and then decides how police service is going to be provided (contract 
with the County).  The St. Louis County Police Department carries out the 
actual physical production of police services.  As one author articulated, the 
concept of provisioning and production allowed public choice theory a 
distinction between government and governance (Howell-Moroney 2008, 99). 
 The concepts of production and provision have been defined separately, 
but many governments do both.  However, in real world situations, the two 
intersect with one another in complex ways.  In the example of a municipality 
contracting with the St. Louis County Police, the police—acting as the 
producer—have an impact on decisions of quality and quantity as well as the 
appropriate unit(s) of service production.  Standardized policies and 
procedures outline how police officers function within the St. Louis County 
Police Department.  If the outlined standardized procedures are not followed, 
the County Police investigates those infractions and takes appropriate action.  
The contracting municipality has no say in the standards or quality set for 
County Police personnel.  Additionally, the County Police have control over 
policing methods employed in contract municipalities. The St. Louis County 
Police can also recommend the quantity of police officers that are necessary to 
police a contract municipality.  In this case, it is clear that the producers are 
impacting the decisions of the providers. 
Raymond G. Hunt and John M. Magenau discuss the role of the police 
chief in their book, Power and the Police Chief.  They distinguish two types of 
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police chiefs, the local versus the cosmopolitan police chief.  This distinction 
is important because when a municipality contracts with a larger agency, 
such as the County Police, the municipality trades a local police chief for a 
more cosmopolitan police chief.  The authors define a local chief’s viewpoint, 
“The chief’s function…was, in short, to preserve and advance customary 
concepts and instruments of the police role in society” (Hunt and Magenau 
1993, 48).  The authors then define the modern chief: 
The modern police chief…is now at least widely 
conceived on an external or cosmopolitan theory, 
the model of public administration—that is, as an 
instrumentally rational manager responsible for 
preserving the public’s strategic interests and for 
ensuring the efficient use of public resources to 
those ends (Hunt and Magenau 1993, 48). 
 
Hunt and Magenau differentiate between styles of police leadership and 
command.  When a municipality contracts police services, the leadership of 
policing changes.  The styles associated with police leadership are important 
and do have consequences on the day-to-day operations of the police. 
 The administrators of police departments, such as St. Louis County are 
not the only police representatives influencing policy decisions.  Michael 
Lipsky argues that police officers themselves make policy decisions.  Lipsky 
defines a police officer as a street-level bureaucrat.  He defines street-level 
bureaucrats as “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in 
the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution 
of their work” (Lipsky 1980, 3).  Lipsky argues that street-level bureaucrats 
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make policy because they have high degrees of discretion and relative 
autonomy from organizational authority.  The individual police officer 
therefore impacts the quality and quantity of police services he/she provides.  
For example, a police officer can determine if enforcement action should or 
should not be taken.  This discretionary authority removes the ultimate 
power of policy makers from those that provision services.  The police officer 
is a part of the production model, but the lines are blurred and the police 
officer makes decisions traditionally reserved for the provider. 
 The blurred lines between production and provision as well as the role 
of street-level bureaucrats impact the decisions that are made with regard to 
policing decisions.  It stands to reason that if a municipality changes who 
handles police services, then there will be broad effects on the community. 
Community Impacts 
 The determination by municipalities on the method by which police 
services will be provided has an impact on the affected community.  There 
can be many impacts, but a few are worth discussing to illustrate the 
importance of these decisions on communities.  Impacts can include social 
class and racial segregation, victim reporting, community knowledge of 
police officers, irregular service provision, and control and usage of assets. 
 The theory of social stratification-government inequality thesis explains 
that fragmentation within local governments leads to social class and racial 
segregation.  Richard Hill found that this segregation frequently left 
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individuals with the most needs within the population in areas with meager 
fiscal resources (1974, 1567).  This means that areas that may need greater 
police services may not have the fiscal resources to provide them, or the 
police services provided may be inadequate or ill-equipped to handle the 
problems of the community.  On the other hand, it has been argued that these 
communities could have the opportunity to fashion service providers in a 
manner that better represents the needs and desires of the community 
(Jimenez and Hendrick 2010, 262).  The decisions that community leaders 
make when it comes to police service providers may reflect the choices of the 
local community, the inability for the community to provide adequate police 
services due to insufficient funding sources, or a desire to bring in an outside 
agency to leverage economies of scale. 
 Victimization and knowledge of policeman have been associated with 
police agency size.  One analysis has suggested that citizens in smaller 
independent communities expect greater police follow-up and investigation 
after reporting a crime (Ostrom and Whitaker 1973, 64).  Citizens in 
communities with local police control may expect greater police follow-up 
due to a higher likelihood of knowing locally controlled and provided police 
officers (Ostrom and Whitaker 1973, 66). 
 When police services are provided by independent smaller communities 
there is an increase in irregular police services.  Regular service providers are 
those that provide services frequently while irregular service providers 
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provide services infrequently and only as needed (Ostrom, Parks, and 
Whitaker 1974, 91).  In St. Louis County, a municipality may provide police 
services, but rely on St. Louis County for processing major crime scenes.  In 
this example, the municipality would be the regular service provider while 
the County would be an irregular service provider.  When a municipality 
contracts police service from the County, the County becomes the regular 
service provider, thus reducing the need for irregular service providers 
because the County police will provide the services they once provided 
irregularly as a part of the regularly provided services. 
 The last example of a community impact based on contracting decisions 
concerns asset specificity.  When a municipality contracts police services they 
lose the in-house capability of providing that service.  Once in-house 
capability is lost, start-up costs can become a barrier preventing 
recommencement of in-house services.  The establishment of a barrier may 
put the contractor in a position to take advantage of the contracting entity if 
sufficient competition and compensation is not agreed upon (Kavanagh and 
Parker 1999, 3). 
The St. Louis Example 
 Understanding police contracting decisions is particularly important in 
St. Louis County, which consists of a myriad of municipalities.  Police service 
provision and production has not only been the topic of many news articles, 
but a topic of discussion within the community for some time.  For example, 
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the St. Louis Post-Dispatch published a series of articles in late 2003 discussing 
problems surrounding small police agencies within St. Louis County 
(Ratcliffe and Howard 2003).  In late 2011, the same paper, published an op-
ed piece wherein the editors encouraged small police departments in the 
County to contract with the County Police (St. Louis Post-Dispatch Editorial 
Board 2011).  After the disappearance of a Breckenridge Hills resident in 2013, 
another editorial was published condemning the effectiveness of small police 
departments in St. Louis County (St. Louis Post-Dispatch Editorial Board 
2013).  Questions of police provisioning and contracting have always been on 
the radar in St. Louis County, but a recent event in Ferguson brought policing 
matters to the forefront of the public conscience.   
 On August 9, 2014, the attention of the St. Louis community was jolted 
to matters of policing, municipal governance, as well as the impact of history 
and shifting demographics on municipalities within St. Louis County.  A 
police shooting on that date and the ensuing response from government 
leaders and citizens served as a focusing event that put the issue of police 
reform and police contracting squarely in the public agenda.   
 The incident occurred in Ferguson when a municipal police officer on 
patrol encountered two young males walking down the street.  The officer, 
investigating a robbery, stopped to speak with the two.  An altercation took 
place between one of the males and the police officer leading to the officers 
use of deadly force against one of the males, who was unarmed.  Following 
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the shooting, rioting broke out in Ferguson and nearby communities, which 
was met with a heavy police response.  The grand jury investigating the facts 
of the incident, as well as a separate probe by agencies within the Department 
of Justice, found there was not enough probable cause for an indictment of 
the officer.  The release of the grand jury decision was met with a new round 
of demonstrations. 
 The incident in Ferguson acted as a catalyst that thrust policing onto the 
public agenda.  Media outlets, government and civic leaders, and everyday 
citizens began discussing how municipalities police themselves.  Questions 
concerned everything from police officers wearing body cameras to concerns 
that police department demographics should reflect community 
demographics.  These concerns were not only raised in St. Louis, but 
nationally. 
   Ferguson raised concerns about the interaction of place, race, and 
socio-economic factors on policing and the criminal justice system.  Place has 
always mattered, some municipalities in St. Louis County incorporated in 
efforts to maintain demographic homogeneity.  Andrea S. Boyles recently 
published a study focused on the experiences of African Americans with the 
police in the Meacham Park area of Kirkwood.  Boyles’ work emphasized the 
role place and race has on interactions with.  She concludes that place does 
matter and, in the Kirkwood case, there is a disparity between policing tactics 
used with poor minorities and those of white residents (Boyles 2015, 189).  
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While Boyles’ work focused on Kirkwood, the same themes of place, race, 
and policing were raised after Ferguson. 
 Ferguson also raised concerns that small municipal police departments 
provided inadequate police services that lacked professionalism and 
community relations.  Concerns of the misuse of the municipal court system 
as a revenue generator for municipalities was also raised and will be 
discussed more in the next chapter.  The discussion following the events in 
Ferguson made policing topics, to include questions of contracting decisions, 
even more important to the St. Louis region.  Police contracting can and does 
change on the ground policies that impact police-citizen interactions. 
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Chapter 2 
Policing St. Louis County 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine police contracting 
decisions.  However, it is imperative to understand the landscape within 
which these contracting decisions are made and the landscape of policing in 
St. Louis County.  St. Louis County is located in the eastern part of Missouri.  
The County had a population of 998,954 in 2010.  The County is 70.3 percent 
white, 23.7 percent black or African American, and 6 percent of the 
population is from other ethnic groups.  The County is made up of a little less 
than 508 square miles of land.  The median household income is $58,485 and 
it is estimated that 10.5 percent of the residents are below the poverty level 
(US Census Bureau, 2014).  In recent years, the County has seen a decrease in 
the total number of Type I crimes, as defined by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) (Chart 2.1).  
 As of December 2015, the County had one County-wide law 
enforcement agency (i.e., St. Louis County Police), fifty-six municipal police 
agencies, and thirty-four municipalities that contract police services with 
another police agency (Table 2.1 and 2.2).  St. Louis County is also host to 
several specialized police agencies. 
St. Louis County Police Department 
 Prior to the formation of the current County Police Department, St. 
Louis County relied on an elected sheriff’s department and constabulary to 
provide law enforcement services to the County.  A series of scandals rocked 
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the Sheriff’s Department in the early 1950’s.  In July of 1953 a citizens’ 
committee began to study the issue of law enforcement in the County.  In 
1954, the commission recommended the County should establish a 
professional police agency, which would assume all law enforcement powers 
and duties of the Sheriff’s Department and the constabulary.   County citizens 
soon voted to enact the committee’s recommendation and the Department 
was established on July 1, 1955.  The charter enacting the new Department 
also allowed for police contracting services.  In the years since the 
Department’s inception, it has grown and changed into a professional 
modern agency.  The allowance within the charter for police contracting 
services foreshadowed an agency that would provide a number of 
municipalities with police services by way of contracts. 
 The County Police Department has undergone significant changes 
since its inception in 1954.  In recent years, the County Police Department has 
published annual reports that provide valuable insights into the workings of 
the Department and descriptive statistics to understand how the Department 
has changed in recent years.  From 2005 to 2014, County Police expenditures 
increased by 50 percent, increasing yearly.  Over the same period of time, the 
authorized strength of the Department increased as well, showing a 13 
percent increase on balance.  In 2014, the County Police had a total force 
strength authorization of 855.  Recent trends indicate the Department’s 
budget and manpower strength will continue to increase. 
	 20	
 Since its establishment, the St. Louis County Police Department has 
grown into a professional organization.  It was accredited by The 
Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) 
on November 21, 1998 and was reaccredited on November 21, 2013 (CALEA, 
2014).   
Municipal Police Agencies 
 The majority of municipalities in St. Louis County are served by 
municipal police services provided directly by the municipality.  These 
agencies serve small municipalities and large municipalities.  The smallest 
municipality with its own police agency is Kinloch, 2010 population of 298, 
while Florissant, 2010 population of 52,158, represents the largest 
municipality served by its own police agency.  From 2003 to 2010, the County 
Police conducted an annual survey of municipal departments; however, 
participation in the survey was at the discretion of each individual 
municipality.  In 2015, following the events of Ferguson, Better Together, 
initiated an effort to collect data on police agencies in St. Louis County.  The 
data was published in an April 2015 report titled, Police Report #1: Regional 
Overview. The data collected from these surveys represent the best data sets 
available regarding municipal police agencies within St. Louis County.   
 In 2015, the respondent municipalities had an average of twenty-nine 
full-time officers.  The average annual pay for a municipal police officer in the 
County was $48,773, while the average annual pay for a County police officer 
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was $48,248.  Of the respondents, the municipality with the lowest average 
police officer salary was Velda City, which reported an average annual salary 
of $26,808; the highest average police officer salary was reported by 
Brentwood, at $70,341 annually (Better Together 2015).  In the last annual 
survey conducted by the County Police, Kinloch reported the lowest average 
salary while Brentwood reported the highest average salary (St. Louis County 
2010).  The difference in police officer salaries provides an illustration of the 
differences in the resources municipalities have to fund police services. 
 Municipal resources are also reflected in reported police budgets 
(Chart 2.2).  Of the 2015 respondents, the lowest police budget per capita was 
Glendale, which reported a per capita police budget of $184.06; while the 
highest was Edmundson, which reported a per capita police budget of $1,138.  
Budget figures provide another illustration of the differences in municipal 
resources for police services. 
Contracted Municipal Police Services 
 Approximately 100,000 citizens are served by an outside police agency 
contracted by their municipality for police services.  Of those citizens, the 
majority are served by County Police.  Later in this study, three will be 
examined in depth.  In this section, other municipalities will be examined to 
provide the reader with an understanding of municipal police contracting in 
St. Louis County. 
 In St. Louis County, municipalities with the smallest populations 
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contract more than municipalities with the largest populations (Table 2.3).  
Twenty-two of the thirty smallest municipalities in the County contract police 
services.  Of the thirty largest municipalities in the County, only two contract 
police services. 
 The majority of municipalities in St. Louis County do not employee a 
professional city manager or administrator.  Municipalities that do not 
employee a city manager or administrator have a higher rate of contracting 
than do municipalities with a professional manager (Table 2.4).  Twenty-eight 
of the fifty-five municipalities without professional management contract 
police services, while six of the thirty-five municipalities with a professional 
manager contract police services. 
 Municipalities in St. Louis County differ in their racial make-up, some 
are predominantly minority while others are almost exclusively white.  
Predominantly minority municipalities, those with a white population of less 
than fifteen percent, contract at about the same rate as do municipalities that 
are majority white (those with a white population greater than eighty-five 
percent) (Table 2.5). 
 In the 2010 census, Kinloch was listed as having the lowest median 
household income at $19,231, while Country Life Acres had the highest 
median household income at $212,500.  If the municipalities of St. Louis 
County were divided equally into thirds, the municipalities with the lowest 
median household income contract police services less than those 
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municipalities in the middle range and those with the highest median 
household income (Table 2.6). 
 Municipalities in St. Louis County receive a large share of revenue 
from a countywide one-cent sales tax.  Cities may be divided into three types 
of cities: point-of-sale cities, pool cities, and a hybrid of the two.  Point-of-sale 
cities retain all of the sales tax generated in their communities.  Pool cities, 
share sales tax revenues on a per capita basis.  Hybrid cities are mostly point-
of-sale cities, but the cities have annexed land after 1984, the annexed land 
area remains in the sales tax pool.  Pool cities have a higher rate of contracting 
than do point-of-sale and hybrid cities.  Fifty-four percent of pool cities 
contract police services, compared with ten percent and nineteen percent of 
point-of-sale respectively (Table 2.7). 
 The descriptive statistics presented above represent characteristics of 
municipalities that have chosen to contract police services versus those that 
have an in-house police department.  The section below, will examine the 
agencies that provide police services via contract. 
Municipal Police Providers 
 In north St. Louis County, the municipalities of Maryland Heights, 
Normandy, and Vinita Park provide police services to neighboring 
municipalities.  Maryland Heights provides police services to Champ. At 
present, Normandy is the largest municipal police contractor.  Normandy 
provides police services to Bellerive, Cool Valley, Glen Echo Park, Greendale, 
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and Pasadena Park.  Champ began contracting police services in 2005 and 
initially paid Maryland Heights $15,000 a year to police the village of sixteen 
people (“Trustees Want More Time to Put Together New Budget” 1996).   
Cool Valley dissolved its police department in 2013 in an effort to save 
money.  Cool Valley reached an agreement with Normandy in which the 
patrol cars used to patrol Cool Valley would bear the logo of Cool Valley 
(Hampel 2013).  In June of 2015, Vinita Park founded the North County Police 
Cooperative and began providing police services to Wellston.  In October of 
2015 the North County Police Cooperative began policing Charlack. 
 Beverly Hills currently provides police services to Velda Village Hills, 
a municipality of approximately 1,055 citizens.  Velda Village Hills had a 
contract with the County Police at one time, but in 1998, the village decided to 
sign a contract with Beverly Hills for police protection.  The village was 
concerned about teens loitering, speeding, and derelict properties (Moore 
1998).  In 2001, residents grew frustrated with Beverly Hills and began 
shopping for police services (Posorske 2001).  In 2004, the trustees of the 
Village decided to switch the policing contract to Northwoods (Levy 2004).  
Since then, trustees have again contracted police services from Beverly Hills. 
 In mid County Kirkwood and St. John provide contract police services. 
Kirkwood has had a long standing contractual partnership with Oakland for 
police services.  A little over 600 Sycamore Hills residents receive police 
services from St. John. 
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 In west County, the municipalities of Crystal Lake Park, Huntleigh, 
and Westwood contract police services from Frontenac.  Combined, these 
three contract municipalities have just over one thousand residents.  Town 
and Country provides police services for Country Life Acres, which boasts a 
population of seventy-four residents. 
 In south County, Shrewsbury has provided police services for 
Mackenzie since 1976.   
County as Police Provider 
 Black Jack, located in north County, was the first municipality to 
contract with the County Police in 1970.  Other north County municipalities 
that receive police services from the County are Dellwood, Flordell Hills, and 
Jennings. 
 In mid County, the municipalities of Hanley Hills, Norwood Court, 
Pasadena Hills, and Uplands Park receive police services from the County 
Police.  Hanley Hills switched to County provided police services at the 
beginning of 1992.  Hanley Hills represented the first time the County Police 
took over policing from a municipality that previously provided its own full-
time police force. 
 Before switching to the County Police in 1996, Pasadena Hills 
contracted police services from Northwoods.  Residents and leaders of 
Pasadena Hills grew unhappy with the services they were receiving from 
Northwoods after Northwoods elected a new mayor, which was followed by 
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a change in police leadership (Cox 1996). 
 In south County, the County Police provide police services for 
Grantwood, Green Park, Marlborough, and Wilbur Park.  Grantwood 
switched to a County contract in 1994 after the death of a their then full-time 
city marshal (“Grantwood Village Will Keep Contract With County Police” 
1999).  Green Park was incorporated in June of 1995 and officials there 
decided upon incorporation to contract police services from the County.  
Marlborough dissolved its police department in 1997 in favor of a County 
contract.  The reason for the change was cited as financial as well as a desire 
to change the municipality’s image, particularly, a desire to shed the image of 
a speed trap (Birmingham 1997). 
 In west County, Clarkson Valley, Twin Oaks, Valley Park, Wildwood, 
and Winchester contract with the County for police services.  Clarkson Valley 
contracted police services from Ballwin in the 1980’s, but in 2007, the 
municipality agreed to a five-year contract with the County Police (Metro 
Digest 2007).  Winchester also had a contract with Ballwin, but switched to 
the County Police in 2000 (“West Post Briefs” 2000).  Similar to Clarkson 
Valley and Winchester, Country Life Acres had a contract with a neighboring 
municipality, Town and Country, for police services.  However, in 1997, the 
Board of Trustees in Country Life Acres decided to contract with the County 
because they felt they would obtain greater services at less cost (Billingsly 
1997). 
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 In 1998, Valley Park decided on a County police contract.  The change 
was motivated by financial issues and problems within the police 
department.  At the time of the turnover, then Mayor Daniel Adams believed 
the switch would save $1.2 million over five years (Little 1998).  Prior to the 
change, the in-house police department had been the subject of a number of 
complaints.  Unlike Valley Park, Wildwood did not have its own police 
department; rather, when Wildwood was incorporated in 1995 the County 
Police were contracted to provide police services.  
Specialized Police Agencies and Services 
 St. Louis County has a myriad of specialized police departments.  
Several institutions of higher education have their own police departments.  
For example, the University of Missouri - St. Louis and Washington 
University have police departments with staffing levels that rival many small 
municipalities. 
 Lambert Airport, which is located in St. Louis County, but an entity of 
the City of St. Louis, has its own police force, that was recently merged into 
the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD).  The County Police 
and SLMPD have an agreement with Metrolink, which is the regional light-
rail and bus authority, to provide police protection to the public transit 
agency.  Major railroads running through the County have their own police 
agencies, whose officers are given State police powers on railroad property. 
 The Missouri State Highway Patrol, Troop C, also provides a law 
	 28	
enforcement presence in the County.  At one time, Troop C was 
headquartered in Kirkwood before moving to Town and Country.  Most 
recently, Troop C’s headquarters was moved to Weldon Springs located in St. 
Charles County.  The Patrol is primarily responsible for traffic enforcement 
and accident investigations on State roadways within the County, but the 
Patrol acts as an additional law enforcement source for police services as 
needed. 
Collaborative Policing Initiatives 
 Despite the number of police agencies in the County, there are 
collaborative initiatives to handle some policing matters.  Those efforts 
include 911 call centers, police training academies, law enforcement computer 
systems and information sharing networks, as well as specialized police units. 
 Many communities within the County utilize regional 911 
communication centers or contract this service from the County Police.   For 
example, the Central County Emergency 911 Center receives 911 calls and 
dispatches fire and emergency medical services (EMS) units in western St. 
Louis County and parts of Franklin County.  Several municipalities have 
come together to form consolidated regional 911 call centers and dispatching 
services, such as the East Central Dispatch Center West Central Dispatch 
Center, which is also the latest example of a regional collaboration for 
dispatching within St. Louis County. 
 The St. Louis County Municipal Police and Fire Training Center 
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provides instructions to recruit police officers who will serve throughout the 
region.  Recently, it was announced that, in an effort to cut costs, SLMPD 
would close their own police academy and collaborate with the St. Louis 
County Police Academy.  These training centers also provide in-service 
continuing education training for public safety personnel within the region.   
 The Regional Justice Information Services (REJIS) network in St. Louis 
allows police agencies within the St. Louis region to have a computerized 
network that is customizable to fit the needs of the metropolitan region.  
Another added benefit to this service is that the computer system contains 
information specific to the region, such as municipal warrants with a small 
extradition range (i.e. if a municipality issues a warrant for failure to appear, 
the police agency may only pick-up the offender within the metropolitan 
area).  The County Police utilize a reporting system known as the Computer-
Assisted Report Entry System (CARE), which allows multiple agencies a 
single repository for police reports, thus reducing the burden of maintaining 
individual networks for reports.  
 In Saint Louis County numerous municipal police agencies participate 
in a mobile reserve SWAT team and it was recently announced that SLMPD’s 
SWAT team would join their resources with the County Police.  St. Louis has 
had a long tradition of sharing air assets, such as police helicopters, through 
the Metro Air Support Unit. 
 These collaborative efforts provide examples of resource sharing and 
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collaboration within policing in the County. 
Municipal Courts, Policing, and Revenue 
 Municipal courts and the revenue generated through court 
proceedings are not the focus of this paper.  However, these topics are worth 
mentioning because they play an important role in the criminal justice 
system.  While policing impacts the daily life of the community and the 
citizenry, the actions taken by police officers are enforced by the court system.  
The courts have the ability to levy fines and fees and issue arrest warrants.  
The ability of the courts to act as municipal revenue generators in the St. 
Louis region has been a topic of conversation recently.  In some cases, the 
accusation is made that the police act in concert with municipal courts to 
ensure an adequate revenue stream for municipal functions.   
 One former police bureaucrat summarized the importance of the 
courts by pointing out that policing could be contracted, or changed, but the 
municipal courts would still act independently.  As an independent body, the 
courts could continue to issue large fines, bench warrants for offenders who 
fail to appear, and reduction or dismissal of charges for municipal residents 
or those with the ability to pay.  In theory, a municipality could contract 
police services, which may reduce enforcement of certain laws (e.g. minor 
traffic offenses), resulting in a reduction of a valuable revenue stream.  
However, the courts could increase fees and fines to a point that would fill 
the gap left by reduced enforcement efforts (personal interview, January 10, 
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2015). 
 A report by the Department of Justice concerning the Ferguson Police 
Department found troubling evidence that members of the City’s 
administration, police, and court divisions acted in concert to increase 
municipal revenue through law enforcement practices.  The report stated, 
“[Ferguson] budgets for sizeable increases in municipal fines and fees each 
year, exhorts police and court staff to deliver those revenue increases, and 
closely monitors whether those increases are achieved” (United States 
Department of Justice (hereafter USDOJ) 2015, 2).  The Department of Justice 
also uncovered troubling documents from the City's Finance Director.  The 
report states: 
In March 2010, for instance, the City Finance 
Director wrote to Chief Jackson [the City's Police 
Chief] that "unless ticket writing ramps up 
significantly before the end of the year, it will be 
hard to significantly raise collections next 
year….Given that we are looking at a substantial 
sales tax shortfall, it's not an insignificant issue" 
(2). 
 
Similarly, in March 2013, the Finance Director wrote to the City Manager: 
"Court fees are anticipated to rise about 7.5%.  I did ask the Chief if he 
thought the PD could deliver a 10% increase.  He indicated they would try 
(2)."  The Justice Department's investigation also discovered that police 
officers within the City knew that revenue generation was stressed.  This 
report lays bare the prevalence of utilizing municipal police agencies as 
revenue generators. 
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 A group of attorneys who perform pro-bono defense services, known 
as the ArchCity Defenders, published a white paper examining the problems 
with municipal court systems.  The group focused on three municipalities, 
Bel-Ridge, Florissant, and Ferguson.  They argue that police and court 
systems in these municipalities target minorities and the poor, who do not 
have the means to pay fines or consult attorneys.  Further, these policies 
contribute to a cycle of poverty impacting the most vulnerable and those on 
the fringes of society.  They conclude that municipalities utilize their law 
enforcement powers as a way to generate revenue, which results in an 
antagonistic relationship between residents and the municipality (Harvey, et 
al., 2014).  
 The outcry from groups such as the ArchCity Defenders and the 
scathing findings of the Justice Department contributed to new legislation 
related to municipalities, fines and fees, as well as municipal courts.  This 
legislation, Senate Bill 5, created minimum standards for municipal 
governance and created process citizens could follow if those minimum 
standards are not being met.  Within St. Louis County general operating 
revenue derived from traffic fines was capped at 12.5%of the annual 
operating revenue.  Municipalities were also required to submit an annual 
report to the Missouri State Auditor detailing revenues from law enforcement 
actions (e.g. bonds, fines, court costs, etc.).  The legislation also capped fines 
for minor traffic violations at $300, limited the conditions in which jail 
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sentences could be given, and provided additional guidelines related to court 
costs (Missouri Senate, 2015). 
 Following the events in Ferguson, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon issued 
an Executive Order establishing the Ferguson Commission, which examined 
data and information concerning the St. Louis region.  The Commission’s 
published report had several calls to action concerning municipal courts and 
the municipal criminal justice system.  Recommendations included: 
eliminating incarceration for minor offenses; treating nonviolent offenses as 
civil violations rather than criminal cases; cancel “failure to appeal warrants;” 
institute a process to review warrants; and determine a way to assess an 
individual’s ability to pay fines and/or fees and allow installment payment 
plans (Ferguson Commission 2015, 94). 
 While municipal courts are not the focus of this paper, the information 
presented above makes it clear that municipal courts play an important role 
in the local criminal justice system.  The method and manner by which 
policing takes place in a municipality impacts the courts.  Additionally, 
municipalities in St. Louis have utilized the police and the court systems as a 
source of revenue generation.  It stands to reason that if the provider of police 
services were to change then the outcomes in revenue generation may also 
change.  One former high ranking police official interviewed for this work 
recalled a municipality being serviced by a police contract requesting 
additional traffic enforcement for the purposes of increasing revenue.  The 
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servicing police department refused to enforce traffic enforcement for the 
purposes of increasing revenue, but did offer to increase traffic enforcement 
based upon data indicating certain areas needed focused attention (e.g. school 
zones) (personal interview, January 10, 2015). 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 Political scientists have not been blind to topics concerning inter-
jurisdictional agreements, collective action, and public choice.  Writers have 
spent considerable time exploring these issues and their work provides a 
solid foundation on the topic.  However, this body of literature fails to 
adequately explain the process of municipal police contracting decisions.  
This chapter will explore literature relative to this topic and discuss gaps in 
the current knowledge as it relates to the topic at hand. 
 Simon A. Andrew presents an overview of work on interjurisdictional 
agreements in his 2009 article, “Recent Developments in the Study of 
Interjurisdictional Agreements: An Overview and Assessment.”  Andrew 
examines pertinent literature, datasets, and research currently being 
conducted on interjurisdictional agreements. 
 A comprehensive national dataset that examines the prevalence of 
interjurisdictional agreements does not exist.  Andrew points out, “The last 
survey of the use of IJAs [interjurisdictional agreements] was conducted more 
than two decades ago by the US Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations” (Andrew 2009, 135).  While a comprehensive national study 
regarding the use of interjurisdictional agreements does not exist, several 
local studies have been conducted relative to this topic.  The Citizens 
Research Council of Michigan conducted a study in 2005 that provides 
information on service production agreements for 116 functions in 26 service 
	 36	
areas in 464 municipal governments in Michigan (Andrew 2006 and The 
Citizens Research Council of Michigan 2005).  The Michigan study found that 
larger cities provide police services with greater frequency than do villages or 
townships (The Citizens Council of Michigan 2005, 2). 
 The State of Iowa maintains information on formal interjurisdictional 
agreements created by city and county governments within the State.  The 
State of Florida also constructed a dataset concerning interjurisdictional 
agreements.  Andrew explains the Florida dataset, “In 2002, Florida required 
its county governments with populations exceeding 100,000 people to 
compile information on the IJAs [interjurisdictional agreements] created by 
themselves and the local governments within their borders” (Andrew 2009, 
136).  Although Florida required reporting of significant data, the reporting 
requirement was restricted to eight general service areas (education, sanitary 
sewer, public safety, solid waste, drainage, potable water, parks and 
recreation, and transportation facilities).  Andrew holds that in the absence of 
a Federal dataset the datasets from Michigan, Iowa, and Florida represent the 
best information for understanding the prevalence of interjurisdictional 
agreements. 
 Andrew lists three ways in which scholars have studied the adaptation 
of interjurisdictional agreements.  The first approach, he states, “frames the 
issue as a choice among several different production options” (Andrew 2009, 
136).  The second approach examines local policy networks and how those 
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policy networks influence interjurisdictional agreements.  The third approach 
utilizes case studies and interviews to explore the motivations for adoption of 
these agreements.  Many of these case studies have focused on the roles of 
elected officials.  While this study will make use of case studies, each 
approach lacks a perspective that takes into account policy process theories.  
The policy process perspective could supplement the existing literature with 
a broader theoretical framework to examine the process and factors 
influencing policy actors with regard to interjurisdictional agreements. 
 The rational choice perspective is very prevalent in examining the 
adoption of interjurisdictional agreements.  One of the primary researchers 
using the rational choice perspective has been Richard C. Feiock.  Feiock 
frames his rational choice argument through a theory known as institutional 
collective action. 
 Literature suggests that municipalities make contracting decisions 
from a rational choice perspective that is also rooted in arguments of 
institutional collective action (Feiock, Tao, and Johnson, 2004, Feiock 2007, 
and Feiock 2009).  While the rational choice perspective is prevalent, the 
rational choice approach cannot adequately describe the policy process 
through which municipal actors determine if their municipality will engage 
in police contracting.  There are two conflicts within the rational choice 
approach.  First, from the rational choice perspective, a municipality should 
contract police services if the municipality has the potential to save on costs 
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associated with providing police services.  Second, the rational choice 
perspective and the institutional collective action approach hinge on an 
assumption that the participating institutions are unitary rational actors that 
engage in interjurisdictional cooperative agreements.  An examination of the 
St. Louis County case demonstrates that some municipalities are not making 
decisions based solely on costs.  Only a small percentage of municipalities 
contract police services despite the availability of viable and cost saving 
alternatives.  Additionally, the rational choice and institutional collective 
action approaches fail to account for the myriad of actors inside the 
institution who are behind the scenes working their own agendas and policy 
levers to influence these decisions. 
Institutional Collective Action 
 Richard C. Feiock, a leading scholar on interjurisdictional agreements, 
utilizes rational choice to frame theories on cooperative agreements and 
regional partnerships.  Feiock discusses his theories succinctly in two papers, 
“Rational Choice and Regional Governance” and “Metropolitan Governance 
and Institutional Collective Action.”  His theory of institutional collective 
action can be useful in understanding some contracting decisions.  However, 
some of Feiock’s propositions can be challenged when examining the police 
contracting decisions within St. Louis County. 
 Elinor Ostrom distinguished two types of rational choice models in her 
2005 book, Understanding Institutional Diversity.  The first generation of the 
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rational choice models held that actors have complete information and seek to 
maximize their benefits.  The second generation of rational choice models 
accounted for the contextual situations with which decisions are made and 
allows for asymmetrical information between actors.  It is from this second 
generation model that Feiock developed his theory.  Feiock defines 
institutional collective action this way: 
 Bilateral contracting and multilateral collective 
action are mechanisms by which two or more 
governments act collectively to capture the gains 
from providing or producing services across a 
larger area.  Taken together these mechanisms can 
be referred to as institutional collective action 
(ICA) (Feiock 2007, 48). 
 
In this model, it is assumed that government officials are engaged in a 
lengthy cost and benefit analysis of cooperative agreements between 
governments in order to capture as many gains as possible.  If officials 
determine that benefits outweigh costs, then the officials decide to cooperate 
on service provision. 
 Feiock also utilizes the Tiebout tradition to further his argument that 
governments will seek to increase collective benefits through collaboration.  
The Tiebout tradition holds that individual households make residential 
decisions based upon the mix of goods and services offered by individual 
municipalities (Tiebout 1956).  Reducing externalities and spillover effects 
produces significant benefits for citizens.  Utilizing the Tiebout model, these 
additional benefits may increase the likelihood that citizens will wish to 
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reside within these municipalities.  Feiock summarizes the work of Brierly, 
“Consolidation…solves scale and externality problems, yet their larger scale 
reduces local control, inefficiencies, and increases coordination costs” (Feiock 
2007, 50 and Brierly 2004).  In this summary, Feiock introduces the possibility 
that reduction of local government control of a service is a cost when 
collaborating for service provision.  A reduction in control over police 
services may become a stumbling block for policy decisions that favor police 
service contracts.  Some communities are reluctant to engage in police service 
contracts out of fear that the community will lose control over the police. 
 In Feiock’s model, costs are not the only factors on which decisions 
concerning interjurisdictional agreements rest; rather, the contextual nature of 
the services that are being considered for cooperation are also factors.  
Context may include characteristics of the good or service, configurations of 
political institutions, and the networks that exist among local government 
officials (Feiock 2007, 48).  It is necessary for Feiock to add context to his 
theory to avoid a failure of the theory when—from a purely monetary 
perspective—it makes sense to contract and collaborate on service 
production.  Adding context to the equation introduces limitations to 
contracting and collaboration and shapes the decision making process that 
surrounds collaborative decisions. 
 Feiock subdivides contextual roles into four groups: the transaction 
characteristics of goods, community characteristics, political institutions, and 
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the structure of policy networks.  Each of these contextual lenses are broken 
into smaller pieces that are then presented as propositions. 
 The transaction characteristics of goods are broken into two 
propositions.  The first asserts that services with greater asset specificity are 
least likely to experience collaborative efforts.  Feiock defines asset specificity 
as “durable investments that cannot easily be redeployed to other users” 
(Feiock 2007, 53).  Utilizing Feiock’s definition, an argument could be made 
that policing is asset specific.  The successful beat officer or detective must 
have an understanding of the community in which he serves to be effective.  
The notion of community oriented policing is built upon establishing 
partnerships built on trust with the community and the police.  The 
information a police officer learns about one community is not easily 
transferable to another community.  For example, a police officer from Ladue 
could not take the information he knows about that community and apply it 
to Wellston.  A police officer’s understanding of a local community is asset 
specific. 
 Feiock’s second proposition for the context of the transaction 
characteristics of goods is that as the difficulty in measuring and monitoring 
service outcomes increases the likelihood of collaborative agreements 
decreases.  Determining how to measure and monitor service outcomes for 
police services is often difficult.  Traditional measures have looked at the 
number of arrests and clearance rates as well as crime statistics and response 
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times (Moore and Braga 2003).  James Q. Wilson has argued that these 
traditional measures for police performance and the frequent search for better 
measures of performance are doomed to fail.  Rather, he argues, police should 
design methods of neighborhood assessment before and after police 
intervention to determine the success or failure of police methods (Wilson 
1993, 159).  It has also been argued that contracts for police services may 
stipulate certain performance measures whereby the contracting municipality 
can measure and monitor police performance on pre-determined metrics 
(Moe 1984, 760).  Despite the difficulties in measuring and monitoring police 
performance and service outcomes, a number of municipalities do decide to 
contract police services. 
 Feiock proposes that the characteristics of a community impact 
collaboration efforts; he has three propositions related to this theory.  The first 
and second are that as the level of demographic heterogeneity both among 
and within local governments increases cooperative agreements decrease.  
The utilization of basic racial demographics reveals that St. Louis County is at 
least seventy percent white.  The racial breakdown of municipalities that 
contract with the County for police services ranges from 99 percent white to 
4.1 percent white.  Many racially diverse municipalities do contract for police 
services and predominantly minority cities contract at a similar ratio than do 
predominantly white cities (Table 2.5).  Based upon these descriptive 
statistics, Feiock’s claim that heterogeneous populations are less likely to 
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contract needs more research in regards to the St. Louis County case. 
 The third proposition concerning community characteristics holds that 
agreements tend to form between governments that neighbor one another.  
This proposition generally holds true for the St. Louis County case. 
 Feiock theorizes that the political structure of a community has an 
impact on decisions to collaborate, which he explains through five 
propositions.  Collaboration is expected to increase in states with less 
restrictive laws.  The more professionally managed a government is, the 
greater the likelihood of collaboration.  Feiock defines professional 
management as a local government with a council-manager form.  Yet, in St. 
Louis County, only a small number of municipalities that contract for police 
services have some type of a professional manager or administrator (Table 
2.4).  Feiock also argues that the likelihood of collaboration increases when 
there are district-based representation systems, elected officials have 
durability in their tenure, and when the governments have similar structures 
of governance. 
 Feiock’s last contextual lens revolves around network analysis.  He 
argues that as local governments become tied to one another they enact 
collaborative agreements.  Additionally, as local governments become more 
tightly clustered and historical relationships exist then collaboration becomes 
more likely.  Feiock argues that this is the case because close relationships 
increase trust and reduce asymmetrical information. 
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 On balance, Feiock’s institutional collective action framework lacks 
explanatory power for the decisions of local municipalities to contract for 
police services.  Small municipalities that provide their own police services 
are too small to achieve economies of scale.  From a purely rational choice 
perspective, one would theorize that municipalities should contract police 
services because the municipality could save money and leverage economies 
of scale; however, many small municipalities maintain their own police 
agencies.  The inability of Feiock’s institutional collective action model to 
explain police contracting decisions leaves room to explore these decisions 
through other theories.  Decisions regarding police contracting are more 
complicated than the unitary rational actor perspective posited by Feiock; 
these decisions are shaped by political actors and institutions that are 
overlooked in the institutional collective action approach. 
 The rational choice theory draws a line between production and 
provision.  As discussed in Chapter 1, this line is often blurred.   Police 
service decisions are not made in an autonomous vacuum motivated by 
technical decisions.  Rather, contracting decisions have an impact on the day-
to-day life of municipal residents.  Contracting police services changes the 
style and approach of the policing methodology. Rational choice theory 
neglects the impact police providers have on the values, interests, and 
policing style within communities. 
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Police Protection as a Lifestyle Service 
 Feiock’s institutional collective action theory lacks explanatory power 
partly because it fails to take into account the identities of local citizens and 
the peculiar networks of police administrators.  Kelly LeRoux and Jered Carr 
have described police services as a lifestyle service (LeRoux and Carr 2010). 
LeRoux and Carr have examined the impact of local officials’ interpersonal 
networks on the formation of interjurisdictional agreements. 
 LeRoux and Carr expound upon Oliver Williams’ 1971 book, 
Metropolitan Political Analysis.  Williams divides public services into two 
generalized groups, system maintenance functions and lifestyle services.  
Lifestyle services include public safety services such as police protection as 
well as education, parks and recreation, public housing, and economic 
development.  LeRoux and Carr explain lifestyle services: 
 These services reflect amenities that vary 
dramatically in quality from city to city.  Williams 
argued that these services distinguish the lifestyles 
of wealthier suburban residents and represent the 
public amenities over which communities 
compete with one another to attract residents and 
businesses (2010, 452). 
 
LeRoux and Carr hypothesized and discovered that lifestyle services will 
remain decentralized.  The reason for this decentralization is that lifestyle 
services represent the quality of life within a community.  Citizens and 
community leaders wish to have lifestyle services that reflect the 
characteristics of the municipality.  Public safety networks also remain 
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decentralized because they display characteristics of low network densities, 
which leads to isolation and decreases the likelihood of collaboration. 
 In St. Louis County many police administrators participate in the same 
professional networks, such as the St. Louis Area Police Chiefs Association 
(SLAPCA), Missouri Police Chiefs Association (MoPCA), and the 
International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP).  In the case of police 
networks in St. Louis County, an alternative hypothesis could be proposed to 
LeRoux and Carr’s hypotheses.  The competing proposal would hold that 
police chiefs are not isolated and are engaged in public safety networks.  
Instead of working to consolidate, these networks help maintain the status-
quo fragmentation and entrenchment of local police administrators.  Police 
administrators are motivated to maintain their jobs and their police 
departments.  Other police administrators have the same desire and do not 
advocate police contracts.  Rather, the Chiefs collaborate on smaller 
programs, such as Citizens Academies and DARE programs, to save money, 
engage their communities, and ultimately save their departments.  
Administrators from a large department, such as St. Louis County Police, do 
not have to fear losing their jobs or their department; therefore, they are more 
willing to advocate police contracts in which the County acts as the provider 
of municipal police services. 
 A distinction also exists between direct services and auxiliary services 
provided by police organizations (Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker 1978).   Direct 
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services are those directed to citizens, such as police patrol, traffic control, 
and criminal investigations.  Auxiliary services are those services used by the 
police, which would include services such as radio communications, entry-
level training, and crime laboratory analysis.  This distinction has been 
utilized to demonstrate the ability of multiple police agencies to form 
cooperative agreements in regards to auxiliary services.  At least one study 
has shown that the overlap with direct police services is low (Ostrom, Parks, 
and Whitaker 1978).  Utilizing the alternative hypothesis posited against 
LeRoux and Carr, police administrators would advocate collaborative efforts 
in the provision of auxiliary services because these services are not directly 
provided to citizens. 
Correlational Studies 
 Correlational studies have been used to predict factors that influence 
collaborative efforts. 
 Harry P. Pachon and Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., conducted a study 
concerning assertions regarding larger police departments through 
examining and analyzing citizen satisfaction surveys through quantitative 
regression analysis.  The authors conducted this study in response to two 
competing theories of police services: the reformist perspective that posited 
the benefits of larger departments and, conversely, those groups arguing 
against consolidation because of the benefits of smaller departments.  
Reformists supported large police departments for three reasons: the ability 
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to specialize, higher levels of professionalism, and benefits from economies of 
scale.  On the other hand, those against consolidation argued that 
consolidation removed the representativeness that came along with locally 
controlled departments and that these concerns outweigh factors of 
efficiency, costs, and equity (Pachon and Lovrich 1977, 39). 
 Pachon and Lovrich examine two assertions.  The first concerns costs 
and expenditures while the second concerns citizen satisfaction.  On the topic 
of their first assertion, the authors argue that costs and expenditures of 
different police departments differ based upon the demands placed on forces 
of varying sizes.  As they argue, small suburban police departments do not 
handle large amounts of violent crime as do large inner-city departments.  On 
the second assertion, the authors found that socio-economic characteristics 
are the most important variable when examining citizen satisfaction with 
police services and not the size of the police agency.  They conclude that 
larger police agencies would produce more economical and satisfying police 
services (Pachon and Lovrich 1977, 45). 
 James M. Ferris conducted a correlational study to determine the 
factors impacting contracting decisions.  Ferris sought to examine the actual 
decisions of local governments in contracting out municipal services.  He 
sought to go beyond the traditional examinations of cost savings as the most 
important factor in the decision to contract.  For his analysis, Ferris utilized 
three independent variables: cost savings (supply side forces), fiscal 
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pressures, and political forces. 
 Ferris argued that a municipality must first establish that contracting 
will improve cost savings before the municipality will engage in contracting.  
Once cost savings are established, then fiscal pressures and political forces 
will influence the final decision to contract.  The extent to which contracting 
efforts can occur is dependent on laws and constituents.  Laws limit the fiscal 
capacity of a municipality through reducing local control over financial 
options.  For example, a state may have a law requiring municipalities to run 
balanced budgets; while, constituents may demand lower tax rates.  
Politicians have a self-serving desire to be reelected and will try to reduce or 
maintain tax rates.  Politicians do not seek tax increases; therefore, if 
contracting will save money and reduce or stabilize tax rates then politicians 
will favor service contracts. 
 Ferris hypothesized that political forces play an important role in 
contracting decisions.  He states, “even if cost savings are demonstrated and 
fiscal prospects are bleak, there is no guarantee that local governments will 
opt to contract out” (Ferris 1986, 294).  Ferris moves the discussion of 
contracting from the purely rational realm and begins to examine the 
influence of political actors on contracting decisions.  Three potential political 
forces that impact contracting decisions: the structure of government (mayor-
council vs. council-manager), citizens, and public employees.  Ferris 
summarizes the point at which each of these variables would be the most 
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optimal for contracting; he states: 
 The decision to contract out will be more likely 
when (1) the cost savings are greater, (2) the fiscal 
limits are more stringent, and (3) the potential 
strength of public service constituency groups and 
public employees are less powerful (Ferris 1986, 
295). 
 
Ferris sought to determine if the proposed optimal level for contracting holds 
up to empirical analysis. 
 Ferris obtained his data from a 1982 study conducted by the 
International City Management Association (ICMA), which surveyed local 
governments regarding the methods of delivering different service, including 
contracting municipal services.  Utilizing this data, regression analysis was 
conducted for each of the independent variables, which determined that 
larger cities are more likely to contract than smaller cities.  On the fiscal 
variable, it was determined that the higher a city’s tax burden, the greater 
likelihood that the city will contract.  Ferris also determined that political 
variables are highly influential in contracting decisions.  Cities with greater 
populations of elderly and lower-to lower-middle-income residents are less 
likely to contract services.  Ferris attributes this finding to the greater reliance 
of residents of this demographic on public services, who therefore, desire to 
maintain local control of public services.  Public employees also play a role 
when they make up a large constituency within a city; in these cases, the 
likelihood of contracting decreases.  Ferris’ findings provide some insight into 
contracting decisions.  
	 51	
David R. Morgan and Michael W. Hirlinger examined factors that 
influenced intergovernmental services in their 1991 article.  Morgan and 
Hirlinger hypothesized that intergovernmental contracting is influenced by 
the same factors that influence contracting decisions within the private sector.  
They utilized similar factors for their analysis as Ferris.  Those factors are cost 
considerations, fiscal pressures, and political influences.  Morgan and 
Hirlinger obtained their data from a 1983 mail survey by the International 
City Management Association on the use of intergovernmental service 
contracts.  The authors then conducted analysis utilizing linear regression to 
test the impact of each variable on intergovernmental service contracts. 
 Morgan and Hirlinger have a number of interesting findings.  The first 
is rather obvious, but important.  Cities outside of metropolitan areas are less 
likely to engage in intergovernmental service contracts because of a lack of 
suppliers.  A second important finding is that municipalities that engage in 
contracting have reduced labor costs.  Findings also show that both poor and 
wealthy communities engage in contracting.  The form of government is also 
an important factor, cities with a council-manager form of government have a 
greater likelihood of engaging in intergovernmental contracting. 
 Michael A. Nelson examined the probability of not employing an 
external service delivery approach in a 1997 article.  Nelson borrows from 
industrial organization literature on the “make” or “buy” dilemmas private 
firms face.  Nelson argues that the public sector must also make these 
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decisions.  Nelson utilized a 1992 International City Management Association 
survey from 1,221 municipalities to conduct empirical analysis.  This study 
found that municipalities do not always elect the mechanism of least-cost to 
deliver services.  Rather, as preferences for service delivery becomes less 
heterogeneous then the likelihood of contracting decreases. 
 These authors utilize correlational studies to determine the variables 
that directly impact contracting decisions.  Pachon and Lovrich examine 
citizen satisfaction as it relates to jurisdictional size.  Ferris as well as Morgan 
and Hirlinger exemplify the importance of examining cost considerations, 
fiscal pressures, and political influence variables in correlational studies to 
examine contracting decisions.  Nelson provides information on the 
expectation on contracting police services. 
Studies Specific to St. Louis 
 Terrence Jones, in his work on fragmentation within St. Louis County, 
found that suburban municipalities within the County were incorporated 
because citizens sought homogenous cities and villages (2000, 58).  Jones, 
building on the work of other scholars (i.e. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 
1961) found that fragmentation created a marketplace.  This marketplace was 
built upon public choice; namely, the ability of citizens to choose the 
municipality that had the right balance of services and goods for the 
individual’s taste (Jones 2000, 125).  Jones also identifies a consequence of 
fragmented policing in which police look the other way on violations 
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committed by local residents and outside residents are handled with a 
heavier hand (Jones 2000, 132). 
 Jones articulates that municipal law enforcement services that flow 
from the fragmented nature of St. Louis County allows for each municipality 
to find a policing style that best fits the municipality the department serves.  
In instances where the municipality cannot afford a police department, the 
municipality can buy the service from a neighboring municipality or St. Louis 
County (Jones 2000, 131). 
 Jones also discusses ways in which fragmented municipalities can 
adapt policies that leverage economies of scale while maintaining local 
control.  One example of this is the training of police officers through the use 
of a police academy that services the County and all municipalities within the 
County.  Another example of this is found in the Regional Justice Information 
System (REJIS), in which police agencies within the metropolitan area can 
easily relay criminal justice information.  Jones summarizes the state of law 
enforcement within St. Louis County, “local control is the default option, 
but…cooperation can and does occur when appropriate” (Jones 2000, 134).  
Numerous citizen satisfaction surveys, that report positive responses for 
locally controlled police agencies, have been utilized to promote and justify 
this fragmented system. 
 In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s Ronald J. Oakerson and Roger B. 
Parks studied a variety of topics, including metropolitan governance, 
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organization, and service delivery in St. Louis County (Oakerson and Parks 
1993).  In one of their works, the two compared service delivery examined St. 
Louis County and Allegheny County (Pennsylvania).  In this work, the 
authors point out that Missouri State statute requires municipalities in St. 
Louis with populations over 400 to provide full-time police departments.  
They found that smaller municipalities in St. Louis County contracted for 
police services while small communities in Allegheny County were less likely 
to contract for police services; rather, smaller municipalities in Allegheny 
County staffed their police departments with part-time officers (Oakerson 
and Parks 1993, 24).  
 Oakerson and Parks found that the existence of fragmented police 
services was supported by integrating structures, that is coordination that 
occurs between various service providers to produce indirect services.  For 
example, various police agencies collaborate on things such as training and a 
regional crime-laboratory (Oakerson and Parks 1993, 24).  The authors argue 
that cooperation through integrating structures supports fragmented 
production of direct services. 
 Oakerson and Parks write about the Tiebout model in conjunction with 
citizen voice and the ability of citizens to vote with their feet.  Voting with 
feet means that citizens have the ability to move from a municipality that 
does not provide the mix of services desirable by the citizen.  They argue that 
voice and exit act as a constraint on the conduct of local officials.  The desire 
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of citizens to find municipalities that present a basket of services to meet the 
needs of the citizens leads to an increase in the number of provisioning units 
(i.e. municipalities).  However, they point out that in St. Louis County the 
number of production units falls below provision units for police services.  
They find that provision units can capture individual preferences within St. 
Louis County because there are a number of active providers for police 
services.  Municipalities within St. Louis County can shop for a provider that 
fits the preferences of the provisioner (Oakerson and Parks 1988).  As 
discussed earlier, producers have considerable discretion in the 
implementation of contracts with municipalities.  In practice, there is a 
blurring of the distinction between provision and production. 
 The proceeding pages have examined literature pertinent to the topic 
of interjurisdictional agreements, institutional collective action, police 
protection as a lifestyle service, correlational studies germane to the topic at 
hand, and literature specific to St. Louis that discusses cooperative 
agreements.  Each one of these studies provides knowledge and insight; 
however, what is missing is a study specific to the political and policy process 
that impacts decisions related to interjurisdictional agreements, specifically 
police contracting, within St. Louis County. 
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Chapter 4 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
 The proceeding chapter discussed literature relevant to police 
contracting decisions.  The existing literature does not provide a cohesive 
understanding of the interplay between theories concerning public choice, the 
policy process, and certain aspects of criminal justice theory on contracting 
decisions.  The proposed hypotheses for this work will be formulated from 
agenda setting and policy formulation literature, as well as some policing 
literature.  This section will examine relevant concepts from these areas and 
how they relate to contracting decisions. 
Policy Process Issues and Contracting 
 The first two hypotheses derive from agenda setting and policy 
formation literature, specifically focusing events, policy windows, and 
punctuated change.  The majority of literature germane to agenda setting and 
policy formation concerns the Federal government.  However, important 
concepts from this literature can be applied to contracting decisions at the 
municipal level. 
 John W. Kingdon argued there are three types of processes that impact 
agenda formation: problems, policies, and politics (1995, 16).  When an issue 
becomes a problem, then the probability that the issue will become an agenda 
item increases.  Policies can become agenda items when policy experts 
intervene and consider policy problems and discuss alternatives.  Political 
forces can also shape the agenda when political mood shifts or elections 
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change the make-up of elected officials. 
 Kingdom proposed that focusing events can force issues onto the 
agenda.  Issues are not always evident to the general public, but focusing 
events can propel an issue onto the agenda.  Kingdom presented events such 
as a crisis or a disaster (1995, 94) as potential agenda drivers.  A police 
department embroiled in turmoil and scandal can become a municipal crisis.  
When a crisis involving a municipal police department occurs, the 
municipality may be forced to examine police services, which may lead to 
questions of police control and police production alternatives. 
 Kingdon theorized that policy changes occur when policy windows 
open.  A policy window was defined as “an opportunity for advocates of 
proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special 
problems” (Kingdon 1995, 165).  A policy window is an opportunity for 
agendas considered separately in the various streams to come together.  
When all three streams (problems, policies, and politics) are coupled, the 
likelihood for policy change increases. 
 Policy windows open for a finite period of time, which restricts the 
ability for policy changes to occur.  Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. 
Jones’ punctuated equilibrium theory is a complementary policy process 
framework, which can also be applied to police contracting issues.  
Punctuated equilibrium theory holds that the policy process is usually quite 
stable with only incremental changes but periodically sharp bursts of 
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heightened attention to a problem or issue, results in the possibility for policy 
change. 
 During times of policy stability, Baumgartner and Jones argue that 
existing political structures and the definition of issues allow for stable 
policies.  However, destabilization can occur within the policy arena.  
Destabilization is defined as a time when issues become redefined.  
Destabilization can occur when new participants are added or when there is a 
change in institutional rules or jurisdiction.  During periods of 
destabilization, efforts are made to restore a state of stabilization. 
 During periods of policy development, which occur during periods of 
destabilization, policy image influences policy development as well as public 
policy venue.  Policy image is defined as the understanding and discussion of 
a policy (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 25).  Policy images are both empirical 
and emotive.  Policy images involving the emotive set a tone for how the 
policy will be discussed.  For example, discussions regarding police 
contracting take on very different tones if the initial discussion was motivated 
by budget issues versus a discussion that was motivated by police detectives 
failing to adequately investigate violent crimes. 
 Policy venue is defined as the institutional location that has the power 
to make authoritative decisions concerning policy issues (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2009, 32).  Policy venue concerning policing has become important in 
the St. Louis County context after the events of Ferguson.  At one time, police 
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decisions were very localized issues left mostly to municipal institutions.  
After Ferguson, the institutional location of policing decisions has expanded 
as the Missouri State Legislature, Courts, and the Federal Government are all 
engaged in discussions of policy issues concerning municipal policing. 
 For punctuated change to occur, there must be a change in both image 
and venue, which they describe as the image-venue interaction.  If a policy 
image changes, then the likelihood of policy venue change increases.  If venue 
changes, then the likelihood of policy image change increases.  Image-venue 
interactions may be seen in police contracting decisions where publicized 
problems with police services lead to image changes.  The change in policy 
image related to policing may result in discussions of police contracting, 
which culminates in the addition of those involved in the policy venue, for 
example the addition of the County Police in municipal discussions regarding 
police services. 
 The policy process literature concerning focusing events and 
punctuated equilibrium provide the foundation for two of the hypotheses for 
contracting decisions.  
 First, from Kingdon, for police contracting to make it to the agenda and for 
it to succeed, there must have been a focusing event or public problem with the in-
house police services. Governments have a long list of problems that they could 
attend to, but only some problems actually make it onto the agenda.  
Focusing events draw attention to a specific problem and allow policy 
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windows to open.  Kingdon also theorizes that budgets can act as problems 
that focus the agenda on a set of issues (e.g. how is the municipality going to 
continue in-house police services).  Without some sort of problem or focusing 
event, matters concerning police contracting will not make it onto the agenda. 
 The punctuated equilibrium theory ties in well to focusing events and 
provides the second hypothesis of this work.  For police contracting decisions to 
succeed there must be a change in image and venue.  First, the image of police 
contracting can change through focusing events.  A focusing event, such as 
police misconduct, may reshape the image of the police and the policy debate 
surrounding how to fix the problems of a local police force.  Second, venue 
also changes as the image of the policing policy debate shifts.  The idea of 
venue is best described as the bringing in of outsiders into the local municipal 
debate regarding policing.  For example, if a scandal rocks a municipal police 
department causing a shift in image, which leads to a policy debate, the 
County police may enter the debate and offer a solution for the municipality.  
Thus, the venue of the debate has expanded.  The election of new politicians 
or the departure of long-standing bureaucrats can also result in a change of 
venue. 
 The theories of focusing events and punctuated equilibrium, which are 
part of the policy process literature, add explanatory powers for police 
contracting decisions.  First, utilizing Kingdon’s theory of focusing events, for 
contracting to make it to onto the agenda and succeed, there must have been 
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a public problem or event that has focused attention on matters of policing 
that float the issue to the top of the agenda.  Kingdom also theorized that 
budgets could act as agenda drivers and for the purposes of this study, 
budgetary issues will be considered problems that have the ability to focus 
the agenda on policing issues. 
 Second, from punctuated equilibrium theory, for contracting to make it 
onto the agenda and succeed there must have been a change in both image 
and venue.  The image of the existing police agency must have changed for 
discussions of police contracting to rise to the top of the agenda.  For police 
contracting to succeed, there must also be a change in venue.  In this context, 
a change of venue can take the form of additional actors or the addition of 
actors with the subtraction of other actors.  For example, municipal leaders 
may pursue police contracting after the election of a new mayor.  The election 
of a new mayor would be an additional actor.  Subtracted actors may also be 
influenced.  For example, a municipality may be reluctant to engage in 
contracting discussions when a long term and well liked police chief is in 
office.  However, if the police chief leaves, municipal leaders may be willing 
to engage in contracting discussions.  In these instances, the venue landscape 
would have changed because of the subtraction of an actor involved in the 
municipal policy process. 
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Policing Styles and Contracting 
 The last hypothesis is derived from the work of James Q. Wilson who 
was a pioneer in policing studies.  Wilson wrote about policing styles in his 
book, Varieties of Police Behavior.  Wilson described three types of police 
behavior: the watchmen style, the legalistic style, and the service style.  
Wilson offered the following explanation for examining police styles: 
I try to describe the behavior of patrolmen 
discharging their routine law-enforcing and order-
maintaining functions, to explain how that 
behavior is determined by the organizational and 
legal constraints under which patrolman work, to 
discover the extent to which it varies among police 
departments, and to determine insofar as the 
evidence permits what accounts for these 
differences and especially how local politics 
contributes to them (Wilson 1968, 10). 
 
Wilson’s theories on police behavior are important to conversations regarding 
police contracting because organizational context and local politics have an 
impact on policing.  Wilson argues that politics shape the methods and 
operations of police.  Wilson is also concerned with street-level bureaucrats, 
in Wilson’s case, the police patrolman.  The police patrolman makes policy 
decisions that are reinforced by police administrators and the local political 
culture.  Patrolman behavior and methods of duty fulfillment provide 
evidence of the type of policing style employed in a subject municipality.   
 The watchman style is characterized by police behavior that 
emphasizes order maintenance within the community.  Officers engage in an 
analysis of the situations to which they are called, resulting in judgment of 
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the seriousness of the infraction.  Less serious infractions are not enforced, 
rather, officers ensure peacefulness and order is restored.  If order is broken 
and cannot be easily restored then the officer takes action reminiscent of the 
role of a traditional law enforcer (Wilson 1968, 141).  Cities that display 
watchman tendencies have departments that do not want to upset the status 
quo, the department is highly sensitive to complaints and there is no formal 
review process.  When complaints are received, the police chief handles the 
complaints personally to maintain order and police legitimacy (Wilson 1968, 
149).  Departments with low pay and low education are consistent with the 
watchman style.  Recruitment is frequently done from within the city.  These 
departments also tend to have little or no written rules or specializations 
within the rank and tend to be highly politicized.  Wilson concludes, “An 
unspecialized department tends to be a watchman-like department that in 
turn tends to resist specialization” (Wilson 1968, 155). 
 The legalistic style is described as the antithesis of the watchman style.  
Legalistic departments place the law enforcement aspect of police work at the 
forefront of their police methodology.  Problems are handled through formal 
police action that results in high rates of traffic tickets and arrests.  Instances 
of law violations that did not upset public order often end in an arrest.  
Wilson describes legalistic police departments, “The police will act…as if 
there were a single standard of community conduct” (Wilson 1968, 172).  
Administrators demand that officers follow strict adherence to the laws and 
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policies thus molding a legalistic department.  Wilson hypothesizes that these 
departments act this way because police administrators want to reduce the 
possibility or suspicion of corruption.  Administrators can also ensure that 
politicians and members of the public cannot accuse the department of failing 
to act.  Generally, these departments were once corrupt or favor-doing 
departments and a move toward legalistically enforcing the laws was a 
conscious decision by administrators or politicians to change the public’s 
perception of the department.  These departments generally have a reform 
police chief, meaning the police chief is a civil servant as opposed to a 
mayoral appointee.  The chief seeks to remove politics from police work.  
Within a reformed department formal hierarchies develop, efficiencies are 
promoted, and complaints are handled formally through an internal affairs 
process (Wilson 1968, 186).  These departments seek to minimize citizen 
complaints through recruiting police officers that can be impersonal and 
adhere to the law enforcement aspect of police work. 
 The service style is Wilson’s third and final style of police behavior.  
The service style falls somewhere between the watchman style and the 
legalistic style.  As Wilson describes this style, “The police take seriously all 
request for either law enforcement or order maintenance…but are less likely 
to respond by making an arrest or otherwise imposing formal sanctions” 
(Wilson 1968, 200).  Wilson argues that one of the reasons for this type of 
policing style is a desire to keep public opinion of the organization favorable.  
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The watchman style centers on keeping the department close to the citizens, 
which in turn causes the police to focus on some community concerns over 
specific law enforcement problems.  This focus on community relations is 
central to the department’s values, training, and leadership.  This community 
focus requires the patrol officer to have a deep knowledge base of the 
community.  Even though some departments are considerably large, 
community service occurs at the local precinct level. 
 As described above, Wilson theorizes there are three types of policing 
styles.  If aspects of policing were plotted on a bell curve, the service style 
aspects would fill the middle of the bell curve, while the negative attributes 
associated with the watchman and legalistic styles would be at the margins.  
Aspects of policing at the margins represents the characteristics of concern for 
police agencies, for example, a police agency focused solely on traffic ticket 
revenue at the expense of community policing. 
 The watchman and legalistic systems each display unprofessional 
aspects that increases their vulnerability to contract decisions.  For example, 
watchman style departments have little to no professional standards, which 
increase the possibility of litigation, citizen complaints, and charges of 
corruption.  Legalistic departments have such emphasis on enforcing the law 
community alienation may result.  Community members may feel that the 
legalistic system preys on the most vulnerable and alienated citizens because 
they are most frequently the subject of law enforcement action.  It is also 
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important to note that if a municipality contracts police services, then the type 
of police service displayed by the outgoing department will not translate into 
the new police department.  Therefore, if a municipality that previously had a 
police department that displayed a watchman or legalistic style contracted 
police services from the County, the municipality should not expect the same 
type of policing style it had before the County. 
 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling ushered in the era of 
community policing in their groundbreaking 1982 article, “The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety.”  In this article, the authors posited the “broken 
windows” theory.  The theory holds that if a building has one broken 
window then the others will soon be broken out because one broken window 
signals that no one cares about the building.  The analogy goes further and 
holds that if petty crimes and social disorders (e.g., panhandling, abandoned 
property, public fighting, liter, etc.) are allowed to exist then citizens will feel 
unsafe.  Citizens then begin to avoid areas while those with nefarious motives 
move in because there is a public perception that no one cares.  The article led 
to an explosion in community policing.  Community policing, at its core, is to 
form cooperative, service-style relationships between the police and citizens 
to deal with petty crimes and social disorders.  Dealing with minor order 
maintenance had previously been thought of as an illegitimate use of the 
police, but Wilson and Kelling’s article helped legitimize the role of local 
police in order maintenance (Kelling and Coles 1996, 19). Building 
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community relations and implementing community policing is particularly 
important for a police department that exemplifies the service style.  In 
instances where municipalities move from a watchman or legalistic style of 
policing to a contractor providing a service style could result in increased 
community policing, which could reduce crime and increase public support 
of police.  In instances of police contracting that shifts the policing style to a 
service style, service from the outside police agency could result in increased 
community input.  
Municipal departments in St. Louis County display characteristics of 
the policing styles outlined above.  For example, the St. Louis County Police 
Department displays a service orientation.  The Department, while large, has 
a focus on community relations and is highly professionalized.  The 
Department operates patrol operations out of local precincts and appears to 
have a good balance of the watchman and legalistic aspects of police work.  
Wilson’s study focused on eight municipalities within the State of New York, 
which were large and had their institutionalized culture and identity.  The 
resources to conduct a study of municipalities and classify them in Wilson’s 
typology was not possible for this work.  Additionally, several of the 
municipalities studied, were small communities served by very small police 
agencies, which limits the institutionalization of culture and identity.  For the 
purposes of this work, sources were examined to understand the 
characteristics of police agencies and then those characteristics were 
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examined under the lens of Wilson’s typologies. 
Wilson’s police typologies are important, because the assertion of the 
third and final hypothesis is that municipalities that contract police services were 
more likely to have operated with the legal and watchman styles, in such a way as 
may be considered unprofessional.  Measuring professionalism in a quantitative 
and objective fashion is outside the scope of the dissertation.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, professional policing is policing that is based on 
specialized training that requires officers to make decisions based on 
standardized best practices of police conduct, which are practices based upon 
rules and using judgment to achieve optimum outcomes.  The opposite of 
professional policing, is a policing methodology based upon the personal 
interests of the police or the unfair application of rules on classifications such 
as race, ethnicity, place of residence, or income.  Professional policing 
upholds individual civil rights acting within the parameters of due process 
and equal protections as guaranteed in the Constitution.  These 
unprofessional attributes can be seen in the watchman and legalistic styles.  
For example, the watchman style resists specialized training and has no 
formal review process for disciplinary issues.  The legalistic style can alienate 
citizens reducing the optimum outcome of policing.  Determining a 
professional police agency or individual officer is not always easy.  However, 
utilizing Wilson’s typologies draws a frame in which to examine police 
behavior and professionalism. 
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Methodology 
 To study these hypotheses five case studies were completed on St. 
Louis County municipalities.  Three municipalities have contracted for police 
services, Fenton, Jennings, and Dellwood.  Two municipalities, Rock Hill and 
Hazelwood, discussed police service contracts, but decided against 
contracting.  The municipalities selected for this study were chosen because 
they vary in their mix of population, household income, and length of time 
contracting with the County. 
 The primary sources of information for this work were news articles, 
budgets, and personal interviews.  Many news articles were pulled from the 
archives of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.  Approximately forty-five individuals 
were contacted and requested to participate in a semi-structured interview.  
Of those contacted, twenty agreed to participate in an interview.  Qualitative 
interviews were conducted with questions that focused on the factors that 
contributed to the contracting discussion and decision.  Most of the 
interviewees provided information which could be verified through public 
records, such as newspaper articles.  A handful of interviewees provided 
insights into political decisions and motivations that did not make the public 
record.  These insights are presented and noted within each case study.  In 
several instances, the public record provided a well documented narrative of 
the changing perceptions of police services throughout the contracting 
process. 
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 Interviewees were promised anonymity prior to each interview.  
Interview notes were taken and are maintained by the author.  To maintain 
anonymity, information received directly from interviewees will be noted 
generically as a personal interview, along with the date of the interview.  
 Historical census data for this paper was obtained from the United 
States Census Bureau.  Uniform Crime Data was obtained from the Missouri 
State Highway Patrol and the St. Louis County Police Department.  Census 
information and crime data were used to obtain a better understanding of the 
case studies. 
  
	 71	
Chapter 5 
Contract Municipality – Fenton 
Of the municipalities studied, Fenton has contracted police services 
from St. Louis County for the longest period of time.  Fenton was 
incorporated in 1837 and is classified as a fourth class city.  Fenton began 
contracting police services in 1995.  The city occupies approximately 6.4 
square miles in south St. Louis County and is located next to the Meramec 
River.  Since 1940, Fenton has grown through annexation and through 
suburbanization.  In 1940, the City had a population of 171 (United States 
Department of Commerce 1943).  In 2010, the City had grown to 3,946 
residents (Chart 5.1) (United States Department of Commerce 2012).  The 
City’s demographic make-up is rather homogeneous, with the percent of 
white residents consistently above 95% since the 1980’s (Chart 5.2).   
As a fourth class city, the City has elected to be governed by a mayor 
and a board of aldermen.  The mayor and aldermen are elected every two 
years.  There are eight aldermen elected from the City’s four wards, thus two 
aldermen are elected from each ward.  State statute allows a fourth class 
village to elect a marshal for the purposes of law enforcement. 
Like other cities in St. Louis County, Fenton generates the majority of 
its annual operating budget from sales tax revenues.  Fenton is a point-of-sale 
City that also participates in St. Louis County’s sales tax pool in areas 
incorporated after 1983.  In the past five years, the City has not had a general 
fund budget deficit, although budgeted general fund revenue has decreased 
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(Chart 5.3). 
The Contracting Decision 
An obituary appearing in the August 10, 2014, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
declared that Guy L. Youngman had been “called home to Jesus on Friday, 
8/8/14” (Obituary of Guy L. Youngman 2014).  Youngman served as 
Fenton’s town marshal for twenty-eight (28) years.  Youngman was first 
elected in 1967 and his last term as City Marshal ended in 1993.  Although 
Youngman served for twenty-eight years, his many terms were not without 
problems.  In 1984, the Board of Alderman cut his annual salary to $4,200 
from $22,500 based upon displeasure with his job performance.  In 1989, an 
effort by Aldermen to increase Youngman’s salary to $6,000 failed by a 4-3 
vote (Gayle 1989), but was subsequently passed.  In 1991, an audit was 
ordered of the Department and its evidence room following the discovery of 
irregularities related to the evidence room.  At the same time, police Major Ed 
Hanneken was relieved of his duties (Billingsly 1991). 
Prior to Youngman’s term, the City was asked to end the practice of 
electing a marshal and turn the position into an appointed chief of police.  
The ballot measure failed.  During Youngman’s term, voters were asked 
another five times to do away with an elected marshal and move to an 
appointed chief of police.  All of the attempts failed.  The last ballot measure 
during Youngman’s term occurred in 1992.  Prior to the 1992 measure, 
Youngman supported the measure, but vowed to run if the measure was 
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defeated.  Youngman was quoted, “If it gets defeated again, I’m going to run 
again.  People voted it down in previous years knowing I was going to run” 
(Fitzmaurice 1992).  Youngman also expressed the rationale for his support of 
the proposal, “The city is getting larger now, and in an election anyone can 
run…. If you get an inexperienced person who would win, it would be bad 
for the city” (Fitzmaurice 1992).  Youngman expressed concern that an elected 
police leader could be unqualified to hold the position, which could lead to 
negative consequences for the city.  The measures to move the City to an 
appointed police chief mirrored other St. Louis County cities in moving away 
from elected marshals (Fitzmaurice 1992). 
In April of 1993, Al Bryan won the marshal’s position defeating 
Youngman and another contender.  One former municipal official described 
the department, at that time, as having some good police officers with 
inconsistent levels of training and professionalism.  The former official went 
on to say the Department lacked a set of standard operating procedures.  
Since the police chief was elected, officers were expected to campaign for the 
chief and to promote the chief’s agenda.  Officers who campaigned for the 
winning chief, knew that the chief would protect them against citizen 
complaints and during disciplinary procedures.  The lack of procedures and 
the spoils of supporting a winning chief, led to a buddy system that created a 
pervasive political network within the Department (personal interview, July 
2, 2015). 
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Another former City official summarized an elected official’s point of 
view regarding the Department.  The former official made a statement that if 
he woke up and a Fenton police officer had been shot, he wouldn’t be sure if 
the officer was shot by the suspect they were chasing or another Fenton police 
officer (personal interview, July 8, 2015).  The implication is that, the 
department lacked professionalism.  One former County official believed that 
the department suffered from poor supervision, despite being paid well 
(personal interview, January 10, 2015). 
In January of 1995, tension between the elected Marshal and city 
leaders was publicized after two police officers, Gary Goede and Billy Ray 
Allen, were fired.  The officers were fired by the Board of Aldermen under 
the mayor’s recommendation.  However, Marshal Bryan had recommended 
disciplinary action, but not termination.  Goede argued that his termination 
was caused by a power struggle between the the Board of Aldermen and 
Bryan.  Goede believed that the Police Department was being micromanaged 
by City officials, requiring four signatures from City Hall for any purchase 
above $25.  Bryan cited the Board’s action as damaging to Departmental 
moral.  He was quoted, “Our officers are professionals and they want to do 
their job.  But this has people wondering if they’re going next” (Oliver 1995). 
In April of 1995, two years after Bryan’s election, Fenton voters were 
again asked to end the practice of electing a marshal in favor of an appointed 
police chief.  Fenton officials argued that moving to an appointed police chief 
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would ensure a qualified person was running the Department.  The 
proposition read, “Should city officials have the authority to hire a qualified 
chief of police rather than electing a city marshal” (Oliver 1995).  Unlike 
Youngman’s 1992 position, Bryan was against the proposed change.  Bryan 
believed that an appointed police chief would be beholden to elected officials 
and could be fired for political reasons.  Bryan was quoted, “That’s not good 
for the city, but it is good for the people in power” (Sutin 1995).  The proposal 
passed with a 7% margin and was set to take effect after Bryan’s term ended 
in 1997. 
Also, in April of 1995, Fenton residents were voting for mayor.  The 
incumbent Mayor, Joe Maurath, ran against Alderman Fran Ruzicka.  A news 
article that ran during the race highlighted issues within the police 
department.  The article noted that since the Spring of 1994 five police officers 
had resigned or been fired from the Department, which led some to claim a 
power struggle was occurring between Maurath and the Marshal.  Ruzicka 
stated he was concerned about the proposed ballot measure to change the 
selection of police chief because he feared it could lead to more scandal 
through nepotism or other patronage.  Maurath on the other hand favored 
hiring a law enforcement consultant to recommend changes to the City and 
the process to successfully select a police chief (Fitzmaurice 1995).  Ruzicka 
would go on to win the election. 
From January of 1995 to April 4, 1995, a span of three months, Fenton 
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officials had fired two police officers that garnered media attention to the 
police department, the method of choosing the police chief was changed, and 
a new mayor was elected.  According to several of the interviewed officials, 
personnel issues, particularly, the situation that led to the firing of Goede and 
Allen directly contributed to the decision to contract police services with St. 
Louis County.  Goode and Allen were accused of sexual harassment along 
with Bryan in one case. 
In 1994, a Fenton Police Dispatcher filed a lawsuit alleging she was 
sexually harassed by the former police officers and that Bryan promoted an 
environment conducive to sexual harassment.  The City of Fenton settled this 
lawsuit in 1996 for $110,000 (Oliver 1996).  Another incident occurred in 
which two gas station employees alleged that the two former police officers 
sexually harassed them in 1993 and 1994.  Both employees alleged that the 
officers made sexually explicit comments and one alleged that she was 
touched inappropriately (Bradford 1996).  The gas station employees filed a 
lawsuit in February of 1995, which the City settled in 1996 for a total of 
$160,000.  One former City official described the Chief’s reaction to the 
lawsuit brought by the gas station employees as callous, recalling he stated 
that “boys will be boys,” in response to the allegations (personal interview, 
July 8, 2015). 
The lawsuits and complaints led to several closed door meetings of the 
Board of Aldermen to discuss personnel issues and the police department.  
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The City Attorney and a subset of aldermen approached the County Police 
Department to ask for a proposal to police the City.  The initial request and 
discussions were done quietly, outside of the public eye.  Several bureaucrats 
close to the contract negotiations stated that the County was the only service 
provider approached by the City.  The proposal request from the County was 
favored by those in the negotiation process.  The proposal was then placed on 
the agenda of Fenton’s Board of Aldermen. 
On May 22, 1995, the Board of Aldermen, in a mostly closed session, 
voted to terminate members of the police department and then voted to enter 
into a five-year agreement with the County Police Department for patrol 
services.  The agreement cost $1,051,510 for the first year of service, and could 
not be increased more than eight percent in subsequent years.  Aldermen 
denied that the decision was political and defended the closed-door nature of 
the contracting discussions citing the myriad of personnel issues that 
surrounded the decision. 
News accounts related to the Board’s actions recount the speed with 
which the change occurred and the reactions of some community members.  
One article detailed the time officers were notified they had been fired, “The 
officers learned at 7:10 p.m. Monday [May 22] they had been fired and would 
receive two months severance pay” (Targovnik 1995).  The Tuesday after the 
decision, City Hall had received 50 to 60 calls from citizens regarding the 
change (Fitzmaurice, 1995).  One citizen, Holly McGarrahan was concerned 
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the County Police would not be as engaged.  McGarrahan was quoted, “We 
always had police officers driving down the street, stopping, talking with the 
kids…. We just don’t think we’ll have that with the county” (Targovnik 1995).  
Yet, another resident, Rose Matejcic, did not believe the change would impact 
the safety of the community (Targovnik 1995). 
In news articles, Fenton officials called the move a cost-saving 
measure.  Valerie Adams, administrative assistant to the Mayor, was quoted, 
“we will save $575,000 and probably get better service” (Fitzmaurice, 1995).  
The City Attorney, Jerome Wallach, also couched the decision as financial.  
Wallach was quoted, “It was a matter of fiscal responsibility…. Do you want 
the city to go into debt?” (Targovnik 1995).  The Wednesday following the 
decision, Mayor Ruzicka sent a letter to residents.  The Mayor’s letter was 
quoted, “The Board of Aldermen and I have been faced with many difficult 
decisions regarding the city’s future and its financial viability.  The city’s 
preliminary five-year financial projections indicate that the city will lose on 
an average up to 1.5 million per year in sales tax revenue…” (Fitzmaurice 
1995). 
Others doubted that finances drove the City’s decision to contract 
police services.  Mac Scott, who was the spokesman for County Executive 
George R. “Buzz” Westfall, doubted finances were behind the contracting 
decision (Fitzmaurice 1995).  Following the decision, the editorial board of the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch criticized the decision.  The writers criticized the 
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secrecy of the contracting discussions and the lack of public involvement.  
The editorial board also criticized the position statement of Alderman Jack 
Lauer, who defended the board’s secrecy by citing personnel issues.  The 
editorial stated, “Getting rid of a city’s police department is more than a 
personnel issue; it’s a restructuring of city services, one that should be open to 
debate by residents” (St. Louis Post Dispatch Editorial Board 1995).  The 
editorial also called the assertion that Fenton made the decision solely for 
financial reasons a “dubious assumption” and noted the City could find cost 
savings without disbanding its police department.  The editorial’s last 
paragraph summarizes the matter: 
Fenton’s flimsy rationales lead almost inescapably 
to the conclusion that the board was motivated by 
other reasons.  The Fenton police department has 
not been without controversy.  And the wholesale 
firing has spurred rumors of troubling problems 
with the Fenton police.  Is the real issue one of 
professionalism and public safety? Fenton 
residents have the right to get straight answers. 
 
To summarize one former City bureaucrat interviewed regarding this matter, 
underlying problems with the Police Department led to contracting 
discussions, but the City latched onto the idea when leaders realized a cost 
savings could also be obtained (personal interview, July 8, 2015).   
Despite the editorials, the news articles, and a small amount of public 
outcry, the decision was made and the City of Fenton was officially being 
patrolled by the St. Louis County Police Department.  A problem department 
was disbanded and the City realized a cost savings as part of the process. 
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Post-Contracting Decision 
After receiving the contract for police services, the St. Louis County 
Police appointed Timothy Fitch as the first commander of Fenton.  A former 
County Police leader described Fitch’s strong leadership abilities as a key to 
success in Fenton (personal interview, January 27, 2015).  After taking over 
police services, the County Police took a neighborhood policing philosophy.  
The use of neighborhood policing contributed to the success of the County 
Police in Fenton.  Fenton’s 1996 Annual Budget set out public safety goals that 
included neighborhood watch programs and continued support and 
participation in community policing programs.  The budget also highlighted 
the cooperative efforts made to establish community policing programs and 
the ability of the City to deliver quality services more economically through 
contracting (City of Fenton 1996). 
Since contracting in 1995, Fenton has maintained a police services 
contract with the County Police.  In 1995, Fenton allocated thirty-two percent 
of its budgeted general fund expenditures to police services.  The general 
fund budget allocation for police services averaged thirty percent for fiscal 
years 1993-1997 (Chart 5.4).  In 2015, Fenton’s budget allocation for police 
services had increased to forty-seven percent of its budgeted general fund 
expenditures.  The 2015 budget allocation for police services was a minor 
budgetary increase, three percent, over the previous year; and only a four 
percent increase in the budgeted general fund expenditures since the 2011 
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budget year (Chart 5.5).  The 2015 police services agreement called for 
twenty-one police officers, three sergeants, and one captain to be assigned to 
the City. 
Recently, the amount of revenue generated by municipalities from 
their municipal courts has been an important discussion point in St. Louis 
County.  Fenton’s budget for revenue generated by the municipal court has 
been low.  In 1995, when the police contract was enacted, Fenton expected the 
municipal court to generate two percent of its budgeted revenue.  In fiscal 
years 2011 through 2015, Fenton expected the municipal court to generate 
three percent of its budgeted revenue on average. 
In the past ten years, per capita crime rates in Fenton have trended 
higher than the average for St. Louis County.  In the past ten years, per capita 
crime rates in St. Louis County have averaged .03 reported UCR crimes per 
resident, while Fenton has averaged .11 reported UCR crimes per resident 
(Chart 5.6). 
The Fenton Policy Process and the Watchman Style 
Of the municipalities studied in this paper, Fenton’s story is unique 
because the City had an elected City Marshal prior to police contracting.  
Additionally, shortly before contracting began, the long-time marshal left 
office.  Marshal Youngman’s statements coupled with the number of failed 
ballot measures, which sought to change the marshal’s office, reveal 
important characteristics of Fenton prior to the contracting decision.  The 
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ballot measures provide evidence that Fenton officials sought to modernize 
and professionalize the police department years before contracting.  
However, the efforts of City leaders were rebuffed by the voters.  If 
Youngman was to be believed, the citizens of Fenton voted down the ballot 
measures because he was in office.  Youngman’s lengthy tenure may have 
prevented a policy window from opening when municipal leaders sought to 
professionalize the Police Department.  The failure of the ballot proposals 
indicate that the mood of the citizens did not support changes to Department 
management.  The failed ballot measures indicate that the image held by the 
electorate did not warrant the proposed changes. 
Focusing Event 
In late 1994 and early 1995, City leaders were aware of lawsuits 
pending against the department.  While City leaders had sought to change 
the Department under Youngman, they failed at the ballot box.  However, the 
pending allegations of police misconduct and the insipid response by the 
Marshal to address misconduct presented a true focusing event.  Kingdon 
argued that focusing events do not occur in a vacuum, rather they often 
reinforce an existing problem.  In the case of Fenton, City leaders were 
already engaged in an effort to modify the police structure.  The allegations of 
misconduct drove City leaders to focus their efforts on exploring alternatives 
to the existing police department.  Additionally, the focusing event was 
coupled with a shift in political mood, as indicated by the successful ballot 
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measure. 
Change in Image and Venue 
In the spring of 1995, Youngman was replaced by a new City Marshal 
and a new Mayor was elected.  This created a change in the actors responsible 
for decisions related to policing.  The image of the police department had 
changed within the community, as evidenced by the ballot measure and the 
image of the police department was further tarnished in the eyes of City 
leaders by the allegations of misconduct.  This represents a change in venue 
due to the changing actors and a change in image in how the Police 
Department was viewed. 
Watchman Style 
Prior to contracting, the Fenton Police Department displayed 
characteristics consistent with the watchman style of policing.  Accounts by 
prior police and City bureaucrats indicate that the city marshal would handle 
complaints through informal methods.  When the Board of Aldermen sought 
to take personnel actions contrary to the Marshal’s wishes, it was said he 
would simply rehire the officer. 
The watchman style is characterized by an organization that does not 
want to upset the status quo.  Maintaining the status quo would have been 
important for an elected marshal, who would have sought reelection and 
would have wanted to curry favor with the electorate.  The ballot initiative to 
move from an elected marshal to an appointed police chief, is consistent with 
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Wilson’s argument that a watchman style will often become a legalistic 
department with the appointment of a reform police chief, who would seek to 
institutionalize a set of professional standards.  However, the City contract 
with the County Police moved the policing style experienced in Fenton to the 
service style displayed by the County.  A highly professionalized police 
agency came into the City and emphasized community relations and 
community policing methods. 
Conclusion 
The Fenton case is supportive of the hypotheses.  First, a focusing 
event occurred, which drove the attention of City leaders to police issues and 
resulted in an exploration of police service alternatives.  Second, the City 
experienced a change in venue and image in relation to the Police 
Department that resulted in a dramatic shift in police policy.  Third, the 
Fenton Police Department displayed characteristics of the watchman style of 
policing, which left it vulnerable to corruption and misconduct.  The 
misconduct of the City’s officers directly contributed to the vulnerability of 
contracting. 
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Chapter 6 
Contract Municipality – Jennings 
The City of Jennings is approximately 3.7 square miles and is located 
in north St. Louis County.  The City is nestled outside of the City of St. Louis 
on the northern side of Interstate 70.  Jennings was incorporated in 1946, a 
time that saw an explosion of municipal incorporations.  Jennings was one of 
more than fifty municipalities that incorporated between 1945 and 1952 
(Jones 2000, 30).  The City’s name came from James Jennings, a slave-owning 
farmer who settled the area in 1839 (Jennings Historical Society 2014).  
Jennings population grew after annexation, peaking in the 1960 census 
number, only to decrease (Chart 6.1).  In 2010, the City’s population had 
dropped below the 1950 census level of 15,282 residents to 14,712 residents 
(United States Department of Commerce 1952 and 2012).  The City has also 
seen a dramatic shift in its demographic characteristics since incorporation 
(Chart 6.2).  In 1950, census figures indicated the City was one hundred 
percent white.  However, in the 2010 census, the white population of the city 
had dropped to 9 percent. 
Jennings is classified as a third-class city and has a mayor-council form 
of government.  The mayor is responsible for the management of the City and 
serves a four-year term.  The City is broken into four wards with two 
representatives from each ward on the board of aldermen.  Aldermen serve 
two year terms. 
Jennings is a “pool city,” which means it shares tax revenues on a per 
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capita basis with other municipalities within St. Louis County.  For fiscal 
years 2011 through 2015, the City has averaged a general fund budget deficit, 
general fund revenues have averaged $8,454,690 while general fund 
expenditures have averaged $8,708,900 (Chart 6.3).  The City began 
contracting police service from the St. Louis County Police in 2011.  Based 
upon the City’s fiscal year 2011 budget, the average patrol officer salary was 
approximately $36,526 before contracting with the County (City of Jennings 
2010).  
The Contracting Decision 
West Florissant Avenue runs out of the City of St. Louis through 
Jennings and continues into Ferguson.  In the aftermath of the Ferguson 
police involved of August 9, 2014, Jennings and Ferguson shared more than a 
common street: at one time they each employed Darren Wilson, the officer 
who was involved in the shooting.  Wilson had worked at the Jennings Police 
Department prior to Ferguson.  The troubles that had faced the Jennings 
Police Department suddenly made their way to the top news stories of 
leading news outlets.  A New York Times article that laid out Wilson’s life 
stated that Jennings provided the formative experiences of Wilson’s policing 
career and those experiences came in a Department rife with problems.  The 
article stated, “[the Department] wrestled historically with issues of racial 
tension, mismanagement and turmoil” (Davey and Robles 2014).  Another 
article featured in the Washington Post had the emblazoned headline, “Darren 
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Wilson’s first job was on a troubled police force disbanded by authorities” 
(Leonnig, Kindy, and Achenbach 2014).  The article’s first paragraph 
described the former Jennings Police Department, “[the City] had a police 
department so troubled, and with so much tension between white officers 
and black residents, that the city council finally decided to disband it” 
(Leonnig, Kindy, and Achenbach 2014).   
The media accounts given regarding the Jennings Police Department 
paint an exaggerated picture of the situation in Jennings prior to the decision 
to contract police services from the County.  Although exaggerated, these 
media accounts demonstrate how the contracting decision in Jennings shaped 
the perception of the police department.  As one former County police 
bureaucrat stated, Jennings decision to contract police service was rooted in a 
crisis surrounding misappropriated grant money (personal interview, June 9, 
2014).  Yet another County police bureaucrat familiar with the contract 
negotiations believed the decision to contract police services was made easier 
through the discovery of fraudulently used grant money as well as an 
incident of misapplied force and racial tensions between the Police 
Department and the community (January 10, 2015). 
Between 2007 and 2009, the Jennings Police Department received 
grants from other governmental agencies to conduct overtime enforcement 
operations related to driving while intoxicated (DWI) violations.  In the 
spring of 2010, it was discovered that thousands of dollars went to pay 
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overtime to officers for conducting DWI enforcement operations in 
accordance with the terms of the grant.  However, DWI enforcement 
operations were never actually conducted, meaning members of the Police 
Department engaged in fraud. 
Robert Orr was the Jennings Police Chief at the time of the DWI grant 
misuse.  Orr was a long-time Jennings Police Department employee who 
worked his way up to lead the Department.  Orr retired on Friday, October 
29, 2010, during the investigation of the DWI grant fraud.  Disavowing any 
knowledge of the fraudulent activity, Orr was quoted in one news article as 
saying, “Some accusations were made…that I should have known what was 
going on, but that’s not possible because there were no checkpoints 
performed in the last 2 1/2 years…there were no checkpoints to watch” 
(Hollinshed 2010).  Orr was defended by then Jennings Mayor Benjamin 
Sutphin, who stated, “Chief Orr had nothing to do with this [DWI grant 
fraud], and this has nothing to do with his retirement” (Hampel 2010). 
In preparation of Orr’s retirement and in the wake of the DWI scandal, 
City leaders requested the County Police Department appoint a County 
Police captain as interim chief as well as conduct an in-depth analysis of 
police operations.  On November 1, 2010, County Police Captain Troy Doyle 
assumed the position of interim chief overseeing police officers employed by 
the Jennings Police Department.  Doyle was the former commander of the 
County’s North County Precinct who sought to strengthen neighborhood 
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watch programs and hot-spot policing within Jennings (Hollinshed 2010).  
Doyle’s initial term was slated to last until May 2011.  Mayor Sutphin was 
quoted, “Doyle will be in charge at least until we get this situation cleaned up 
and the department straightened out” (Hampel 2010).  Some worried that 
Doyle’s presence was a step toward a County take-over, which was not ruled 
out by Mayor Sutphin or Tim Fitch, the County’s Police Chief.  Sutphin was 
quoted, 
“At the end of May, we’ll evaluate whether to hire 
our own chief and continue with an independent 
police department, or to ask the county to take 
over completely…. Our officers were grumbling 
that this was just a path to move them out in favor 
of county officers.  I told them that it wouldn’t 
have to end up that way if they got their act 
together” (Hampel 2010). 
 
For his part, Chief Fitch was quoted, “at that point [in May of 2011], it will be 
a matter of figuring out the cost…. If Jennings can afford it, we will provide 
it” (Hampel 2010). 
In early January of 2011, the Jennings Police Department was once 
again receiving negative media attention after a police pursuit and the firing 
of shots by a Jennings Police Officer.  On Tuesday, January 4, 2011, a Bel-
Ridge police officer conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle containing two 
females and a child.  During the stop, a female passenger slid to the driver’s 
seat and drove off, hitting the officer as she fled.  Bel-Ridge officers initially 
pursued the vehicle, but ended the pursuit due to the presence of a child in 
the vehicle.  A Jennings police officer encountered the vehicle and began a 
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pursuit based upon police radio traffic that indicated the driver was wanted 
for assaulting a police officer.  The Jennings officer was not aware of the 
presence of a child in the vehicle.  During the pursuit, a Jennings officer 
attempted to shoot out the vehicle’s tires.  The attempt to shoot out the tires 
failed.  The chase came to an end in the City of St. Louis and the officer was 
subsequently suspended (Bell 2011).  The aftermath resulted in another 
incident of questionable police practices by Jennings’ police officers. 
City leaders initially indicated discussions of police contracting would 
not happen until May of 2011, but those discussions happened months 
earlier.  On February 10, 2011, citizens crowded into a town hall meeting to 
discuss the possibility of a County police contract.  City officials presented a 
list of contracting advantages and County officials promised the City could 
maintain control, local identity, and that the move was not a County take 
over.  Contracting was expected to save the City money due to decreased 
liability and legal expenses.  Residents, including Jean Deeds, who had lived 
in the City for forty-two years, wanted everything to stay the way it was.  
One council member expressed concerns regarding the proposed County 
contract (O’Connell 2011).  Councilwoman Yolonda Fountain-Henderson did 
not think the City should rush into a police contract.  She was quoted, “I feel 
like with the problems that we have, they can be fixed.  The problem was 
leadership, we can fix it as a community” (O’Connell 2011).  Councilman 
Rodney Epps supported the policing decision and was quoted, “We have bad 
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policing here, and it costs us money…. We have a mess, why do you think the 
county is here?  If we didn’t have a mess, they wouldn’t be here” (O’Connell 
2011). 
Despite the concerns of residents and Councilwoman Fountain-
Henderson, on February 28, 2011, the Jennings City Council voted 6-1 to hire 
the County Police through a contractual agreement.    Councilwoman 
Fountain-Henderson abstained from the vote.  She had filed a lawsuit 
attempting to block the contract decision and characterized the contract as a 
take over (O’Connell 2011).  Mayor Sutphin defended the contract citing the 
problems with the in-house police agency.  Another Councilman Dennis 
Campbell was quoted following the decision, “It’s so easy to do the right 
thing, it’s like a no-brainer for me” (O’Connell 2011).  The contract began on 
March 12, 2011. 
As discussed, media accounts of the Jennings Police Department at the 
time of the contracting decision largely focused on issues related to grant 
funds and police misconduct.  However, other issues have been identified as 
factors in the contracting decision, namely potential collective bargaining of 
police officers and racial tensions between the community and the police. 
A City official close to the contracting process stated that while 
corruption was the primary driver for the contracting decision, concerns of 
unionization and collective bargaining also played into the decision.  This 
City stated that police officers had sought to unionize prior to the decision to 
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contract.  Fearing the possibility of unionization, Mayor Sutphin pushed for a 
County police services contract to avoid unionization.  A former police 
bureaucrat stated that Jennings police officers wanted a collective bargaining 
agreement that would strengthen disciplinary procedures.  This official citied 
the Mayor’s unwillingness to bargain as the primary driver of the contracting 
decision.  Solidifying disciplinary procedures was necessary because the 
Department ran on a “good ol’ boy system,” in which disciplinary policies 
and procedures were unfairly followed and enforced (personal interview, 
October 30, 2015). 
County and City officials close to the contracting process also cited 
racial tensions between the City and the Police Department.  The City had 
seen a demographic shift that was not reflected in the police administration.  
One City leader stated non-residents would avoid coming through Jennings 
because the police would frequently stop motorists.  Department members 
were known to enforce the law with a heavy hand, with a particular focus on 
traffic violations, which led to a disconnect between the police and local 
youth.  Despite the claims of racial tensions, a City leader observed the 
Jennings Police Department knew members of the community, would stop 
and speak with community members, and were visible (personal interview, 
June 16, 2015).  A former police official stated that the Jennings Police 
Department would police fairly, but racial minorities were fearful of police 
(personal interview, October 30, 2015). 
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While unionization and racial tensions were not topics of discussion in 
the media surrounding the contracting decision, they are important to note in 
this paper.  The fact that leaders observed these underlying issues are an 
important note in understanding the undercurrents of the contracting 
decision.  The problem of unionization was solved by the County Police 
because the County contract relieved the City of personnel issues.  The 
County also sought to improve police and community relations through 
community policing strategies, such as neighborhood watch programs. 
Post-Contracting Decision 
After receiving the contract for police services, Captain Troy Doyle 
remained the commander of Jennings.  County police officers patrolling the 
City were assigned cars marked “City of Jennings” and police patches specific 
to Jennings were put on County Police uniforms in an effort to maintain local 
identity.  In Mayor Sutphin’s budget letter for fiscal year 2012, Sutphin stated, 
“the contract with St. Louis County for police services resulted in savings in 
both the general revenue and capital improvement fund” (City of Jennings 
2011).  The cost savings contributed to a two percent pay increase for full-time 
employees. 
A former County Police administrator stated that the County took an 
active role in policing through community policing strategies.  The County 
police utilized data to determine the areas with the highest rates of crime and 
then focused on policing those areas the hardest.  The former administrator 
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credited County’s community policing efforts as a factor that decreased crime 
rates within the City (personal interview, January 10, 2015). 
The initial contract divided the City into four beats, to be staffed 
twenty-four hours per day and seven days per week.  The contract provided 
thirty-three commissioned officers from the County police, which consisted of 
one (1) commanding officer, which was identified as a Lieutenant in the 
original contract and later modified to Captain, six (6) sergeants, and twenty-
six (26) police officers (City of Jennings and St. Louis County, Missouri 2011 
and 2015). 
From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015, the percentage of the 
general fund expenditures dedicated to supporting the police contract has 
averaged thirty-three percent.  The total general fund expenditures dedicated 
to police and public safety expenses have increased since the inception of 
contracting from the years immediately proceeding the contracting decision 
(Chart 6.4).  The City’s expected revenue from fines and fees has slightly 
increased for budgets during the County Police contract. 
In April of 2015, Fountain-Henderson, the former councilwoman who 
attempted to gain a legal injunction against the police contract, was elected 
Mayor of Jennings.  In September of 2015, the newly-elected Mayor and 
another councilwoman raised concerns regarding harassment of residents by 
County police and a lack of patrols.  Concerns regarding the lack of a bidding 
process to award the police contract were also raised (Byers 2015).  Later in 
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the month, elected City leaders announced the police services contract would 
be put out to bid in anticipation of the March 11, 2016 expiration date of the 
County police services contract.  During the announcement that the contract 
would be put to bid, previously raised issues of County police performance 
were downplayed.  Rather, City officials said the contract had to be put to bid 
in order to comply with City policies.  A news article that ran regarding the 
announcement described the public’s support for the County police.  One 
resident was quoted, “I don’t see personally how we can do any better than 
St. Louis County” (Fowler 2015).  The County police commander, Captain 
Jeffrey Fuesting, pointed to decreasing crime rates and community support in 
response to the announcement (Fowler 2015). 
In the past ten years, per capita crime rates in Jennings have trended 
higher than St. Louis County, but per capita crime rates have decreased in 
recent years and have shown further decreases under the County police 
contract.  In the past ten years, per capita crime rates in St. Louis County have 
averaged .03 reported UCR crimes per resident, while Jennings has averaged 
.08 reported UCR crimes per resident (Chart 6.5). 
The Jennings Policy Process and the Watchman Style 
 The Jennings case supports the hypotheses of this paper.  There were 
two focusing events as well as a change in image and venue.  Prior to 
contracting, the Jennings Police Department displayed characteristics 
associated with the watchman style of policing. 
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Focusing Event 
Jennings had two independent focusing events that contributed to the 
contracting decisions.  Jennings Police had long grumbled about low pay and 
high work demands.  In 2005, Jennings faced a growing crime rate, an 
increase in violent crime, and a police force demanding higher pay (Cambria 
2005).    Yet, the City did not contract and in 2010 the City’s police officers 
made an average of $10,000 less than the County average for police officers 
working in other municipalities (St. Louis County 2010).  In 2005, Robert Orr 
was the Police Chief.  Orr was still at the helm of the Department when his 
employees corruptly obtained overtime funds between 2007 and 2009 and 
when the investigation came to light in 2010.  The fraudulent receipt of grant 
money associated with DWI enforcement efforts served as Jenning’s first 
focusing event.  This event led to the retirement of Orr and the installation of 
a County police bureaucrat to oversee and evaluate the Department’s policies 
and procedures. 
The installation of a County commander, was the first step in opening 
the policy window.  First, a focusing event occurred, which defined the 
institution as problematic.  Second, the political forces in the City of Jennings 
supported changing the manner in which the Police Department ran when 
they asked the County to oversee and evaluate the police situation.  Third, the 
installation of County Police commander, put into place a new set of policy 
specialists.  During the initial discussions surrounding the installation of the 
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County Police Captain, the County Police Chief was already discussing 
contracting in the media, laying a foundation for the subsequent outcome. 
The second focusing event was the misapplied use of force by a 
Jennings police officer.  A little over a month later, the City decided to 
contract police services.  This second focusing event further illuminated both 
procedural and personnel issues with the Jennings Police Department and 
opened the City to another potential lawsuit.  All of these issues could be 
solved through a County Police contract.  The County invested time and 
resources explaining the potential benefits of contractual police provision.  
The corruption within the Department opened the policy window, but the 
misapplied use of force kept the policy window open for a longer period of 
time, which further increased the chances for contracting. 
Change in Image and Venue 
The decision to contract police services in Jennings was accompanied 
by a change in image and venue during a period of destabilization.  The 
change in image occurred in the wake of the two focusing events.  The image 
of the Department was shaped by the focusing events, leaving a dark cloud of 
corruption and unprofessionalism over the Department. 
A change in venue can be characterized as a change in the institutions 
that control policy issues.  In this instance, City leaders invited the County 
Police to appoint a police commander to oversee the Department.  This 
appointment was done after news of the misapplied grant funds broke and 
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the police chief resigned, which led to instability.  Once County command 
was in place, the policies and practices of the Department were scrutinized.  
The presence of County Police commander during the second focusing event 
allowed the County control the policy narrative.  When Councilman Epps 
pointed to bad policing by the municipal Department, he referred to the 
County as an agency that was brought in to handle a policy problem. 
Watchman Style 
The Jennings Police Department prior to contracting displayed 
attributes associated with the watchman style of policing.  The Department 
was described as one that frequently enforced traffic regulations with a heavy 
hand, particularly on those from outside the City.  While the watchman style 
is described as having a focus on order maintenance over formal law 
enforcement action, the watchman style left room for aggressive policing in 
certain areas, such as traffic enforcement, particularly with a select group of 
individuals such as outsiders driving through the municipality.  The 
watchman style also described the police as withdrawing from relationships 
with African-American citizens, which could lead to a perception of racial 
tensions.  Jennings displayed attributes of the watchman style in the methods 
of police enforcement. 
Jennings also displayed attributes of the watchman style in the 
organizational context.  Watchman style departments are characterized by 
low pay.  Jennings officers were paid salaries lower than the County average 
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for municipal officers.  A small police agency, such as Jennings, limited the 
ability to develop specialization and advanced training opportunities, which 
is characteristic of a watchman style department.  Lack of oversight and 
standardized procedures are also typical of watchman style departments.  
The lack of oversight was demonstrated in the DWI grant scandal when the 
Police Chief admitted his lack of knowledge in the fraud related to DWI 
grants. 
Policy Entrepreneur 
Jennings is the first example where the County’s actions reflect those of 
a policy entrepreneur.  A policy entrepreneur is an organization or individual 
willing to expend resources in the hopes of obtaining a policy they favor.  The 
County favored a police contract and the investment of a full-time police 
commander, although reimbursed, helped ensure an outcome favorable to 
the County.  The County commander not only oversaw the Department, but a 
comprehensive examination of the Department’s operations was undertaken.  
The County also invested time and resources preparing a proposal for police 
services and explaining the potential benefits of contractual police provision. 
Conclusion 
The Jennings case further substantiates the hypotheses.  Jennings was 
the subject of an investigation concerning the fraudulent use of DWI grant 
funds, which acted as a focusing event that drew attention to corruption 
within the department.  This focusing event led to a change in image and 
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venue and the appointment of a County commander to oversee the agency.  
A second focusing event, further changed the image of the agency and 
allowed for policy entrepreneurs and experts to further frame the agency as 
unprofessional.   
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Chapter 7 
Contract Municipality: Dellwood 
 
Jennings and Dellwood were both incorporated during a time of 
explosive growth in the number of municipalities incorporating between 1945 
and 1952.  Dellwood’s incorporation came at the tail end of this period of 
municipal growth, with incorporation in the year 1951.  Dellwood is classified 
as a fourth class city.  The City covers 1.03 square miles of territory in north 
St. Louis County.  The first census after incorporation, the 1960 census, 
showed the City’s population at 4,713 (United States Department of 
Commerce 1961).  The 1970 census showed a peak in the City’s population at 
7,137 (United States Department of Commerce 1973), however, the City’s 
population began decreasing in subsequent census years and had dropped to 
5,025 residents in the 2010 census (United States Department of Commerce 
2012) (Chart 7.1).  Like Jennings, Dellwood has seen a dramatic demographic 
shift since incorporation.  In the 1960 census the City was 97% white, while 
the 2010 census showed a white population of 18% (United States 
Department of Commerce 1961 and 2012) (Chart 7.2). 
As a fourth class city, the City has elected to be governed by a mayor-
city administrator-aldermen form of government.  The City is broken into 
four wards with two aldermen elected from each ward.  Unlike Fenton and 
Jennings, Dellwood has a city administrator who is responsible for 
supervising City operations.  The City participates in the sales tax pool and 
has had a mostly balanced budget in the past five fiscal years (Chart 7.3).   
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In the 2010 survey of County police departments, Dellwood reported 
having a force of seventeen officers (St. Louis County 2010).  Dellwood began 
contracting police services from the County Police Department in 2012. 
The Contracting Decision 
In April of 2011, former alderwoman Loretta Johnson was elected 
mayor of Dellwood.  Johnson was Dellwood’s first African American mayor.  
She replaced Jack Agnew, who had served as Dellwood’s mayor for twelve 
years.  One former City bureaucrat described the operation of the City as a 
mom and pop shop in which the police department did not operate under a 
set of formalized rules and regulations.  The Mayor hired a new city 
administrator who found several problems with City management.  Attempts 
were made by the Mayor and newly appointed administrator to modernize 
and professionalize City departments, only to receive push back from 
entrenched bureaucrats (personal interview, January 2, 2015). 
The Dellwood Police Department was described as an agency with 
several internal problems in early 2011.  There were rifts between officers 
motivated by race.  The ability to discipline officers was obstructed by 
personal relationships within the Board of Aldermen.  When disciplinary 
actions would go before the aldermen, officers would employ their personal 
relationships in such a way as to thwart severe disciplinary action.  The 
ability to influence disciplinary proceedings was particularly beneficial to 
three or four officers who were frequently the subject of complaints. 
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Despite the internal problems brewing within the police department, 
officers were paid at a level similar to their colleagues in other municipal 
departments.  In 2010, the average salary for a police officer in Dellwood was 
$46,795 while the average pay for a municipal police officer in St. Louis 
County was $46,154 (St. Louis County 2010).  The Department consisted of 
sixteen officers with an average of twelve years of service (Walker 2011). 
After the April election, City leaders attempted to hold a hiring 
process for the Department, with a focus on recruitment of not only qualified 
applicants, but also minority applicants.  The process did not net the results 
City leaders had hoped.  In the fall of 2011, City leaders stealthily approached 
the St. Louis County Police to discuss the possibility of contracting police 
services. 
A former City official speculated racism was behind the initial contract 
discussions.  When the Mayor took office, the department had a small 
number of minority officers.  It was believed that Mayor Johnson sought to 
replace the internal department in hopes of gaining more minority officers, 
which would reflect the changing demographics of Dellwood.  The official 
stated the negative information that was published about the Dellwood Police 
Department was trumped up to tarnish the reputation of the Department 
(personal interview, May 20, 2015). 
News of the potential contract began to spread in late November.  On 
Monday, November 28, 2011, residents crowded into a council meeting to 
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express their support for the Dellwood Police Department.  One resident 
collected signatures in support of the Police Department.  A news account of 
the meeting summarized the comments made by many residents in 
attendance, “[Residents said] the officers were more like family than a city 
service…telling stories of officers helping them with personal problems, 
checking on them after accidents or family deaths, and knowing them on a 
level that made them feel safer” (Walker 2011).  At the meeting, the City 
Attorney Donnell Smith cited personnel issues as the rationale for exploring 
contracting options with St. Louis County and that the process was just 
beginning.  Mayor Johnson refused to comment since the decision revolved 
around personnel matters.  Chief Fitch of the County Police indicated City 
leaders had approached the County approximately two weeks prior to 
November 28 (Walker 2011). 
After the open forum, the council went into closed session.  During the 
closed session, Police Chief Fred Haunold was placed on administrative 
leave.  The City agreed to pay the salary of a County Police lieutenant and the 
County agreed to provide a sergeant at no cost to the City.  The agreement 
called for the County to oversee the police department (Walker 2011).   
In the wake of these discussions and the replacement of police 
leadership, police members went door to door seeking support for the 
Department.  Aldermen reported that some citizens feared supporting the 
switch to St. Louis County because they felt threatened by the door to door 
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campaign.  Alderwoman Dawnn Tanksley was quoted, “They [the residents] 
were terrified…I had to assure them that it would be okay. That didn’t do any 
good - they were still afraid…The day they started canvassing, I had several 
residents that were offended and afraid…like they were being targeted.  They 
were intimidated” (Rivas 2011). 
On December 7, 2011, a town hall was held with several hundred 
residents in attendance, the majority supported keeping an independent 
Dellwood police agency.  City Administrator Frank Myers defended the 
aldermen’s decision to explore a police contract option citing several 
concerns, including increased crime rates, personnel issues, improper 
handling of evidence, and improper reporting of crime statistics to state and 
federal authorities.  While City leaders and aldermen explored a County 
police contract, some aldermen were skeptical.  Alderman James Lovings 
called for the matter to be placed on the ballot (Walker 2011). 
The next day, on December 8, 2011, a special session was called to vote 
on dissolving the Police Department and contracting with the County.  
However, no vote was taken because the requisite number of aldermen for a 
quorum was lacking.  This session foreshadowed a months long stand-off and 
legal battle between aldermen trying to prevent a County takeover and those 
willing to dissolve the Department. 
After news of a potential County takeover became public, police 
officers began applying for jobs with the County.  Several of Dellwood’s 
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fifteen officers were hired by the County Police in the wake of the 
announcement.  This led to a dire situation for police protection in Dellwood, 
which resulted in the Mayor ordering a state of emergency because the City 
lacked enough police officers to adequately patrol the City. 
On Monday, January 10, 2012, the Mayor asked the County Police to 
cover some police patrols in the City.  The Mayor was quoted, “our city has 
become unable to conduct normal business and our citizens will suffer 
without assistance” (Currier 2012).  The County agreed to patrol the City 
during day shifts.  However, County police officers would only be able to 
enforce state laws.  As a practical matter, this meant County officers would 
not write traffic tickets or handle other low level nuisance crimes, such as 
abandoned vehicles (Currier 2012).   
The County Police Chief acknowledged that residents may have a hard 
time accepting the presence of County officers.  He was quoted, “We fully 
expect that people will be against us and will test us…. We know there are 
people hoping and praying that we screw up” (Currier 2012).  Alderman 
James Lovings, who protested the County contract by boycotting council 
meetings, was a vocal critic of the proposed change.  Lovings argued that the 
dwindling police force was the only way to ensure support for a contract.  
Lovings was quoted, “The only way (Johnson) could get St. Louis County to 
Dellwood was to get our officers gone…. The way to get them gone was to 
lean on Chief Fitch to take our officers” (Currier 2012).  Lovings argued that 
	 107	
the matter of a police contract should be put before the residents on the next 
municipal ballot. 
In the media accounts surrounding the County patrols, County 
Sergeant Dave Kopfensteiner, stated issues had been discovered with 
Dellwood’s evidence procedures.  Particularly, Dellwood had not sent 
evidence that required analysis by the crime laboratory.  This information 
foreshadowed additional revelations of a County audit that would cast a dark 
shadow on the competency of the Department. 
In late January of 2012, additional revelations were made about 
mishandling of evidence by the Dellwood Police Department.  A newspaper 
account summarized the problems: “In the audit, St. Louis County police 
allege that Dellwood officers sold copper tubing from the police evidence 
locker to a copper scrap yard…evidence had been destroyed or was never 
returned to its owner…[and] guns had been taken from the locker by officers 
for personal use (Walker 2012).”  In the same newspaper account Chief Fitch 
praised Dellwood officials for bringing the matter to light while Alderman 
Lovings, one of the four Aldermen boycotting council meetings, defended the 
Police Department (Walker 2012). 
Almost a month later, in late February of 2012, news was released that 
the Dellwood police had mishandled cases, to include egregious crimes such 
as reported cases of rape.  The County reported that between 2009 and 2011, 
121 cases were mishandled.  In many cases, the initial report and follow-up 
	 108	
work generated leads that led to a suspect, but Department members failed to 
complete the case and seek a warrant for the subject’s arrest.  A news article 
presenting the mishandling of cases to the public cited a woman, Felicia 
Vanderford, whose son had been murdered in the City.  Vanderford 
described how she was contacted by police during the homicide 
investigation.  She was told that police had conducted an investigation and a 
suspect had been developed.  However, the subject was not arrested and had 
not been prosecuted (Walker 2012). 
Former City officials argued the report of mishandled cases was blown 
out of proportion.  These officials cited a lack of witnesses and victim 
cooperation as the primary reason warrants were not applied for by 
detectives.  Officials argued that this was an easy way to further tarnish the 
reputation of the police unnecessarily.  One former official pointed out that 
St. Louis County had unsolved cases and that their policing methods may not 
result in successful prosecutions in all cases (personal interview, May 20, 
2015). 
Despite several months of negative reporting about Dellwood police, 
four aldermen continued to boycott council meetings.  On April 3, 2012, a 
municipal election was held leading to the election of three new aldermen 
and the reelection of an incumbent.  Two of the boycotting aldermen, Richard 
Culberson and Donald Haynes, were replaced.  Culberson did not seek 
reelection and Haynes was unseated.  James Lovings, a boycotting aldermen 
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was reelected.  Nine days after the election, the stalemate came to an end and 
the board approved a contract with the County police.  The measure passed 
5-3.  Newly elected Alderman Ellis Fitzwalter and previously boycotting 
aldermen Lovings and Karen Bober voted against the measure. 
Dellwood elected police service from St. Louis County, but unlike the 
other municipalities studied, Dellwood received a second proposal from 
Ferguson, a neighboring municipality.  The two proposals were vastly 
different.  The County proposed a contract that would cost approximately 
$1.3 million annually, while Ferguson proposed a contract that would cost 
approximately $621,000 annually.  The County proposal would assign twelve 
officers to the City of Dellwood while Ferguson would hire six additional 
officers.  Ferguson’s officers would be assigned beats that covered Dellwood, 
but would not be primarily responsible for policing Dellwood.  Then 
Ferguson Police Chief Tom Jackson was quoted, “We’d be adding people to 
each platoon and changing our beat plan to maximize our response times and 
efficiency” (Byers 2012). 
Post Contracting Decision 
Dellwood has continued contracting with County Police since 
beginning the contract in 2012.  An amendment to the contract was executed 
in June of 2015 because the City elected to remove the lieutenant position.  
The County would still provide twelve officers and a sergeant.  In post 
contracting fiscal years, the percentage of general fund expenditures 
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dedicated to contracting has averaged fifty-five percent (55%). 
A few people interviewed described the County Police as being purely 
“reactive.”  The officers assigned to the City were spending their time outside 
of City assisting with other calls for service being handled by the County 
Police.  The former Dellwood Police Department was described as being 
present and visible, driving down every street every day, but that daily 
presence was lacking with the County Police (personal interview, May 20, 
2015). 
Since contracting with St. Louis County, the City has seen an increase 
in reported crime.  In the last ten years, the City saw a spike in reported crime 
since 2011 (Chart 7.4).  In 2010, there were .04 reported UCR crimes per 
resident and .01 reported violent crimes per resident.  In 2014, there were .07 
reported UCR crimes per resident and .02 reported violent crimes per 
resident. 
The Dellwood Policy Process and the Watchman Style 
Dellwood’s path to a police contract had the most drama of any of the 
municipalities studied.  The contracting process took almost four months, 
with a persistent media narrative that the existing department was 
unprofessional while four aldermen boycotted meetings.  Despite the drama 
associated with the contracting decision, Dellwood’s path to contracting is 
supportive of the hypotheses. 
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Focusing Event 
Dellwood represents a variation of a focusing event when a symbol 
emerges and diffuses.  In these instances, as with all focusing events, an 
underlying issue, such as an unprofessional City department is coupled with 
a focusing event.  However, instead of the traditional focusing event, a 
symbol emerges and then the issue spreads.  In the case of Dellwood the 
Department became a symbol of an unprofessional police agency.  The 
unprofessionalism began to diffuse as the St. Louis County Police began to 
audit the department and uncover issues.  As the County began uncovering 
issues, the web of problems grew wider and culminated when attention was 
called to the mishandling of egregious violent crimes. 
Change in Image and Venue 
The Dellwood case exemplifies a change in venue and image.   The 
first change in venue occurred when Mayor Johnson was elected and hired a 
new city administrator.  The venue continued to change when the County 
police were asked to provide oversight of the Department.  The addition of a 
new administrator and the invitation of County police into municipal affairs 
changed the authorities that were responsible for making decisions regarding 
police policies. 
A change in image occurred as the County Police began conducting 
audits of the Department.  The negative reporting concerning the 
investigative abilities of the Dellwood Police Department changed the tone 
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surrounding the Department.  The narrative about the Department changed 
to unprofessionalism.  
Despite the initial change in venue and image, a change in police 
service did not immediately occur because of the boycotting aldermen.  The 
change in service providers did not occur until another venue change 
occurred after the April 2012 municipal elections when the Board of 
Aldermen was reshaped, which allowed for a police contract agreement. 
Watchman Style 
Similar to the other municipalities studied, the Dellwood Police 
Department displayed characteristics of the watchman style.  The politics of 
the watchman style are marked by a lack of political willpower to 
professionalize and modernize the police department, in part because of poor 
city administration.  The City of Dellwood suffered from a “mom and pop” 
attitude toward city administration for years prior to the election of Mayor 
Johnson.  This attitude carried over to the police department.  Political 
willpower to professionalize the department did not exist.  Even during the 
initial contract negotiations when unprofessional actions by police were made 
public, political willpower was lacking. 
The police chief prior to the decision to contract had a long tenure with 
the Department, which is consistent with the watchman style.  Officers lacked 
specialization despite pay that was on par with the average pay of other 
municipal police departments throughout the County.  The Department had a 
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small detective bureau.  However, as the County audit discovered, detectives 
did an inadequate job on investigations. 
Policy Entrepreneur 
Similar to Jennings, the County police acted as a policy entrepreneur in 
the Dellwood case.  The County police were provided legitimacy in 
reviewing Dellwood when they were invited into the City and asked to 
conduct a review of the existing police agency based upon their expertise.  
The County’s presence helped move the agenda of contracting forward in 
two visible ways.  First, the County audit uncovered deficiencies in the 
existing police service.  Second, the introduction of the County police helped 
create a shortage in Dellwood’s ability to field enough police officers to serve 
the town.  This allowed the County to provide officers to cover the day shift 
and introduced them into the day to day operations related to policing the 
City. 
When the topic of police contracting was first discussed, Dellwood 
residents spoke out against disbanding Dellwood’s police force.  When 
additional officers were needed to police the City, the County police provided 
resources to fill the void. After agreeing to provide officers, County Police 
Chief Fitch was quoted, “We fully expect people will be against us…so we 
have to be prepared to become immediately subjected to scrutiny” (Currier 
2012).  The quote exemplifies the policy entrepreneur role of the County 
because resources were provided in the hopes of swaying citizen opinions 
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about police services.  If citizens who were previously critical of County 
Police were able to interact with County Police, it may result in a positive 
shift in public opinion.  A positive shift in public opinion could quell critical 
voices. 
Conclusion 
Dellwood’s march toward police contracting has the most drama of the 
case studies presented in this paper.  A new mayor sought to professionalize 
City services and in the process brought in a larger Department to oversee 
and review the practices of the police, which resulted in a new narrative of an 
unprofessional police agency.  However, attempts to contract police services 
led to a boycott by members of the Council.  After a municipal election a year 
after the Mayor’s election, a vote was finally taken to contract police services.   
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Chapter 8 
Non-Contract Municipality: Rock Hill 
Rock Hill is one of two case studies in which police contracting was 
discussed and debated, but not implemented.  Rock Hill was incorporated in 
1929.  The City was given its name by a Presbyterian minister who 
encountered two steep and rocky hills while going to the area to celebrate a 
service (City of Rock Hill).   
The City is classified as a fourth class city and covers a little over one 
square mile in the middle of the County.  The City is bisected by Manchester 
Road.  Between the 1940 and 1970 census the City’s population grew from a 
low of 1,821 residents to a high of 7,275 residents (United States Department 
of Commerce 1943 and 1973).  After 1970, the City’s population began to 
decline to 4,635 residents in the 2010 census (Chart 8.1) (United States 
Department of Commerce 2012).  In the last thirty years, the City has not 
experienced a large demographic shift (Chart 8.2). 
As a fourth class city, the City has elected to be governed by a mayor-
city administrator-aldermen form of government.  The City is broken into 
three wards with two aldermen elected from each ward.  The City is a point 
of sale City, which relies on sales taxes for a significant portion of its general 
fund revenue.  The City has had a general revenue fund deficit in four of the 
past five fiscal years (Chart 8.3). 
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The Contracting Decision 
In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the City of Rock Hill had a very tight, but 
balanced budget (Chart 8.4).  As a former City bureaucrat stated, the City was 
looking at the possibility of bankruptcy in the years before 2004 if the 
situation of tight budgets continued and expenditures continued to grow.  As 
a dire financial situation griped the City, leaders began to examine all services 
in an effort to cut expenditures in anticipation of the 2004 fiscal year (personal 
interview, July 8, 2015). 
Part of the dire financial situation in the City was caused by a push to 
construct a civic center expected to cost over ten million dollars.  The effort 
was spearheaded by then Mayor Robert Salamone.  A large part of the City’s 
reserve funds were expended to finance the initial planning stages of the civic 
center.  The City had also failed to attract a Wal-Mart store, which would 
have bolstered tax revenue. 
The examination of City departments included the twelve-man police 
department.  In 2004, the median Rock Hill police officer salary was $48,250.  
As a cost saving measure, police contracting was discussed.  Rock Hill did not 
examine a change to police services because of unprofessionalism or 
corruption.  Rather, the police were simply another City department that 
needed examination in a larger effort to reduce expenditures. 
City leaders initially approached the St. Louis County Police as part of 
their review.  The County was asked to develop a plan to police the City and 
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determine the associated costs.  One former City bureaucrat stated the 
County prepared a good proposal. 
In May of 2004, news broke that the City was examining the possibility 
of police contracting.  Reactions to the possibility of contracting police 
services were overwhelmingly negative.  David Arnold, a resident was 
quoted, “how can we build a civic center if we can’t pay for our police” 
(Sparks 2004)?  Other residents defended the Rock Hill Police believing 
outside police agencies would not be as effective.  Another resident, Tim 
Sheahan was quoted, “our police know who the bad guys are and they know 
what’s going on” (Sparks 2004).  Rumors were also circulating that contracted 
police services would result in increased police response times and decreased 
police presence and proactive patrols. 
Despite the support for the police department, City leaders, 
particularly Don Cary, the City Finance Director, argued the City had to 
examine expenses because of the dire financial situation.  On May 26, 2004, 
the City held a special meeting to discuss the proposed changes.  At the 
meeting the financial situation was discussed.  Cary believed the City would 
face a deficit budget by fiscal year 2007 if changes were not made.  It was 
estimated that contracting police services from the County would save an 
average of $300,000 annually.  The County police proposed assigning a 
lieutenant to oversee the municipality and five patrol cars. 
One former City bureaucrat recalled a Rock Hill police officer standing 
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in the back of a meeting in which contracting was discussed.  The officer 
stood at the back of the meeting holding an infant telling the residents he was 
going to lose his job leading to an inability to care for his child (personal 
interview, July 8, 2015). 
The pressure against contracting was too great, which led the Council 
to back down.  Instead of contracting, the Police Department agreed to 
pursue cost cutting measures.  The Council also agreed to allow a buyout of 
long term employees. 
Following the Decision Not to Contract Out 
In the years following the contracting discussion, the City’s general 
fund revenues outpaced general fund expenditures (Chart 8.4).  The 
percentage of general fund expenditures dedicated to the police department 
fell from 32% in fiscal year 2004 to 26% in fiscal year 2006.  The proposed 
convention center was not completed. 
One interviewee stated that many residents felt Mayor Salamone 
attempted to ruin the City of Rock Hill (personal interview, May 12, 2015).  
After leaving office, Salamone faced corruption charges for receiving kick 
backs from a pension fund company that took over service to the City during 
Salamone’s tenure.  
In the ten years since the decision not to contract, the per capita crime 
rate has remained relatively study.  The per capita crime rate for Rock Hill 
has remained lower than that of St. Louis County (Chart 8.5). 
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The Rock Hill Policy Process 
Rock Hill discussed contracting police services from the County, but 
did not actually contract.  The Rock Hill case supports the hypotheses 
through negative findings.  Rock Hill had a focusing event, but it did not 
concern the Police Department.  The image and venue of the Police 
Department did not change.  Throughout the contracting discussions the 
professional abilities of the Police Department were not questioned.  
Historical references and interviewees failed to provide an adequate picture 
of Rock Hills’ police style.  Therefore, the third hypothesis concerning police 
styles could not be satisfactorily answered. 
Focusing Event 
In Rock Hill, a specific incident did not focus attention on the police 
department.  Rather, budget constraints created a focusing event surrounding 
the City’s budget and future fiscal position.  The focusing event was a catalyst 
to reexamine service provision and the civic center backed by the Mayor. 
Focusing events do not occur in a vacuum, they must have 
accompaniment.  Unlike the successful contracting examples, the focusing 
event did not specifically center upon the Police Department and lacked 
accompanying concerns or issues related to the Department.  In Rock Hill, 
residents and leaders did not have a preexisting perception of a problem 
related to the Police Department.  As one former County police leader stated, 
Rock Hill, provided a quality police service (personal interview, May 21, 
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2015).  Residents could not accept a solely budgetary rationale for disbanding 
local police control. 
Budgetary concerns can constrain policy and promote policy (Kingdon 
1995, 106).  In the case of Rock Hill, budgetary concerns promoted a policy 
discussion concerning police contracting.  Rock Hill’s focusing event included 
the Police Department, but was not defined by the Police Department.  In this 
instance, the focusing event drew attention to the proposed civic center.  
Citizens were not willing to exchange municipal services for a civic center.  
The focusing event also caused City leaders to reduce expenditures in 
individual departments. 
Change in Image and Venue 
The period leading up to Rock Hill’s contracting discussions was not a 
period of instability.  The image and venue of the Police Department was 
stable throughout the contracting discussion period. 
Rock Hill lacked a change in both image and venue during the 
discussion of police contracting.  Negative information regarding the police 
department was not revealed during the contracting discussion.  The image 
of the police department as a good service provider was not shaken.   
Unlike other municipalities, Rock Hill lacked a change in actors during 
the contracting discussions.  The County was not called in to oversee or audit 
the police department.  A new mayor or city administrator did not enter the 
picture advocating a change to police services. 
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Conclusion 
Elected Rock Hill leaders wanted to build a civic center during a time 
when bureaucrats were forecasting a dire fiscal position for the future of the 
City.  City leaders began to consider options to cut expenditures, which led to 
a discussion of the possibility of contracting police services from St. Louis 
County.  The focusing of attention to contracting was not precipitated out of a 
police issue.  The venue and image surrounding the police department was 
stable and there were no changes to either.  Residents did not support the 
civic center plan and did not support police contracting.  City leaders were 
able to take actions to cut expenditures and the civic center was not 
constructed.  In the end, the Rock Hill Police Department was maintained. 
  
	 122	
Chapter 9 
Non-Contract Municipality: Hazelwood 
Of the municipalities studied, Hazelwood has the largest population 
and land area.  The City was one of the rash of municipal incorporations in 
the late forties and early fifties, incorporating in the year 1949.  The City is 
located in north St. Louis County covering a little over sixteen square miles.  
Since incorporating, the City has grown in size and population.  In the 1950 
census, the population numbered 336 and had grown to 25,703 in the 2010 
census (Chart 9.1) (United States Department of Commerce 1943 and 2012).  
In the past thirty years, Hazelwood has seen a demographic shift, but not to 
the extent of Jennings and Dellwood.  The City’s population was 87% white 
during the 1980 census and 64% white in the 2010 census (Chart 9.2) (United 
States Department of Commerce 1982 and 2012). 
Hazelwood is a home rule city, which means the City has drafted and 
adopted a charter outlining a structure of government specific to the City.  
Hazelwood operates under the council-manager plan of governance.  In the 
council-manager form of governance, cities employ a professionally trained 
administrator to manage the day to day operation of the City.  A weak mayor 
primarily serves as the political leader of the city, but lacks administrative 
authority. 
Like Fenton, Hazelwood is a point-of-sale City that also participates in 
the County’s sales tax pool in areas incorporated after 1983.  In the last five 
fiscal years, the budgeted general fund revenue has averaged over thirty 
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million dollars while general fund expenditures have averaged a little over 
twenty-four million dollars.  Revenues outpaced expenditures every year 
(Chart 9.3). 
The Contracting Discussion 
In 1948, the St. Louis Ford automobile plant moved to Hazelwood, by 
2002, the plant employed more than 2,600 workers (Gillerman and 
Schlinkman 2002).  In 2002, Ford was facing declining profits.  The company, 
announced that the Hazelwood plant faced closure.  The possibility of losing 
revenue associated with the plant caused City leaders to discuss potential cost 
saving measures.  One of those measures, was a consideration to contract 
police services from the St. Louis County Police. 
The potential economic impact of losing the Ford plant could have 
significant consequences on the City’s budget.  If the Ford plant closed, the 
City faced a potential decrease in revenue of twenty percent (Gillerman and 
Schlinkman 2002). 
In anticipation of losing revenue, the City obtained a proposal for 
police services from the St. Louis County Police.  A former City leader 
recalled two council members wanted to explore the idea of contracting 
police services.  These two council members thought the discussion could 
occur out of the public forum.  The City Manager was asked to explore 
contracting options (personal interview, November 20, 2015).  One former 
County police administrator recalled Hazelwood Police Chief Carl Wolfe 
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made the initial inquiry regarding a potential contract (personal interview, 
January 10, 2015).  Initial news the of proposal was circulated in an 
anonymous e-mail.  The anonymous e-mail caused the City’s Communication 
Manger, Deb Faber, to confirm that a proposal was received, but any 
decisions on disbanding the Police Department would require significant 
discussion and that the discussions would be rooted in the budget (Posorske 
2002). 
On May 14, 2002, County Police Lieutenant Ken Cox presented the 
County’s proposal to police Hazelwood to the City Council.  The County 
proposed a $3.6 million contract to provide police services.  The County’s 
proposal was significantly less than the $5.6 million Hazelwood was 
spending on police services.  During the meeting, Mayor Carr made it clear 
that the meeting was simply an information session (Harris 2002). 
News of a potential police contract did not sit well with members of 
the community or members of the police department.  A campaign was 
started to save the department and dubbed a “Blue Ribbon Campaign” 
because community and police members were asked to wear blue ribbons to 
City Council meetings to show support for the Police Department.  Members 
of the Police Department also began touting the professionalism of the 
department.  Russ Craven, a police officer, was quoted as saying, “The 
Hazelwood Police Department is one of the most respected, professional and 
progressive police departments in the region” (“Hazelwood police officers 
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rally to save department” 2002). 
On May 15, 2002, over five hundred residents showed up at a meeting 
of the City Council.  The Council rejected the County’s policing proposal.  In 
response, Mayor Carr noted that the proposal was not a formal action item 
and expressed contentment that the residents would support a revenue 
increase (Harris and Porsorske 2002).  A former City leader stated that the 
cost savings from a County contract would have been marginal if Hazelwood 
was to maintain the same level of police services that were provided 
internally.  However, the City would not have known if a County police 
contract was a viable option without exploring the matter (personal 
interview, November 20, 2015). 
While the County’s proposal to provide police services was rejected, 
City leaders were still concerned about the impending plant closure and the 
possible loss of revenue.  In the City Manager’s fiscal year 2003 budget 
proposal, the news of the Ford plant closure loomed large.  In the budget 
prepared for fiscal year 2003, department heads cut $1.2 million from their 
operating budgets.  As part of the cuts, five vacant full-time employees were 
cut.  Two of those cuts came from the Police Department (City of Hazelwood 
2002). 
One former County police administrator believed that Hazelwood 
used the County.  The County prepared a patrol plan for the City as part of its 
proposal.  The former administrator believed Hazelwood simply took the 
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plan and used it as a blueprint and implemented the suggested changes in an 
effort to save money (personal interview, January 10, 2015). 
One former City leader believed that the people of Hazelwood had a 
deep conviction that municipalities should provide their own police service.  
This leader pointed to Hazelwood’s annexation efforts in the nineties.  During 
those annexation efforts, Hazelwood leaders had Hazelwood police officers 
patrol areas that were to be annexed.  Residents in soon to be annexed areas 
began to see Hazelwood police with greater frequency than they had seen 
County police.  At that time, flyers were produced touting the superiority of 
public services provided by the City.  The policing efforts demonstrated by 
the City during the annexation discussions resulted in a service standard 
citizens expected.  Unincorporated citizens, who were later annexed, wanted 
to be served by the Hazelwood police because they could recall lackluster 
service by the County police (personal interview, November 20, 2015). 
In 2006, the Ford plant closed.  Hazelwood still maintains its own 
Police Department, which is staffed by sixty-nine officers.  In the last ten 
years, the per capita crime rate in Hazelwood has been slightly higher than 
the rest of St. Louis County (Chart 9.4). 
The Hazelwood Policy Process and the Service Style 
Hazelwood’s contracting discussion resembled Rock Hill’s because 
both City’s examined police service options in the face of a budget crisis.  The 
Hazelwood case is also supportive of the hypotheses.  Hazelwood lacked a 
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focusing event specific to the police department and a change in image and 
venue.  The Police Department displayed characteristics closely associated 
with the service style.   
Focusing Event 
Hazelwood’s focusing event was the announcement that the Ford 
plant would close by mid-decade.  This event, focused the attention of City 
leaders on budgetary matters.  The City’s concerns regarding the budget 
focused attention on all City departments, to include the Police Department, 
but a focusing event specific to the Police Department did not exist. 
Budgetary concerns in Hazelwood also acted as policy promoter, 
which caused the possibility of police contracting to rise higher on the 
agenda.  The impending closure of the Ford plant and the conjoined budget 
issues also promoted other agenda items, such as an effort by City leaders to 
find alternative revenue streams.  City leaders also advocated Ford to 
continue production in the City. 
Change in Image and Venue 
The views of residents and City leaders regarding the Police 
Department’s professionalism and effectiveness were positive and that view 
did not change.  As one former member of the County Police command staff 
stated, the consensus was that the department did their job (personal 
interview, May 21, 2015).  Residents supported the Department and were 
willing to attend a City Council meeting to voice their support.  The 
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individuals responsible for policies surrounding the Police Department did 
not change.  The City did not see a change in leaders prior to the contracting 
discussion.  The Mayor had served since 2000 and the police chief had served 
for a little over fifteen years.  While the County Police prepared a contract 
proposal, the County was not asked to oversee or audit the existing municipal 
police services. 
Service Style 
The long tenured Police Chief had built a professional department.  
The Police Chief was a member of several professional policing organizations, 
including the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).  As one 
prior City leader stated, the Chief was highly respected and aggressive in 
establishing an effective police agency that excelled in community-oriented 
policing (personal interview, November 20, 2015).  The characteristics 
described by the former City leader are consistent with the service style of 
policing.  In the service style, a reform police chief implements a standardized 
set of procedures, focusing on serving the community through community 
policing methods.  In the service style, the police chief is responsive to the 
needs of the community.  The same City leader stated the Chief understood 
the needs of the police and the community and that he would ask the Council 
to provision the Police Department appropriately (personal interview, 
November 20, 2015). 
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Conclusion 
In the case of Hazelwood, all three hypotheses were supported.  The 
contracting discussion was born out of concern for future revenue projections 
related to the potential shuttering of the Ford plant.  A focusing event specific 
to the Police Department was lacking.  A change in venue and image was also 
lacking.  The Department also displayed characteristics associated with the 
service style of policing. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
St. Louis County is made-up of ninety municipalities that provide 
police services both internally and through contractual agreements.  The 
purpose of this work was to examine police contracting decisions under the 
lens of agenda setting and policy process theories.  To study the issue, five St. 
Louis County municipalities were examined.  It was hypothesized that 
successful contracting discussions would be preceded by a focusing event, a 
change in image and venue, and that a legalistic or watchman police 
department would be more likely to contract out than a department with a 
service style. 
Focusing Events 
Different types of focusing events preceded the contracting discussions 
in each municipality.  Focusing events surrounding problems with the police 
departments proceeded contracting in Fenton, Dellwood, and Jennings.  In 
Rock Hill and Hazelwood, focusing events proceeded the contracting 
discussions, but the events centered around budgetary issues, not the police. 
In Fenton, allegations of police misconduct presented a focusing event 
during a time in which City leaders sought to implement police reforms 
aimed to modernize the Police Department and increase professionalism.  In 
Jennings, two focusing events, one concerning corruptly gained grant funds 
and the other surrounding the misapplication of deadly force served as 
focusing events.  In Dellwood, the focusing event centered on unprofessional 
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conduct by the Dellwood Police Department, which was epitomized by 
lackluster case investigations. 
In Rock Hill and Hazelwood, the focusing event did not focus on the 
police.  Rock Hill’s budget issues were driven by proposals to build a civic 
center that would have depleted dwindling resources.  In Hazelwood, 
concerns of future deficits were fueled by the announcement the Ford plant 
was slated for closure. 
These findings suggest that focusing events are necessary for the topic 
of police contracting to make it to the agenda.  For contracting to succeed, the 
focusing event must focus attention on a problem or issue with the existing 
police service.  In instances where the focusing event raised police contracting 
to the agenda, but was not specific to the police, the agenda item failed to 
result in a police services contract.  
Change in Image and Venue 
A change in both image and venue were necessary for contracting to 
occur in the case studies.  Changes in image and venue result during periods 
of policy destabilization.  A change in image regarding the police provided a 
new tone in which to discuss and evaluate existing police services and 
alternatives.  A change in venue often brought other individuals into the 
discussion of policy issues surrounding the police. 
In contracting discussions that ultimately led to contracting, there was 
a change in image and venue with relation to the municipal police 
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department.  For example, in Fenton, one change in venue occurred when a 
new city marshal was elected.  A change in image occurred as the information 
was made public that called into question the quality and professionalism of 
the police department.  In both Jennings and Dellwood, one change of venue 
occurred when County police commanders were asked to oversee the existing 
police departments.  The image of the existing police agencies was also 
changed as information related to the quality and professionalism of the 
police department was made public.  Contracting discussions in Rock Hill 
and Hazelwood lacked a change in both image and venue.  
Police Styles 
Wilson’s police service styles were utilized to frame a discussion of 
police agencies and practices that operate on the margins of professional 
policing.  It was hypothesized that police agencies displaying characteristics 
associated with the legalistic and watchman styles of policing would have a 
higher likelihood of contracting. While an in-depth analysis of the policing 
culture and the accompanying style was not feasible for this analysis, an 
assessment of policing styles was made based on interviews and public 
documents.  The municipalities that contracted police services in this study 
displayed characteristics of unprofessional police behavior associated with 
the watchman style as framed by Wilson.  The dissolved agencies were often 
described as “good ‘ol boy” departments.  Discipline was uneven and 
standardized policies in procedures were either not in place or overlooked.  
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The agencies that were ultimately dissolved displayed characteristics of 
police agencies operating at the margins.  These practices often led to a 
disconnect between the community and the police. 
The municipal police departments that were dissolved in favor of 
contracted police services displayed characteristics of the watchman style, 
providing evidence in favor of the hypothesis.  However, given the absence of 
hard data on policing styles and the limited number of cases, more research 
would be needed to fully test this hypothesis. 
Policy Entrepreneurs 
 At the beginning of this research, the potential for policy entrepreneurs 
and their role in the policy process was overlooked.  While conducting 
interviews and research, it became clear that policy entrepreneurs did play a 
role in the policy process.  In at least two of the case studies, Dellwood and 
Jennings, the County Police acted as policy entrepreneurs.  Policy 
entrepreneurs invest resources into a problem in order to obtain a favorable 
outcome.  The County Police invested resources in the form of manpower, 
agency audits, and patrol plans during contracting discussions.  While the 
municipalities offered to reimburse the County’s expenses for the assignment 
of police commanders to oversee the Departments, the County had to shuffle 
manpower at the command staff level to cover the assignments. 
 County Police members became key actors in the policy process, 
particularly during audits of existing police departments.  As seen in the 
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cases of Dellwood and Jennings, the County Police audits resulted in negative 
press regarding the departments.  The introduction of the County Police also 
resulted in a change in venue because the County Police could influence local 
police policy and policy discussions surrounding the police.  The introduction 
of the County Police impacted both changes in venue and image. 
 Several interviewees pointed to respectable intentions by the County 
Police when it came to matters of contracting.  The motives of the County 
Police to engage in contractual police services were often described as a 
desire to provide a professional police service to municipal residents.  
However, as seen in several articles, citizens and some elected leaders have 
had concerns the County Police engage in “take-over” tactics during 
contracting discussions.  When the County Police act as policy entrepreneurs 
there is the possibility for a conflict of interest.  If the County Police can enter 
the policy fray, thus changing the venue, and release negative information 
about a department, changing the image, the County stands a better chance of 
receiving a police services contract.  The County therefore receives a benefit, 
even if it is as minuscule as an increase to the number of full-time employees 
allowed and an increase in the size of territory policed. 
Findings and the Rational Choice Theory 
 One of the criticisms of rational choice theory in Chapter 3 was that the 
theory could not fully explain police contracting decisions.  From the rational 
choice perspective, a municipality should contract police services if the 
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municipality would save money and increase efficiency.  While saving money 
and achieving greater efficiency did play a role in contracting decisions, these 
were not the only factors.  In cases where contracting could have saved 
money, such as Rock Hill, the municipality decided against contracting police 
services.  The rational choice perspective also assumes that participating 
institutions are unitary rational actors.  The participating institutions have a 
number of actors inside the institutions who are behind the scenes working 
their own agendas and policy levers to influence decisions.  These actors can 
drive the agenda, such as the introduction of policy entrepreneurs. 
 Feiock expanded the rational choice discussion to include matters of 
context in decisions to collaborate between governments, a few of those 
contextual factors are worth mentioning again in light of the research.  One of 
Feiock’s propositions was that characteristics with greater asset specificity are 
least likely to experience collaborative efforts.  Policing is asset specific 
because police officers are familiar with the territory in which they function.  
Citizen concerns about losing officers known to them were raised by citizens 
in all of the case studies. 
 Feiock also theorized that community characteristics and political 
structures would influence collaborative agreements.  Utilizing the data 
presented in Chapter 2, it was clear that several of these contextual factors did 
not matter in the case of police contracting in St. Louis County.  One of the 
contextual theories was that demographic homogeneity increased 
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collaborative agreements.  However, in St. Louis County many racially 
diverse municipalities contract police services (reference Table 2.5).  Another 
factor concerning political structure held that collaborative efforts would 
increase with professional management.  Yet, in St. Louis County, the 
majority of municipalities contracting police services are not professionally 
managed (reference Table 2.4). 
 The data and case studies suggest that rational calculations were not 
enough to ensure contracting decisions.  In both Rock Hill and Hazelwood 
contracting police services from the County could have decreased costs and 
increased efficiencies, yet these municipal police departments were retained.  
In Fenton the cost savings of contracting were publicized, yet the underlying 
causes of contracting were not rooted in cost savings and increased 
efficiencies.  In the cases presented, rational calculations related to costs and 
efficiencies were not sufficient to bring about the decision to contract.  In 
these cases, there also needed to be a change in image and venue. 
 Changes in image and venue occur in a specific space in time.  In the 
case studies presented, these changes were preceded by focusing events.  One 
of the purposes of this work was to examine how theories from the policy 
process literature could be applied to contracting decisions, particularly when 
rational choice theories seemed to fall short.  The majority of municipalities in 
St. Louis County do not contract police services.  In the County several 
municipalities with small populations, which most assuredly could increase 
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efficiencies, do not contract police services.  The case studies suggest that for 
contracting to occur there needs to be a perfect storm of events.  Kingdon 
describes this perfect storm of events as a policy window.  A policy window 
is only open for a short period of time and various actors must seize upon the 
opportunity for action on a specific agenda item.  Certainly, in the successful 
contracting decisions, various policy participants were able to come together.  
The need for these various events to occur and open a policy window 
indicates the possibility that inefficient and unprofessional municipal police 
agencies, that would benefit from contracting, will continue to exist. 
The Future of Policing in St. Louis County 
As discussed, the decision to contract police services does not always 
occur out of need or rational basis.  These contracting decisions need to be 
combined with other events.  The recent events and follow-up from the 
incident in Ferguson, are redefining and reshaping the policing landscape in 
St. Louis County.  The follow-up has consisted of inquiries and reports by the 
Department of Justice and the Ferguson Commission.  The Missouri State 
Legislature and the County Council have taken up the matter and passed 
legislation that seeks to reduce unprofessional practices within the criminal 
justice system in St. Louis County. 
 This work was started long before the events of Ferguson, but those 
events cannot be overlooked.  The hypotheses and conclusions of this work 
can be applied to post-Ferguson policing in St. Louis County.  Ferguson acted 
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as a County wide focusing event on both municipal policing and municipal 
court systems.  Issues of professional policing and an examination of 
alternatives to the status-quo St. Louis County municipal police system have 
long been discussed by those concerned with matters of policing.   However, 
Ferguson thrust matters of municipal policing onto the agenda causing not 
only those interested in police policies to examine the status-quo but others 
outside of the day to day policy process. 
 The issues that have been laid bare by Ferguson show municipal police 
agencies that operate at the margins of professionalism.  These agencies often 
display characteristics of the legalistic or watchman style of policing.  Police 
agencies operating at the margins are often joined by a larger criminal justice 
system in which prosecutors and municipal courts enforce laws with a heavy 
hand of fines, fees, and warrants.  Over-policing and the severity of court 
sentences are often targeted on outsiders and residents with low incomes. The 
ArchCity Defenders report summarized this concern, “Overall…stopping, 
charging and fining the poor and minorities…and by incarcerating people for 
the failure to pay fines…unintentionally push the poor further into poverty” 
(Harvey, et al., 2014).  The operation of police agencies that feed upon 
outsiders and residents with low incomes to increase revenues further 
increases poverty and decreases the quality of life for a certain segment of 
society. 
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There has been a shift in policy venue and image in relation to 
municipal police agencies in St. Louis County.  The venue was greatly 
expanded as the federal government, legislative bodies, government agencies, 
and an appointed commission all began to examine police services in St. 
Louis County.  The image of municipal police agencies was forever changed.  
Prior to Ferguson and immediately after, many small municipal police 
agencies still exist and many have not made the necessary changes to increase 
efficiency or professionalism.  Contracting police services does not always 
occur because of a rational need, which suggests that some incentive is 
necessary to professionalize police services. 
 Incentives and encouragement to change the status-quo of policing 
and the operations of municipal courts in St. Louis County has occurred in 
Senate Bill 5 and in recent County legislation.  Senate Bill 5 limited the 
amount of revenue a municipality could collect from traffic fines.  The Bill 
also limited fines and jail sentences and provided guidelines related to court 
costs.  Municipalities were also required to submit an annual report to the 
Missouri State Auditor detailing revenues from law enforcement actions.  
Senate Bill 5 was one post-Ferguson change by the Missouri legislature to 
upend the status-quo. 
 The St. Louis County Council, concerned about problems with 
professionalism in municipal police agencies in the County went beyond the 
Missouri legislature.  In December of 2015, the County Council approved a 
	 140	
measure requiring police departments in the County to meet a series of 
baseline standards.  The measure was supported by County Executive Steve 
Stenger.  Stenger stated that the measure’s main purpose was to ensure equal 
access to quality law enforcement across the County (Giegerich 2015).  
Departments were allowed six months to meet the standards set forth in the 
bill or face fines or a County takeover.  While the measure is currently being 
contested in court, it demonstrates the attention local leaders are giving to 
policing policies and the desire to change the business as usual attitude of 
policing in St. Louis County. 
 Outside of St. Louis County and Missouri, national attention has been 
turned to policing policies.  After Ferguson and several other high-profile 
events surrounding police in other parts of the county, President Barack 
Obama called together the “Task Force on 21st Century Policing” to examine 
issues of policing.  In May of 2015, the Task Force released its report, which 
featured six topics, or “pillars.”  Those six pillars were: (1) building trust and 
legitimacy, (2) policy and oversight, (3) technology and social media, (4) 
community policing and crime reduction, (5) training and education, and (6) 
officer wellness and safety.  Key recommendations concerned an emphasis on 
increasing peace officer training standards.  The group also recommended 
creating standards for hiring and education of police officers.  Another key 
finding of the group was to expand a database that maintained a list of 
decertified police officers in an effort to keep officers who had been 
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discharged due to a problem from becoming a police officer in another state 
or another department. 
 Ferguson has created an environment that has led to the opening of a 
policy window that is conducive to further contracting and collaborative 
efforts.  Based upon the findings of this study, future efforts of contracting 
and collaborative efforts are to be expected in St. Louis County.  A focusing 
event and changes to both image and venue have occurred. 
Limitations, Recommended Research, and Conclusion 
 The purpose of this work was to examine police contracting decisions 
in St. Louis County, specifically the drivers behind contracting discussions 
and decisions examined primarily under the lens of policy process theories.  
This study was limited to five case studies, which represent only a small 
sampling of municipalities in St. Louis County.  The findings are insightful 
and further our knowledge of contracting decisions and the policy process 
behind those decisions.  However, five case studies may not be representative 
of all the cases of municipal contracting or those instances in which a 
municipality would benefit from contracting. 
 The focus of this study was also specific to the St. Louis County 
experience.  St. Louis County is an extreme case of suburban fragmentation, 
with a large number of small municipalities.  The findings of this study may 
not be generalizable to other areas or metropolitan areas with larger suburbs.  
Due to the timing of this study and the focus on St. Louis County, the 
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majority of individuals contacted for an interview failed to respond or 
declined.  Several cited potential litigation issues surrounding contract 
decisions.  Others, felt that the timing of the study was suspect and 
questioned the integrity of any study focused on policing in the aftermath of 
Ferguson.  At least one potential interviewee cited a previous interview in 
which the interviewee’s words were inserted into an article that displayed 
bias (in the opinion of the potential interviewee). 
 Future research could certainly expand the foundation laid by this 
work.  Increasing the number of interviewees and the municipalities studied 
could produce a broader picture of contracting decisions in St. Louis County.  
A comparative study, utilizing examples from St. Louis County and other 
regions where contracting is prevalent (e.g. King County, Washington and 
Los Angeles County, California) could determine the generalizability of this 
study. 
 The three case studies of successful police contracts were limited to 
municipalities that have contracted with the St. Louis County Police.  Further 
research on municipalities that have only contracted with other municipal 
governments would be beneficial.  This research could compare and contrast 
the differences and rationale behind decisions to contract with another 
municipality versus the County.  
 Wilson’s policing styles were utilized to frame a discussion of police 
professionalism in this study.  Future studies could operationalize 
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professionalism through an in-depth analysis of policies and procedures for 
each department.  The policies and procedures of each case study, both before 
and after the contracting discussions, could be matched against national 
standards as outlined by the Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA).  Utilizing the standards recommended 
by CALEA, the departments could be rated on levels of professionalism 
based upon the existence of commonly accepted policies. 
 As the nature of policing in St. Louis County continues to evolve, 
future studies should be completed, perhaps utilizing techniques described 
above.  Future research could further an understanding of the evolution of 
policing in both America and in a highly fragmented metropolitan area after a 
metropolitan-wide focusing event.  Future research could also be expanded to 
the policy process.  Examining the policy streams and the policy window 
opened after Ferguson would be insightful to both the policy process and 
criminal justice arenas. 
 Despite the limitations of this study and areas for future research, this 
study has expanded an understanding of police contracting decisions and the 
ability to apply theories of the policy process to these decisions.  The rational 
choice models previously used to describe interjurisdictional agreements 
posited that the participating institutions are unitary rational actors that 
sought to reduce costs and increase efficiency.  Feiock built upon this 
foundation and proposed that context played an important role in 
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interjurisdictional agreements.  This study moved beyond that discussion, 
utilizing theories from the policy process literature, to demonstrate the 
importance of focusing events and the necessity for changes in image and 
venue for contracting to occur.  
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1 
Municipal Police Departments in St. Louis County 
Ballwin Eureka Overland 
Bel-Nor Ferguson Pacific 
Bel-Ridge Flordell Hills Pagedale 
Bella Villa Florissant Pine Lawn 
Bellefontaine Neighbors Frontenac Richmond Heights 
Berkeley Glendale Riverview 
Beverly Hills Hazelwood Rock Hill 
Breckenridge Hills Hillsdale St. Ann 
Brentwood Kinloch St. John 
Bridgeton Kirkwood Shrewsbury 
Calverton Park Ladue Sunset Hills 
Chesterfield Lakeshire Town & Country 
Clayton Manchester University City 
Country Club Hills Maplewood Velda City 
Crestwood Maryland Heights Vinita Park 
Creve Coeur Moline Acres Warson Woods 
Des Peres Normandy Webster Groves 
Edmundson Northwoods Woodson Terrace 
Ellisville Olivette  
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Table 2.2 
Municipalities Contracting Police Services in St. Louis County 
Municipality Police Service Provider 
Bellerive Normandy 
Black Jack St. Louis County 
Champ Maryland Heights 
Charlack Vinita Park (North County Police Coop.) 
Clarkson Valley St. Louis County 
Cool Valley Normandy 
Country Life Acres Town & Country 
Crystal Lake Park Frontenac 
Dellwood St. Louis County 
Fenton St. Louis County 
Glen Echo Park Normandy 
Grantwood Village St. Louis County 
Green Park St. Louis County 
Greendale Normandy 
Hanley Hills St. Louis County 
Huntleigh Frontenac 
Jennings St. Louis County 
Mackenzie Shrewsbury 
Marlborough St. Louis County 
Norwood Court St. Louis County 
Oakland Kirkwood 
Pasadena Hills St. Louis County 
Pasadena Park Normandy 
Sycamore Hills St. John 
Twin Oaks St. Louis County 
Uplands Park St. Louis County 
Valley Park St. Louis County 
Velda Village Hills Beverly Hills 
Vinita Terrace Vinita Park (North County Police Coop.) 
Wellston Vinita Park (North County Police Coop.) 
Westwood Frontenac 
Wilbur Park St. Louis County 
Wildwood St. Louis County 
Winchester St. Louis County 
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Table 2.3 
St. Louis County Municipalities by Size 
Smallest 30 Municipalities Middle 30 Municipalities Largest 30 Municipalities 
Municipality Contract* 
2010 
Population Municipality Contract* 
2010 
Population Municipality Contract* 
2010 
Population 
Champ 1 13 Lakeshire 0 1432 Olivette 0 7737 
Country Life Acres 1 74 Hillsdale 0 1478 Maplewood 0 8046 
Mackenzie 1 134 Bel-Nor 0 1499 Brentwood 0 8055 
Glen Echo Park 1 160 Winchester 1 1547 Des Peres 0 8373 
Bellerive 1 188 Vinita Park 0 1880 Sunset Hills 0 8496 
Vinita Terrace 1 277 Warson Woods 0 1962 Ladue 0 8521 
Westwood 1 278 Hanley Hills 1 2101 Richmond Heights 0 8603 
Kinloch 0 298 Marlborough 1 2179 Berkeley 0 8978 
Huntleigh 1 334 Wellston 1 2313 Ellisville 0 9133 
Twin Oaks 1 392 Moline Acres 0 2442 Eureka 0 10189 
Uplands Park 1 445 Green Park 1 2622 Town & Country 0 10815 
Crystal Lake Park 1 470 Clarkson Valley 1 2632 Bellefontaine Neighbors 0 10860 
Pasadena Park 1 470 Bel-Ridge 0 2737 Bridgeton 0 11550 
Wilbur Park 1 471 Riverview 0 2856 Crestwood 0 11912 
Beverly Hills 0 574 Pine Lawn 0 3275 Saint Ann 0 13020 
Greendale 1 651 Pagedale 0 3304 Jennings 1 14712 
Sycamore Hills 1 668 Frontenac 0 3482 Clayton 0 15939 
Bella Villa 0 729 Fenton 1 4022 Overland 0 16062 
Flordell Hills 0 822 Woodson Terrace 0 4063 Creve Coeur 0 17833 
Edmundson 0 834 Northwoods 0 4227 Manchester 0 18094 
Grantwood Village 1 863 Rock Hill 0 4635 Ferguson 0 21203 
Pasadena Hills 1 930 Breckenridge Hills 0 4746 Webster Groves 0 22995 
Norwood Court 1 959 Normandy 0 5008 Hazelwood 0 25703 
Velda Village Hills 1 1055 Dellwood 1 5025 Maryland Heights 0 27472 
Cool Valley 1 1196 Glendale 0 5925 Kirkwood 0 27540 
Country Club Hills 0 1274 Shrewsbury 0 6254 Ballwin 0 30404 
Calverton Park 0 1293 Saint John 0 6517 University City 0 35371 
Charlack 1 1363 Black Jack 1 6929 Wildwood 1 35517 
Oakland 1 1381 Valley Park 1 6942 Chesterfield 0 47484 
Velda City 0 1420 Pacific 0 7002 Florissant 0 52158 
Police Contracts 22 of 30 73% Police Contracts 10 of 30 33% Police Contracts 2 of 30 7% 
* 0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services 
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Table 2.4 
St. Louis County Municipalities by Professional Management 
Not Professionally Managed Professionally Managed 
Municipality Contract* Municipality Contract* Municipality Contract* 
Bel-Nor 0 Lakeshire 0 Ballwin 0 
Bel-Ridge 0 Mackenzie 1 Berkeley 0 
Bella Villa 0 Marlborough 1 Black Jack 1 
Bellefontaine 
Neighbors 0 Moline Acres 0 Brentwood 0 
Bellerive 1 Norwood Court 1 Charlack 1 
Beverly Hills 0 Oakland 1 Chesterfield 0 
Breckenridge Hills  0 Overland 0 Clayton 0 
Bridgeton 0 Pagedale 0 
Country Club 
Hills 0 
Calverton Park 0 Pasadena Hills 1 Crestwood 0 
Champ 1 Pasadena Park 1 Creve Coeur 0 
Clarkson Valley 1 Pine Lawn 0 Dellwood 1 
Cool Valley 1 Riverview 0 Des Peres 0 
Country Life Acres 1 Saint Ann 0 Ellisville 0 
Crystal Lake Park 1 Sunset Hills 0 Eureka 0 
Edmundson 0 Sycamore Hills 1 Fenton 1 
Flordell Hills 0 Twin Oaks 1 Ferguson 0 
Florissant 0 Uplands Park 1 Glendale 0 
Frontenac 0 Valley Park 1 Hazelwood 0 
Glen Echo Park 1 Velda City 0 Kirkwood 0 
Grantwood Village 1 
Velda Village 
Hills 1 Manchester 0 
Green Park 1 Vinita Park 0 Maplewood 0 
Greendale 1 Vinita Terrace 1 
Maryland 
Heights 0 
Hanley Hills 1 Warson Woods 0 Normandy 0 
Hillsdale 0 Wellston 1 Northwoods 0 
Huntleigh 1 Westwood 1 Olivette 0 
Jennings 1 Wilbur Park 1 Pacific 0 
Kinloch 0 
Woodson 
Terrace 0 
Richmond 
Heights 0 
Ladue 0 
  
Rock Hill 0 
Police Contracts 28 of 55 Saint John 0 
*0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services Shrewsbury 0 
    
Town & Country 0 
    University City 0 
    
Webster Groves 0 
    
Wildwood 1 
    
Winchester 1 
    
Police Contracts 6 of 35 
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Table 2.5 
St. Louis County Municipalities by Racial Diversity 
Predominantly Minority (<15% White) Diverse Predominantly White  (>85% White) 
Municipality Contract* % White^ Municipality Contract* % White^ Municipality Contract* % White^ 
Velda Village Hills 1 0.9 Black Jack 1 16.3 Chesterfield 0 86.5 
Pine Lawn 0 1.5 Dellwood 1 18 Brentwood 0 87.5 
Uplands Park 1 2 Normandy 0 21.3 Manchester 0 87.6 
Hillsdale 0 2.2 Vinita Terrace 1 22.7 Town & Country 0 87.8 
Wellston 1 2.4 Bellefontaine Neighbors 0 25.7 Pacific 0 88.4 
Velda City 0 3 Riverview 0 27 Ballwin 0 89.3 
Pagedale 0 3.4 Greendale 1 28 Kirkwood 0 89.4 
Kinloch 0 3.4 Pasadena Hills 1 28.1 Webster Groves 0 89.9 
Norwood Court 1 4.1 Ferguson 0 29.3 Frontenac 0 90.1 
Beverly Hills 0 4.2 Vinita Park 0 30.1 Shrewsbury 0 90.4 
Northwoods 0 4.3 Pasadena Park 1 35.1 Huntleigh 1 91.3 
Flordell Hills 0 5.8 Bel-Nor 0 48.7 Crystal Lake Park 1 91.5 
Moline Acres 0 6.3 University City 0 50.8 Ellisville 0 91.7 
Glen Echo Park 1 8.1 Calverton Park 0 53.4 Westwood 1 92.1 
Country Club Hills 0 8.2 Breckenridge Hills 0 53.5 Wildwood 1 92.2 
Jennings 1 8.5 Bellerive 1 54.8 Green Park 1 92.5 
Cool Valley 1 11.8 Charlack 1 55.8 Winchester 1 92.6 
Hanley Hills 1 12 Edmundson 0 56.4 Bella Villa 0 92.6 
Bel-Ridge 0 14.2 Olivette 0 60.9 Clarkson Valley 1 92.9 
Berkeley 0 14.3 Hazelwood 0 64.1 Lakeshire 0 93.7 
Police Contracts 8 of 20 40% Saint John 0 67.4 Crestwood 0 93.8 
  
  
Woodson Terrace 0 68.5 Sunset Hills 0 94.1 
  
  
Florissant 0 69.3 Des Peres 0 94.3 
  
  
Saint Ann 0 69.5 Eureka 0 94.9 
  
  
Rock Hill 0 70.6 Fenton 1 95.5 
  
  
Bridgeton 0 72.4 Ladue 0 95.5 
  
  
Maryland Heights 0 73.2 Country Life Acres 1 95.9 
  
  
Overland 0 73.3 Wilbur Park 1 96.2 
  
  
Maplewood 0 74.1 Oakland 1 96.2 
  
  
Clayton 0 78 Glendale 0 96.7 
  
  
Creve Coeur 0 79.9 Twin Oaks 1 97.4 
  
  
Marlborough 1 80 Warson Woods 0 97.9 
  
  
Richmond Heights 0 81.7 Grantwood Village 1 99 
  
  
Sycamore Hills 1 82.8 Mackenzie 1 99.3 
  
  
Valley Park 1 85.1 Champ 1 100 
  
  
Police Contracts 11 of 35 31% Police Contracts 15 of 35 43% 
*0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services  ^Source: 2010 US Census Bureau Statistics 
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Table 2.6 
St. Louis County Municipalities by Household Income 
Lower 1/3 in Household Income Middle 1/3 in Household Income Top 1/3 in Household Income 
Municipality Contract* 
Median 
Household 
Income^ Municipality Contract* 
Median 
Household 
Income^ Municipality Contract* 
Median 
Household 
Income^ 
Kinloch 0  $19,231  Lakeshire 0  $44,000  Kirkwood 0  $69,845  
Normandy 0  $21,183  Overland 0  $44,816  Olivette 0  $70,050  
Wellston 1  $23,836  Shrewsbury 0  $45,709  Manchester 0  $71,405  
Hillsdale 0  $23,958  Bella Villa 0  $47,969  Bel-Nor 0  $72,679  
Riverview 0  $25,885  Dellwood 1  $48,432  Webster Groves 0  $73,206  
Bel-Ridge 0  $26,404  Uplands Park 1  $49,063  Glen Echo Park 1  $76,875  
Marlborough 1  $27,150  Hazelwood 0  $49,355  Crystal Lake Park 1  $77,500  
Velda City 0  $29,250  Bellefontaine Neighbors 0  $49,549  Fenton 1  $78,074  
Pine Lawn 0  $29,570  Vinita Terrace 1  $49,659  Oakland 1  $78,929  
Pagedale 0  $29,767  University City 0  $50,099  Ballwin 0  $79,484  
Country Club Hills 0  $29,821  Florissant 0  $50,894  Pasadena Hills 1  $81,071  
Flordell Hills 0  $30,417  Pacific 0  $51,004  Clayton 0  $83,940  
Jennings 1  $30,656  Sycamore Hills 1  $52,000  Creve Coeur 0  $91,642  
Cool Valley 1  $31,389  Calverton Park 0  $52,222  Sunset Hills 0  $91,957  
Berkeley 0  $31,745  Greendale 1  $52,500  Eureka 0  $94,212  
Vinita Park 0  $32,065  Mackenzie 1  $53,750  Chesterfield 0  $96,367  
Breckenridge Hills 0  $32,312  Bridgeton 0  $53,879  Bellerive 1  $101,875  
Norwood Court 1  $33,113  Winchester 1  $54,464  Glendale 0  $102,237  
Velda Village Hills 1  $33,214  Black Jack 1  $54,903  Grantwood Village 1  $106,250  
Beverly Hills 0  $33,375  Pasadena Park 1  $54,907  Warson Woods 0  $110,156  
Maplewood 0  $35,067  Maryland Heights 0  $55,643  Wildwood 1  $113,737  
Hanley Hills 1  $35,496  Richmond Heights 0  $57,880  Des Peres 0  $117,431  
Edmundson 0  $36,827  Valley Park 1  $58,378  Champ 1  $120,694  
Ferguson 0  $36,928  Wilbur Park 1  $60,179  Town & Country 0  $135,900  
Moline Acres 0  $37,000  Crestwood 0  $62,860  Westwood 1  $144,167  
Woodson Terrace 0  $37,015  Green Park 1  $63,164  Frontenac 0  $147,917  
Charlack 1  $37,796  Rock Hill 0  $65,438  Ladue 0  $154,541  
Northwoods 0  $38,235  Brentwood 0  $65,950  Huntleigh 1  $173,750  
Saint Ann 0  $39,343  Twin Oaks 1  $66,429  Clarkson Valley 1  $186,875  
Saint John 0  $43,413  Ellisville 0  $67,944  Country Life Acres 1  $212,500  
Police Contracts 8 of 30 27% Police Contracts 13 of 30 43% Police Contracts 13 of 30 43% 
*0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services  ^2009 Median Household Income, Source: 2010 US Census Bureau Statistics; Not Adjusted for Inflation 
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Table 2.7 
St. Louis County Municipalities by Point of Sale vs. Pool Cities 
Point of Sale Cities Hybrid Cities Pool Cities 
Municipality Contract* Municipality Contract* Municipality Contract* Municipality Contract* 
Berkeley 0 Ballwin 0 Bel-Nor 0 Lakeshire 0 
Beverly Hills 0 Bridgeton 0 Bel-Ridge 0 Mackenzie 1 
Breckenridge Hills 0 Crestwood 0 Bella Villa 0 Maryland Heights 0 
Brentwood 0 Creve Coeur 0 Bellefontaine Neighbors 0 Moline Acres 0 
Clayton 0 Des Peres 0 Bellerive 1 Normandy 0 
Cool Valley 1 Ellisville 0 Black Jack 1 Northwoods 0 
Edmundson 0 Eureka 0 Calverton Park 0 Norwood Court 1 
Ferguson 0 Fenton 1 Champ 1 Oakland 1 
Frontenac 0 Hazelwood 0 Charlack 1 Pagedale 0 
Ladue 0 Kirkwood 0 Chesterfield 0 Pasadena Hills 1 
Maplewood 0 Manchester 0 Clarkson Valley 1 Pasadena Park 1 
Marlborough 1 Pacific 0 Country Club Hills 0 Pine Lawn 0 
Olivette 0 Sunset Hills 0 Country Life Acres 1 Riverview 0 
Overland 0 Town & Country 0 Crystal Lake Park 1 Saint John 0 
Richmond Heights 0 Twin Oaks 1 Dellwood 1 Sycamore Hills 1 
Rock Hill 0 Valley Park 1 Flordell Hills 0 University City 0 
Saint Ann 0 Police Contracts 3 of 16 Florissant 0 Uplands Park 1 
Shrewsbury 0 
  
Glen Echo Park 1 Velda City 0 
Warson Woods 0 
  
Glendale 0 Velda Village Hills 1 
Woodson Terrace 0 
  
Grantwood Village 1 Vinita Park 0 
Police Contracts 2 of 20 
  
Green Park 1 Vinita Terrace 1 
    
Greendale 1 Webster Groves 0 
    
Hanley Hills 1 Wellston 1 
    
Hillsdale 0 Westwood 1 
    
Huntleigh 1 Wilbur Park 1 
    
Jennings 1 Wildwood 1 
    
Kinloch 0 Winchester 1 
    
    Police Contracts 29 of 54 
*0 = Municipal Police Department, 1 = Contract Police Services 
 
	 152	
Charts 
 
 
 
50000
55000
60000
65000
70000
75000
80000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
To
ta
l	T
yp
e	
I	C
ri
m
es
Year
Source:	Missouri	State	Highway	Patrol,	Uniform	Crime	Reporting
Chart	2.1
Type	I	Crimes	St.	Louis	County	
2001	- 2014
	 153	 
$184.0
6	
$185.7
5	
$189.2
4	
$190.6
8	 $200.5
9	
$202.3
1	
$202.5
6	
$207.0
4	
$211.9
1	 $224.3
9	
$224.5
0	
$226.1
4	
$229.8
2	
$232.1
2	 $253.4
9	
$255.7
4	
$260.2
2	
$260.9
0	
$264.9
2	
$265.1
8	
$265.2
5	
$265.7
0	
$271.1
5	 $281.7
9	 $297.0
1	 $307.0
0	
$307.6
7	
$308.2
1	 $320.1
3	 $327.4
2	 $339.0
0	
$342.3
2	 $349.1
2	 $361.5
5	 $381.7
2	
$381.8
6	
$383.3
1	
$388.2
1	
$390.6
7	 $412.0
0	 $454.4
7	 $465.1
9	
$467.8
3	
$469.8
8	
$473.6
9	 $525.7
9	 $540.6
1	
$544.2
7	 $591.7
8	 $730.7
7	 $801.4
1	
$1,137
.79	
GLEN
DALE
MANC
HEST
ER
BALL
WIN
WEBS
TER	G
ROVE
S
NORT
HWOO
DS
CHES
TERF
IELD
BELL
EFON
TAIN
E	NEI
GHBO
RS
FLOR
ISSAN
T
ROCK
	HILL
LAKE
SHIRE BEL-R
IDGE
RIVER
VIEW
UNIV
ERSIT
Y	CIT
Y
CRES
TWOO
D
ELLIS
VILLE
BREC
KENR
IDGE	
HILLS FERG
USON
WARS
ON	W
OODS
SAINT
	JOHN BERK
ELEY
SAINT
	ANN
KIRK
WOOD PACIF
IC
BEL-N
OR
OVER
LAND
MOLI
NE	AC
RES
SUNS
ET	HI
LLS
HAZE
LWOO
D
SHRE
WSBU
RY
OLIVE
TTE EURE
KA
VELD
A	CIT
Y
HILLS
DALE
PAGE
DALE
WOOD
SON	T
ERRA
CE
CREV
E	COE
UR
CLAY
TON
MARY
LAND
	HEIG
HTS
TOWN
	&	CO
UNTR
Y
NORM
ANDY
CALV
ERTO
N	PAR
K
BRID
GETO
N
MAPL
EWOO
D
BELL
A	VIL
LA
BREN
TWOO
D
LADU
E
RICH
MOND
	HEIG
HTS
COUN
TRY	C
LUB	H
ILLS
PINE	
LAWN
DES	P
ERES
FRON
TENA
C
EDMU
NDSO
N
PER	CA
PITA	E
XPEND
ITURES
MUNICIPALITYSOURCE:	US	CENSUS	BUREAU	AND	BETTER	TOGETHER(NOT	ADJUSTED	FOR	INFLATION)
CHART	2.2	- 2015	PER	CAPITA	POLICE	EXPENDITURES
(AS	REPORTED	TO	BETTER	TOGETHER)	
	 154	  
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	5.1
City	of	Fenton	Population	1940-2010
	 155	  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1980 1990 2000 2010
Ra
ce
	P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	5.2
City	of	Fenton	Demographics	1980-2010
%	White%	Black%	Other	Races
	 156	  
$4,400,000.00	
$4,600,000.00	
$4,800,000.00	
$5,000,000.00	
$5,200,000.00	
$5,400,000.00	
$5,600,000.00	
$5,800,000.00	
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bu
dg
et
ed
	A
m
ou
nt
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Fenton
(Not	Adjusted	for	Inflation)
Chart	5.3
City	of	Fenton	Budget
Revenues	&	Expenditures,	FY's	2011-2015
RevenuesExpenditures
	 157	  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Pe
rc
en
t	o
f	G
en
er
al
	F
un
d	
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Fenton
Chart	5.4
City	of	Fenton	Budget
Percent	of	General	Expenditures	Dedicated	to	Police	
Serivces,	FY's	1993	- 1997
	 158	  
40%
41%
42%
43%
44%
45%
46%
47%
48%
49%
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pe
rc
en
t	o
f	G
en
er
al
	F
un
d	
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s	
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Fenton
Chart	5.5
City	of	Fenton	Budget
Percent	of	General	Expenditures	Dedicated	to	Police	
Services,	FY's	2011	- 2015
	 159	  
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pe
r	C
ap
ita
	C
ri
m
e
Year
Source:	Missouri	State	Highway	Patrol	and	St.	Louis	County
Chart	5.6
Per	Capita	Reported	UCR	Crime,	2004-2014
Fenton	and	St.	Louis	County
St.	Louis	CountyFenton
	 160	  
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	6.1
City	of	Jennings	Population	1950-2010
	 161	  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Ra
ce
	P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	6.2
City	of	Jennings	Demographics	1950-2010
%	White%	Black%	Other
	 162	  
$7,800,000.00	
$8,000,000.00	
$8,200,000.00	
$8,400,000.00	
$8,600,000.00	
$8,800,000.00	
$9,000,000.00	
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bu
dg
et
ed
	A
m
ou
nt
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Jennings
(Not	Adjusted	for	Inflation)
Chart	6.3	
City	of	Jennings	Budget
Revenues	&	Expenditures,	FY's	2011-2015
RevenuesExpenditures
	 163	  
29%30%
31%32%
33%34%
35%36%
37%38%
39%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pe
rc
en
t	o
f	G
en
er
al
	F
un
d	
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Jennings
Chart	6.4	
City	of	Jennings	Budget
Percent	of	General	Expenditures	Dedicated	to	Public	
Safety/Police	Services,	FY's	2009- 2015
	 164	  
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pe
r	C
ap
ita
	C
ri
m
e
Year
Source:	Missouri	State	Highway	Patrol	and	St.	Louis	County
Chart	6.5
Per	Capita	Reported	UCR	Crime,	2004-2014
Jennings	and	St.	Louis	County
St.	Louis	CountyJennings
	 165	  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	7.1
City	of	Dellwood	Population	1960-2010
	 166	 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Ra
ce
	P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	7.2
City	of	Dellwood	Demographics	1960-2010
%	White%	Black%	Other
	 167	  
$-
$500,000.00	
$1,000,000.00	
$1,500,000.00	
$2,000,000.00	
$2,500,000.00	
$3,000,000.00	
2011	Actuals 2012	Actuals 2013	Budget 2014	Budget 2015	Budget
Bu
dg
et
ed
/A
ct
ua
l	A
m
ou
nt
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Dellwood
(Not	Adjusted	for	Inflation)
Chart	7.3
City	of	Dellwood	Budget
Revenues	&	Expenditures,	FY's	2011-2015
RevenuesExpenditures
	 168	  
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pe
r	C
ap
ita
	C
ri
m
e
Year
Source:	Missouri	State	Highway	Patrol	and	St.	Louis	County
Chart	7.4	
Per	Capita	Reported	UCR	Crime,	2004-2014
Dellwood	and	St.	Louis	County
St.	Louis	CountyDellwood
	 169	  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	8.1
City	of	Rock	Hill	Population	1940-2010
	 170	
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Ra
ce
	P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	8.2
City	of	Rock	Hill	Demographics	1940-2010
%	White%	Black%	Other
	 171	  
$2,800,000.00	
$2,900,000.00	
$3,000,000.00	
$3,100,000.00	
$3,200,000.00	
$3,300,000.00	
$3,400,000.00	
$3,500,000.00	
$3,600,000.00	
$3,700,000.00	
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bu
dg
et
ed
	A
m
ou
nt
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Rock	Hill
(Not	Adjusted	for	Inflation)
Chart	8.3
City	of	Rock	Hill	Budget
Revenues	&	Expenditures,	FY's	2011-2015
RevenuesExpenditures
	 172	  
$2,000,000.00	
$2,500,000.00	
$3,000,000.00	
$3,500,000.00	
$4,000,000.00	
$4,500,000.00	
$5,000,000.00	
$5,500,000.00	
$6,000,000.00	
2002	Actual 2003	Budget 2004	Budget 2005	Budget 2006	Actual
Bu
dg
et
ed
/A
ct
ua
l		
Am
ou
nt
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Rock	Hill
(Not	Adjusted	for	Inflation)
Chart	8.4
City	of	Rock	Hill	Budget
Revenues	&	Expenditures,	FY's	2002-2006
RevenuesExpenditures
	 173	  
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pe
r	C
ap
ita
	C
ri
m
e
Year
Source:	Missouri	State	Highway	Patrol
Chart	8.5	Per	Capita	Reported	UCR	Crime,	2004-2014
Rock	Hill	and	St.	Louis	County
St.	Louis	CountyRock	Hill
	 174	  
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	9.1
City	of	Hazelwood	Population	1950-2010
	 175	  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Ra
ce
	P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Census	Year
Source:	US	Census	Bureau
Chart	9.2
City	of	Hazelwood	Demographics	1960-2010
%	White%	Black%	Other
	 176	  
$-
$5,000,000.00	
$10,000,000.00	
$15,000,000.00	
$20,000,000.00	
$25,000,000.00	
$30,000,000.00	
$35,000,000.00	
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bu
dg
et
ed
	A
m
ou
nt
Fiscal	Year
Source:	City	of	Hazelwood
(Not	Adjusted	for	Inflation)
Chart	9.3
City	of	Hazelwood	Budget
Revenues	&	Expenditures,	FY's	2011-2015
RevenuesExpenditures
	 177	  
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pe
r	C
ap
ita
	C
ri
m
e
Year
Source:	MIssouri	State	Highway	Patrol
Chart	9.4	
Per	Capita	Reported	UCR	Crime,	2004-2014
Hazelwood	and	St.	Louis	County
St.	Louis	CountyHazewlood
	 178	
References 
Andrew, Simon A.  2009. “Recent Developments in the Study of 
Interjurisdictional Agreements: An Overview and Assessment.”  State 
and Local Government Review.  41:133-142. 
Baumgartner, Frank R. And Bryan D. Jones.  2009.  Agendas and Instability in 
American Politics.  Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Bell, Kim, “Police Changeover: Hanley Hills Adopts County Protection 
Source,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 15 December, 1991. 
Bell, Kim, “Driver arrested, officer suspended after chase Stopped by police, 
woman drove off with baby; during ensuing chase, Jennings officer 
fired at car,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 7 January 2011, News Pg. A2. 
“Bel-Nor Will Continue to Provide Police Protection to Greendale,” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 22 April, 2004. 
Better Together.  2015.  Police Report #1: Regional Overview.  St. Louis, MO. 
Billingsly, Linda, “Fenton Police to be Audited,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 21 
December, 1991, Five Star Edition, News, Pg. 15B. 
Billingsly, Linda M., “Contract set for police protection; switch ok’d to 
County, from Town and Country,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch 29 
December, 1997, West Post, Pg. 1. 
Birmingham, Steve, “Police Cut; Contract set with County; trustees cite 
savings, increase in protection,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 18 August, 
1997, Zone South, Pg. 1. 
	 179	
“Board Approves Pact to Patrol Village,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 12 January, 
1989, News, Pg. 3. 
Boyles, Andrea S.  2015.  Race, Place, and Suburban Policing: Too Close for 
Comfort.  Oakland, California: University of California Press. 
Bradford, Colleen, “Fenton Settles Harassment Suits Against Ex-Officers,” St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, 27 June, 1996, Five Star Edition, News, Pg. 2B. 
Brierly, Allen B.  2004. “Issues of Scale and Transaction Costs.”  In City-
County Consolidation and Its Alternative: Reshaping the Local Government 
Landscape, eds. Jared B. Carr and Richard C. Feiock.  Armok: ME Sharp, 
55-86. 
Byers, Christine, “Dellwood evaluates policing proposition Ferguson’s offer 
‘is a very different proposal and not what we envisions…,’” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 12 January 2012, News, Pg. A3. 
Byers, Christine, “Jennings mayor, councilwoman raise concerns about 
contract with St. Louis County police,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, News, 
10 September 2015, Pg. A11. 
CALEA.  2014.  "St. Louis County Police Department."  CALEA Client 
Database.  http://www.calea.org/content/calea-client-database (4 
August 2014). 
Cambria, Nancy, “Police, firefighters in Jennings want higher salaries,” St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 March 2005, Five Star Edition, North Post, Pg. 2. 
Citizens Research Council of Michigan.  2005.  Catalog of Local Government 
	 180	
Services.  CRC Memorandum 1079 (September).  Livonia. 
City of Fenton.  1993.  Statement of Condition of the City of Fenton for Fiscal Year 
Ended December 31, 1993.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  1993.  1994 Proposed Budget.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  1994.  1995 Annual Budget.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  1995.  1996 Annual Budget.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  1996.  1997 Annual Budget.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  2010.  2011 Approved Budget.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  2011.  Approved Budget Fiscal Year 2012.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  2012.  Approved Budget Fiscal Year 2013.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  2013.  Annual Budget Fiscal Year 2014.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Fenton.  2014.  Annual Budget Fiscal Year 2015.  Fenton, MO. 
City of Hazelwood.  2001.  Budget: Fiscal Year 2001-2002.  Hazel wood, MO. 
City of Hazelwood 2002.  Proposed Budget: Fiscal Year 2002-2003.  Hazelwood, 
MO. 
City of Hazelwood.  2003.  Budget: Fiscal Year 2003-2004.  Hazelwood, MO. 
City of Hazelwood.  2010.  Budget 2010-2011.  Hazelwood, MO. 
City of Hazelwood.  2011.  Budget 2011-2012.  Hazelwood, MO. 
City of Hazelwood.  2012.  Budget 2012-2013.  Hazelwood, MO. 
City of Hazelwood.  2013.  Budget 2013-2014.  Hazelwood, MO. 
City of Hazelwood.  2014.  Budget 2014-2015.  Hazelwood, MO. 
City of Jennings.  2008.  Adopted Operating Budget Fiscal Year 2008 - 2009.  
	 181	
Jennings, MO. 
City of Jennings.  2009.  Adopted Operating Budget Fiscal Year 2009 - 2010.  
Jennings, MO. 
City of Jennings.  2010.  Adopted Operating Budget Fiscal Year 2010 - 2011.  
Jennings, MO. 
City of Jennings.  2011.  Adopted Operating Budget Fiscal Year 2011 - 2012.  
Jennings, MO. 
City of Jennings.  2012.  Adopted Operating Budget Fiscal Year 2012 - 2013.  
Jennings, MO. 
City of Jennings.  2013.  Adopted Operating Budget Fiscal Year 2013 - 2014.  
Jennings, MO. 
City of Jennings.  2014.  Adopted Operating Budget Fiscal Year 2014 - 2015.  
Jennings, MO. 
City of Jennings and St. Louis County, Missouri.  2011.  Police Service 
Agreement. 
City of Jennings and St. Louis County, Missouri.  2015.  First Amendment to 
Police Service Agreement. 
City of Rock Hill.  “History.” http://www.rockhillmo.net/History.aspx (2 
November 2015). 
Cox, Michelle M., “County Police Assume Duties; Northwoods Out,” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 12 September, 1996, Zone North, Pg. 1. 
Currier, Joel, “St. Louis County police begin Dellwood patrols Mayor declares 
	 182	
state of emergency as aldermanic fight rages on over dissolution of 
department, “St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 January 2012, Pg. A1. 
Davey, Monica and Frances Robles.  2014. “Darren Wilson Was Low-Profile 
Officer With Unsettled Early Days.” NYTimes, 24 August, 2014.  
http://nyti.ms/1mG6lo5 (16 October 2015).    
Feiock, Richard C.  2007. “Rational Choice and Regional Governance.”  
Journal of Urban Affairs.  29(1): 47-63. 
Feiock, Richard C.  2009. “Metropolitan Governance and Institutional 
Collective Action.”  Urban Affairs Review.  44: 356-377. 
Feiock, Richard C., Jill Tao, and Linda Johnson.  2004. “Institutional Collective 
Action: Social Capital and the Formation of Regional Partnerships.”  In 
Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. 
Richard C. Feiock.  Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
147-158. 
Ferguson Commission.  2015.  Forward through Ferguson: A Path Toward Racial 
Equality.  14 October 2015. 
Ferris, James M.  1986. “The Decision to Contract out: An Empirical 
Analysis.”  Urban Affairs Quarterly.  22(2)(December): 289-311. 
Fitzmaurice, Leo, “City Officials Hope 6th Time a Charm for Marshal Plan,” St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, 22 October 1992. 
Fitzmaurice, Leo, “County Police Patrol Fenton after Firing,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 25 May 1995, Five Star Edition, News, Pg. 1B. 
	 183	
Fitzmaurice, Leo, “Police Flap, State Audit Plays Roles in Mayoral Race,” St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, 23, March 1995, Five Star Edition, Zone South, Pg. 
1. 
Fowler, Lilly, “Jennings to put police contract now with county up for bids,” 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 September 2015, News, Pg. A4. 
Gayle, Lisha, “Bid to Raise Salary of Marshal Rejected,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 19 January 1989. 
Giegerich, Steve, “St. Louis County Council enacts police standards bill, 
setting up court challenge,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 01 December 2015. 
Gillerman, Margaret and Mark Schlinkmann, “Hazelwood plans to urge Ford 
to keep plant open; Mayor will join Governor on visit to headquarters, 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 17 January 2002, North Post, Pg. 1. 
“Grantwood Village will keep contract with County Police; we have ‘no 
complaints,’ says village board chairman,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 21 
June, 1999, South Post, Pg. 2. 
Hampel, Paul, “Cool Valley to dissolve police department,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 10 January 2013. 
Hamper, Paul, “Jennings hands county reins to its police force Mayor says 
DWI grant money was misappropriated,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1 
October 2010, news, pg. A1. 
Hardin, Russell.  1982.  Collective Action.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
	 184	
Harris, D. Paul, “County police propose to serve Hazelwood,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 15 May 2002, Metro, Pg. B2. 
Harris, D. Paul and Alex Posorske, “Police support makes difference; as 
audience cheers, Hazelwood council rejects takeover; tax hike may be 
needed,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 20 May 2002, North Post, Pg. 1. 
Harvey, Thomas, John McAnnar, Michael-John Voss, Megan Conn, Sean 
Janda, and Sophia Keskey.  2014.  ArchCity Defenders: Municipal Courts 
White Paper.  November.  03a5010.netsolhost.com/WordPress/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/ArchCity-Defenders-Municipal-Courts-
Whitepaper.pdf (August 23, 2015). 
“Hazelwood police officers rally to save department; City may turn over 
services to County,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 13 May 2002, North Post, 
Pg. 8. 
Hill, Richard Child.  1974. “Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality 
in the Metropolis.”  The American Political Science Review.  68(4):1557-
1568. 
Hirsch, Werner Z.  1964. “Local Versus Area wide Urban Government 
Services.”  National Tax Journal.  17(4) (December): 331-339. 
Hollinshed, Denise, “County takes over Jennings police force Captain gets 
temporary reins of department tainted by scandal,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 31 October 2010, Community Pg. B1. 
Howell-Moroney, Michael.  2008. “The Tiebout Hypothesis 50 Years Later: 
	 185	
Lessons and Lingering Challenges for Metropolitan Governance in the 
21st Century.”  Public Administration Review.  68(1):97-109. 
Hunt, Raymond G. And John M. Magenau.  1993.  Power and the Police Chief: 
An Institutional and Organizational Analysis.  Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications. 
Jamison, Judith Norvell and Richard Bigger.  1957. “Metropolitan 
Coordination in Los Angeles.”  Public Administration Review.  
17(Summer): 164-169. 
Jennings Historical Society.  “A Brief History of Jennings, Missouri.” 2014. 
http://jenningshistory.org/history.asp (October 14, 2015). 
Jimenez, Benedict S. And Rebecca Hendrick.  2010.  "Is Government 
Consolidation the Answer?"  State and Local Government Review.  
42(3):258-270. 
Jones, E. Terrence.  2000.  Fragmented by Design: Why St. Louis Has So Many 
Governments.  St. Louis, MO:Palmerston & Reed Publishing. 
Kavanagh, Ian and David Parker.  1999. “Managing the Contract: A 
Transaction Cost Analysis of Externalization.”  Local government 
Studies.  26(4): 1-22. 
Kingdon, John W.  1995.  Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.  New York: 
Harper Collins College Publishers. 
Leonnig, Carol D., Kimberly Kindy, and Joel Achenbach.  2014. “Darren 
Wilson’s first job was on a troubled police force disbanded by 
	 186	
authorities.”  The Washington Post.  23 August 2014.  
http://wpo.st/sZKh0 (16 October 2015). 
LeRoux, Kelly and Jered B. Carr.  2010. “Prospects for Centralizing Services in 
an Urban County: Evidence from Eight Self-Organized Networks of 
Local Public Services.”  Journal of Urban Affairs.  32(4): 449-470. 
Levy, Sterling, “Velda Village Hills votes to switch its police 
protection/Beverly Hills is dropped in favor of one-year contract with 
Northwoods,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 20 May, 2004. 
Lipsky, Michael.  1980.  Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in 
Public Services.  Russell Sage Foundation: New York. 
Little, Joan, “Valley Park votes to turn police duties over to County,” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 10 October, 1998, News, Pg. 18. 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.  2009.  Contract Law Enforcement 
Services.  January.  
http://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/uploads/CLESDocumen
t.pdf (June 1, 2014).  
Mehay, Stephen L.  1979. “Intergovernmental Contracting for Municipal 
Police Services: An Empirical Analysis.”  Land Economics 55(1): 59-72. 
“Metro Digest: News from around the region,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 June 
2007, Metro, Pg. C4. 
Miller, Gary J.  1981.  Cities by Contract.  Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Missouri State Highway Patrol.  Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Statistical 
	 187	
Query. 
https://www.mshp.dps.mo.gov/MSHPWeb/SAC/data_and_statistic
s_ucr_query_backup.html (July 13, 2014). 
Missouri Senate.  2015.  Senate Bill No. 5.  98th General Assembly.  July. 
http://www.seante.mo.gov/15info/pdf-bill/tat/SB5.pdf (August 24, 
2015). 
Moe, Terry M.  1984. “The New Economics of Organization.”  American 
Journal of Political Science.  28(4): 739-777. 
Moore, Doug, “New Police Officer Will Help City’s Force Protect Velda 
Village Hills,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 March, 1998, North Post, Pg. 1. 
Moore, Mark H. And Anthony A. Braga.  2003. “Measuring and Improving 
Police Performance: The Lessons of Comp stat and its progeny.”  
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management.  
26(3): 439-453. 
Morgan, David R. And Michael W. Hirlinger.  1991. “Intergovernmental 
Service Contracts: A Multivariate Explanation.”  Urban Affairs 
Quarterly.  27(1)(September): 128-144. 
Nelson, Michael A.  1997. “Municipal Government Approaches to Service 
Delivery: An Analysis from a Transactions Cost Perspective.”  
Economic Inquiry.  25(January): 82-96. 
O’Connell, Patrick M., “Jennings policing stirs concern Residents cite worries 
about switch to St. Louis County control, used decision,” St. Louis Post-
	 188	
Dispatch, 11 February 2011, News, Pg. A5. 
O’Connell, Patrick M., “County is hired to patrol Jennings Councilwoman has 
filed lawsuit to block action, which is to start March 12,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 1 March 2011, News, Pg. A2. 
Obituary of Guy L. Youngman.  2014.  St. Louis Post Dispatch, 10 August, 2014, 
Classified Advertising. 
Oliver, Dan, “$25,000 to Settle Sex-Misconduct Suit,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1 
April 1996, Five Star Edition, Zone South, Pg. 3. 
Oliver, Dan, “2 Police Officers Fired; One Alleges Politics Involved,” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 21 January, 1995, Five Star Edition, Zone South, Pg. 1. 
Ostrom, Elinor.  2005.  Understanding Institutional Diversity.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom, Elinor and Gordon Whitaker.  1973. “Does Local Community Control 
of Police Make a Difference?  Some Preliminary Findings.”  American 
Journal of Political Science.  17(1): 48-76. 
Ostrom, Elinor, Roger B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitaker.  1978. “Policing: Is 
There a System?”  In The Policy Cycle, eds. Judith V. May and Aaron B. 
Wildavsky.  Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications. 
Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren.  1961. “The 
Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical 
Inquiry.”  The American Political Science Review.  55(December): 831-842. 
Oakerson, Ronald J. and Roger B. Parks.  1988. “Citizen Voice and Public 
	 189	
Entrepreneurship: The Organizational Dynamic of a Complex 
Metropolitan County.”  Publius.  18(4): 91-112. 
Pachon, Harry P. And Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr.  “The Consolidation of Urban 
Public Services: A Focus on the Police.”  American Society for Public 
Administrations.  37(1): 38-47. 
Parks, Roger B. And Ronald J. Oakerson.  1993. “Comparative Metropolitan 
Organization: Service Production and Governance Structures in St. 
Louis (MO) and Allegheny County (PA).”  Publius.  23(1): 19-39. 
Porsorske, Alex, “Hazelwood begins considering budget options if Ford plant 
closes,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 6 May 2002, North Post, Pg. 1. 
Porsorske, Alex, “Velda Village Hills Officials are Shopping for Police Force; 
Beverly Hills now Patrols the Area,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 23 April, 
2001, North Post, Pg. 1. 
Ratcliffe, Heather and Trisha L. Howard, “Bad cops bounce from city to city,” 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 30 November, 2003. 
Ratcliffe, Heather and Trisha L. Howard, “The law in disorder,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 29 November, 2003. 
Ratcliffe, Heather and Trisha L. Howard, “Summary: The law in disorder – 
unequal protection,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 30, November, 2003. 
Rivas, Rebecca S., “Intimidation in Dellwood,” The St. Louis American, 22 
December 2011.  
http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/article_7f14f66e-
	 190	
2c3e-11e1-8bb4-001871e3ce6c.html (27 October 2015). 
Sparks, Glen, “Rock Hill Residents Question Funding Priorities,” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 24 May 2004, West Post, Pg. 1. 
St. Louis County.  2012. “Local Government.” St. Louis County Fact Book. 
https://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document 
Library/Maps and GIS/Fact Book/Fact Book/Fact Book 2007-
2012/LocalGovernment.pdf (6 January 2016). 
St. Louis County.  2011. “St. Louis County Population.”  St. Louis County Fact 
Book.  http://www5.stlouisco.com/plan/factbook/population.html 
(10 February 2012). 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2003.  Police Factsheet: 2003.  Saint Louis 
County, Missouri. 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2004.  Police Factsheet: 2003.  Saint Louis 
County, Missouri. 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2005.  Police Factsheet: 2003.  Saint Louis 
County, Missouri. 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2005.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/p
olice/Reports/05annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2006.  Police Factsheet: 2003.  Saint Louis 
County, Missouri. 
	 191	
St. Louis County Police Department.  2006.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/p
olice/Reports/06annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2007.  Police Factsheet: 2003.  Saint Louis 
County, Missouri. 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2007.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/p
olice/Reports/07Annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2008.  Police Factsheet: 2003.  Saint Louis 
County, Missouri. 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2008.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/p
olice/Reports/08annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2009.  Police Factsheet: 2003.  Saint Louis 
County, Missouri. 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2009.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/p
olice/Reports/09annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
	 192	
St. Louis County Police Department.  2010.  Police Factsheet: 2003.  Saint Louis 
County, Missouri. 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2010.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/p
olice/Reports/10Annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2011.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/p
olice/Reports/11Annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2012.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/p
olice/Reports/12Annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
St. Louis County Police Department.  2013.  St. Louis County Police Department 
Annual Report.  
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/document%20library/pol
ice/reports/13Annual.pdf (4 August 2014). 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch Editorial Board, “Balkan cops’ bad week our view: It’s 
taxpayers v. police jobs in north county municipalities,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 12 December, 2011, Editorial, Pg. A14.  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch Editorial Board, “Editorial: Tragedy highlights need 
	 193	
for police department consolidation,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 
January, 2014, Editorial. 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch Editorial Board, “Fenton Police Pulled off the Beat,” 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 May, 1995, Editorial, Pg. 6B. 
Sutin, Phil, “Voters will be asked to give up authority to elect marshal; plan 
for creating city of green park also to be on ballot,” St. Louis Post 
Dispatch, 9 February, 1995, Five Star Edition, Zone South, Pg. 1. 
Targovnik, Diane M., “Police Fired; Fenton Switches to County Force,” St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, Five Star Edition, News, Pg. 1B. 
Tiebout, Charles M.  1956.  “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.”  Journal of 
Political Economy.  64(5)(Oct.): 416-424. 
“Trustees Want More Time to Put Together New Budget,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 25 January, 1996, Zone North, Pg. 3. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  1943.  
Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940.  Washington, D.C. 
Department of Commerce. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  1952.  
A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the United States: Census of 
Population: 1950: Part 25 Missouri.  Washington, D.C. Department of 
Commerce. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  1961.  
The Eighteenth Decennial Census of the United States: Census of Population: 
	 194	
1960: Part 27 Missouri.  Washington, D.C. Department of Commerce. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  1973. 
1970 Census of Population: Part 27 Missouri.  Washington, D.C. 
Department of Commerce. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  1982.  
1980 Census of Population: Part 27 Missouri.  Washington, D.C. 
Department of Commerce. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  1993.  
1990 Census of Population and Housing: Missouri.  Washington, D.C. 
Department of Commerce. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  2003.  
2000 Census of Population and Housing: Missouri: 2000.  Washington, 
D.C. Department of Commerce. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  2012.  
Missouri: 2010: 2010 Census of Population and Housing.  Washington, 
D.C. Department of Commerce. 
United States Department of Commerce.  United States Census Bureau.  2014.  
State & County QuickFacts: St. Louis County, Missouri.  
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29189.html (16 August 
2014). 
United States Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division.  2015.  Investigation 
of the Ferguson Police Department. Washington, DC: Department of 
	 195	
Justice. 
Walker, Marlon A., “Dellwood officers sold evidence, audit says,” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch 26 January 2012, Pg. A3. 
Walker, Marlon A., “Dellwood ousts police chief; county officer oversees 
force,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch 30 November 2011, Pg. A9. 
Walker, Marlon A., “Dellwood residents back police At town hall meeting, 
they support keeping department amid calls for dissolving it,” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, 8 December 2011, Pg. A3. 
Walker, Marlon A., “Dellwood residents back police, They show support after 
city suggested contracting with St. Louis County for coverage,” St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 November 2011, Pg. A7. 
Walker, Marlon A., “Handling of stalled cases in Dellwood stirs discord 
County audit finds pattern of delays in criminal charges; officials delay 
vote on Police Department future,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 27 February 
2012, Pg. A1. 
“West Post Briefs,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 2 October, 2000, West Post, Pg. 1. 
Williams, O.P.  1971.   Metropolitan Political Analysis.  New York: Free Press. 
Wilson, James Q.  1968.  Varieties of Police Behavior.  Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Wilson, James Q.  1993. “The Problem of Defining Agency Success.”  In 
Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System.  Washington, DC: 
US Department of Justice, 156-166. 
	 196	
Wilson, James Q. And George L. Kelling.  1982. “The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety.”  The Atlantic.  March: 29-38. 
